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HEGEL'S
DOCTRINE OF REFLECTION,

*BEING A PARAPHRASE AND A COMMENTARY INTER-
POLATED INTO THE TEXT OF THE SECOND
VOLUME OF HEGEL'S LARGER LOGIC,
TREATING OF "ESSENCE."*

BY
WILLIAM T. HARRIS,
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WILLIAM T. HARRIS,
1881.

TO

JAMES S. GARRLAND,

WITH WHOSE KIND ASSISTANCE THIS WORK

HAS BEEN COMPLETED,

I dedicate

THESE PAGES.

WILLIAM T. HARRIS.

TO THE READER.

This translation and paraphrase of the second volume of Hegel's larger Logic is herewith submitted to a small circle of students who sympathize with an attempt to interpret in English the subtle and fruitful thoughts of Hegel on the subject of the categories of Reflection—showing their genesis from the experience which the mind makes of the transitoriness of the world of sense-objects, and showing, at the same time, the limits of the validity of those categories. It is by no means a complete elaboration of the whole book—some parts being less than a fluent translation, and lacking commentary altogether, while others are believed to be fairly adequate. The translator's commentary is included in parentheses. The work was begun and continued under the auspices of the "Kant Club" of St. Louis, Missouri, and has been used as a hand-book by that club. The translator hopes to add, from time to time, more commentary to this volume, and has promised to write for it an introduction which will attempt to deduce the point of view for "Essence," from that of "Being," which Hegel treats in the first volume. A paraphrase of the third volume, treating of the Syllogism, Teleology in Nature, and the absolute Ideal of the World or the Personality of the Absolute—which Hegel discusses under the subjects of "Subjectivität," "Objectivität," and "Idee"—is in progress, and may be given to the same public that this volume reaches.

The reader will find it profitable to study these pages in connection with the exposition of "Essence" given in the smaller Logic of the Encyclopaedia of Hegel, as found in the elegant and exact rendering of Mr. Wallace of Oxford University.

It is needless to say that this book will in no wise supply the place of a continuation of the famous "Secret of Hegel" by Dr. Stirling, which gives a translation of, and an exhaustive commentary on, the greater part of the first volume of the larger Logic. This paraphrase undertakes a sort of auxiliary work that will be unnecessary when we receive the continuation of that work from its author.

May 1, 1881.

ESSENCE.

The truth (*i. e.*, the outcome) of being is essence.

Being is the immediate (*i. e.*, the first phase of things), since knowing ought to recognize the true, that which being is in and for itself, it does not stop with the first phase of things and its determinations (its belongings), but it transcends this with the assumption that behind this first phase (being) there is something else, something deeper than being, that which constitutes the background, the truth of being. This investigation is a process of mediating the knowing; for it does not find essence as something direct, a first phase, but it begins with something else, with being as a first phase, and has a preliminary way or road to travel, namely, to proceed beyond being, or rather to descend into it. First, upon collecting itself, returning within itself (*Erinnern*, re-collecting itself) from immediate being (first phase of things)—through this mediation, it finds essence. Language has in the verb *Seyn* (being) adopted for the past tense the word *gewesen* (been); (*Wesen* denotes essence); for *Wesen* (essence) is past being, but a timeless past.

This movement, represented as the progress of the activity of knowing, may appear as an activity that is merely subjective, external to being as such, and in no wise concerning its real nature; but this beginning from being, and this progress which cancels the same and arrives at essence as a mediated knowing, is an activity appertaining to being itself. It has been already demonstrated (in the first book of this logic) that it (being) re-collects itself (*erinnert*), and, through this return into itself, becomes essence. (Every form of being—every category thereof—presents some form of relation to the without or the beyond, which, when traced out, as it has been done by the author in Volume I., relates back to the beginning, thus resulting on every hand in the category of self-relation, which is essence.)

If, therefore, the absolute was defined on a former occasion as being (*Seyn*), now it is to be defined as essence. The scientific knowing (*Erkennen*) cannot on any account remain at the standpoint of the multiplicity of existences (the first phase of particular being,

Daseyn), nor any more at the standpoint of being (pure abstract being); it is impressed with the conviction that this pure being, the negation of everything finite, presupposes (implies) an activity of re-collection, which has, by abstraction, ascended from immediate particular existence to pure being. Being by this process has come to be defined as essence, as such a being from which everything definite and finite has been abstracted (removed by negation). Thus this being is a somewhat devoid of determination (particularity), a simple unity, from which everything definite has been removed by an external process (*i. e.*, by the abstract reflection of the thinker); to this unity, definiteness or particularity was already something foreign (external), and it remains as something standing over against it after this act of abstraction; for it has not been annulled absolutely, but only in relation to this unity (*i. e.*, the act of reflection has not discovered the nugatoriness in particular things—that is, their transitory nature—but in this analytic process of arriving at pure being it arbitrarily separates the determinations from being as a substrate, and holds them apart). It has already been mentioned above that if the pure essence is defined as the including comprehension of all realities (*Inbegriff aller Realitäten*), these realities underlie the nature of the determinateness and of the abstracting reflection, and this including comprehension reduces them to an empty simplicity. Essence is, according to this view, only a product, an artificial result. This external negation, which is abstraction, merely removes the determinateness of being from it, and what remains is essence; it merely places them somewhere else, and leaves them existing as before. According to such a view, essence would be neither in itself nor for itself (*i. e.*, neither an independent being nor a totality, but merely a phase of something else, or, what is worse, an arbitrary abstraction); it would depend on another—*i. e.*, on external, abstracting reflection; and it would be for another, namely, for the abstraction, and, besides this, for the particular existence which had been separated from it, and which remained over against it. Taken in this sense essence is, therefore, a dead, empty abstraction from all determinations.

Essence, however, as we find it here (as a result of the discussion of the categories of being), is what it is, not through an external act of negation (abstraction), but through its own negativity, the infinite movement of being (“infinite:” that is returning into itself, the categories of being have all been traced through relations to others, back into relations to themselves. Dependence always implies self-de-

pendence, which is independence; because that which depends has its being in another, and really depends on its own being in this other). It is being in and for itself (independent and total); absolute being in itself, since it is indifferent towards all determinateness of being (*i. e.*, towards all that belongs to the first phases of things), all other-being (dependence on others), and relation to another, is entirely annulled; it is, however, not merely this being in itself, for as such it would be only the abstraction of the pure essence; but it is likewise essentially being for itself (*i. e.*, a being which realizes itself in others dependent upon it — others which manifest it), it is itself the negative activity which performs for itself this cancelling of the other-being, dependence upon others, and the characteristics which it receives through others.

Essence as the perfect return of being into itself (*i. e.*, the first phase of things traced out through its relations into a totality, so that the whole stands in self-relation, is essence) is, at first, undefined, for the determinateness of being are cancelled in it; it contains them in itself — but not in a form in which they are explicitly stated. Absolute essence, in this simplicity, has no particularity (*Daseyn*). But it must pass over into particularity (*i. e.*, a correct apprehension of it will find particularity belonging to it); for it is being in and for itself — that is to say, it distinguishes the determinations which it contains in itself (for this is an active process whose negative relation to itself is an act of distinguishing), since it is a repulsion of itself from itself, or indifference towards itself, negative relation to itself, it posits itself in self-opposition, and is only infinite being for itself in so far as it is the unity of itself with this its difference. Essence is the absolute unity of Being within and for itself; its act of determining remains, therefore, wholly within this unity, and, therefore, is not a BECOMING, nor a TRANSITION, nor are its determinations something other (alien, foreign), nor are its relations directed to another; they are independent — but only thus while they are in their unity with each other. Since essence is in its first aspect simple negativity, the determinateness which it contains only in itself, in its sphere, is to be stated so as to give it its particularity, and its being for itself (its realization).

Essence is, in the entire compass of logic (that is, in relation to the other spheres), the same that quantity was in the sphere of being (quantity as related to quality and to mode). That is to say, essence is absolute indifference toward limits. Quantity is this indifference in its immediateness or first phase, and the limit as regards it is an

immediate external determinateness ; this passes over into quantum (*i. e.*, the particularity of quantity is through an entirely external or indifferent limit) ; the external limit is necessary to it, and exists in connection with it. On the contrary, determinateness does not exist over against essence, it is posited only through essence, not free, but only in relation to its unity. The negativity of essence is ~~reflection~~, and the determinations are all reflected, posited through Essence and remaining in it as cancelled.

Essence, in the logic, stands between Being and the Idea (*Begriff*), and constitutes the middle term, and its activity is the transition from being to the idea (from unconscious existence to conscious subjectivity). Essence is the being in and for itself, but this rather in the form of the being in itself; for its general characteristic is determined through the fact that it is the first phase after being, or the first negation of being. Its activity consists in this, that it posits negation or determination within itself, and through this gives itself particularity, and proceeds toward the state of infinite being for itself, which it is potentially. Thus it attains its particularity, which is identical with its nature, and through this becomes the idea. For the idea is the absolute, realizing its absoluteness in the particular determinations which manifest the internal nature or essence of things. The particularity, however, which essence creates, is not yet true particularity, such as it is in and for itself, but it is posited, or dependent on essence ; and therefore, to be carefully distinguished from the particularity of the idea.

The first phase of essence is appearance, or it is the activity of reflection. Secondly, it is a manifestation or phenomenon. Thirdly, it is self-revelation. Its activity, therefore, posits the following determinations : —

- 1st. As simple potential essence in its determinations within itself.
- 2d. As emerging into particularity, or into existence, or manifestation.

3d. As essence which is one with its manifestation, as actuality.

(The above is a very general statement of the standpoint and contents of this second book of the Logic. This book is the most original part of Hegel's Philosophy, formulating as it does the nature of reflection, and exploring its scope and the genesis of its categories. Hegel, in his general statements prefixed to his chapters, does not attempt to demonstrate anything or show the dialectic of its process, although his remarks are made in full view of the entire compass of the treatment which follows. The special treatment begins below with the caption, "Essential and Unessential.")

FIRST SECTION.

Essence as Reflection into Itself.

Essence comes from being (*i. e.*, a consideration of being finds essence as a necessary presupposition, the totality, the including process of which being is a phase); it is, therefore, not immediately in and for itself (independent), but a result of that movement (*i. e.*, the process in which being has been proved inadequate). In other words, essence, taken as something immediate (that is, as a first phase of things), would be a definite, particular existence (*bestimmtes Daseyn*) standing in opposition to another particular existence; it is, in fact, only an *essential* particular existence opposed to an *unessential* one. But essence, according to its true definition, is the in and for itself cancelled being (*i. e.*, being which has shown itself to be a first phase of an including process in which it loses its individuality and vanishes in other phases, the total process being the annulment of each particular phase, and, as such, the essence). It (essence) has only *appearance* opposed to it (*i. e.*, nothing independent or self-existing, nothing standing on an equality with essence, but only appearance, show, seeming). But appearance is the proper activity of essence manifesting itself (*das eigene Setzen des Wesens*).

Essence is, *in the first place*, reflection (*i. e.*, it offers, on first consideration, this phase of its activity). Reflection determines itself (*i. e.*, it particularizes itself, comes into the form of self-opposition). Its determinations are in the form of posited-being (*i. e.*, dependent phases resulting from a process which transcends them); a posited-being which is at the same time reflection into itself (completing itself to a totality, self-dependent); its determinations are —

Secondly, Reflected determinations, or essentialities (*i. e.*, total processes; these reflected determinations are phases of essence, having its form, that is of self-related determination, but each one is a special phase, while essence includes them all).

Thirdly, Essence, as the reflection of the determining activity into itself, becomes ground (cause or reason), and passes over into existence and phenomenon, or manifestation (N. B. — This “becom-

ing and passing over" of categories, is objective in the sense that it is demonstrated to be presupposed, as the necessity of things, but it is a becoming and passing-over from subjective illusion, or inadequate ideas, to true and adequate ideas of what must be in the nature of things.)

(The above is a mere recapitulation of the contents of this first section, and in no wise offered as a demonstration by the author. The following three chapters furnish the demonstration.)

FIRST CHAPTER.

Appearance.

Essence, conceived as a result from being—as the presupposition of the categories of being—seems, at first, to stand in opposition to being; in which case immediate being is regarded as the *unessential*.

But it is, secondly, something more than a mere "unessential," it is essence-less being, it is *appearance*.

Thirdly. This appearance is not something external to essence, outside of it, another to essence, but its (essence's) own appearance (or manifestation). The appearing of essence as a part of its own activity (*das Scheinen des Wesens in ihm selbst*), is *reflection*.

(This, likewise, is a recapitulation, but only of the present chapter.)

A.

The Essential and the Unessential.

Essence is cancelled or annulled (*aufgehobene*) being (see page 1 of this translation, explanatory of the general standpoint of this book. This paragraph is the first one in this book which is not a recapitulation of what follows it. It takes up the subject where it was left at the close of the first book of this logic, namely: at the doctrine of being. Here it attempts to seize the subject in its immediate or most obvious aspect—the first impressions of thought upon what is the true result of the investigation up to this point). It (essence) is simple identity (*Gleichheit*) with itself, but it is this, in so far as it is the negation of the entire sphere of being (or first phases of things). Essence has, therefore, immediateness opposed to it, as something from whence it has originated, and has proved itself abiding and persistent under the changes of the former (immediate being). Essence, itself, regarded in this aspect, is a being

also, an immediate essence, and the sphere of being opposed to it, is a negative, only in this relation to essence, and not otherwise; essence is, therefore, a particular negation. Being and essence, in this respect, stand in relation to each other as *somewhat* and *other*—a reappearance of those categories of being—for each possesses being, immediateness, indifference towards the other, and equal validity as regards being. (Evidently, a very inadequate notion of the true results of the investigation of the categories of being. Essence stands in relation to being, not as something else opposed to it, but as its truth, the totality of its process, in which particular phases—of being—appear and disappear).

But being, as standing in opposition to essence, according to this point of view, is the unessential; it is that which has been annulled, cancelled, shown to be a phase of a process. And in so far as this stands in relation to essence as another (co-ordinate), it prevents essence from being regarded properly, and reduces its concept to that of another particular being, an “essential” being.

The distinction between “essential” and “unessential,” therefore, is a distinction which treats of essence as though it were a category of being (and loses sight of the standpoint of essence altogether); for essence in this regard is an immediate somewhat, and, hence, only one as opposed to another, namely, to being. The sphere of being is presupposed by this mode of considering it, and what is called being in this relation is an independent somewhat, a further external determination to being, and conversely, what is called essence is also independent, but only as regards the other, and from a special point of view—in so far, therefore, as the phases of “essential” and “unessential” are discriminated in a being, this distinction is an external subjective one, one not affecting the being itself, a separation which falls in a third (*i. e.*, in the subject making the distinction, but not in the being thus separated into “essential” and “unessential”). It is left undetermined what belongs to the “essential,” or the “unessential;” it is some external mode of consideration (some subjective interest or point of view) which makes this distinction, and at one time looks upon the content as “essential” and, at another, as “unessential.”

More strictly considered, essence is reduced to the category of “essential,” as opposed to “unessential,” only when taken as cancelled being or particularity (*Daseyn*). Essence is in this manner regarded only as the first or the negation, which is determinateness, through, and by means of which, being becomes particular being (*Da-*

seyn), or particular being is opposed to "other" as "other." But essence, on the other hand, properly defined, is the absolute negativity of being (*i. e.*, it is not "another," to being, but the total process in which being is utterly swallowed up, and all of its phases annulled — nothing of it persisting, as opposed to the negativity of this process, which is essence); it (essence) is being itself, but not in the form of particulars, opposed to each other (*als ein Anderes bestimmt*), but as being, which has been annulled, not only as immediate being, but as immediate negation, that is, as such negation as is involved in the categories of otherness. Being, or particularity, persists consequently not as "another" — for essence exists — and that which (being) is still an immediate, to be distinguished from essence, is not merely an unessential being, but an immediate which is utterly nugatory, it is only a no-essence (*Unwesen*) — appearance.

B.

Apearance.

(1.) *Being is appearance.* The being of appearance consists only in the annulment (the being cancelled) of being — in its nugatoriness; this nugatoriness belongs to essence, and being is appearance in and through this nugatoriness, and, therefore, only in and through essence; it (appearance) is the negative posited as negative.

Appearance is the whole of what is left from the sphere of being; at first, however, it seems as though appearance still possessed a side, or a phase, of independence from essence — to be in some respect another to it. The "other" (as a category) contains two phases (*Momente*), particularity and its negation. The "unessential," since it does not possess being, possesses the phase of non-extantness, which belongs to the category of otherness. Appearance is this immediate negation of particular being, regarded as a being, and as only in relation to another, so that it possesses being through the fact that it negates particular being; the unessential is, therefore, a dependent somewhat, which exists only in its negation (through another). There remains for it, therefore, only the pure determinateness of immediateness (the form of it, without the substance), it is reflected immediateness: *i. e.*, an immediateness which is only by means of its negation, and which is, outside of this mediation, nothing else than the empty determination of immediateness of the negation of particular being. (Appearance has independence, or immediate validity, not as a mediate being — a somewhat — but through the negating ac-

tivity which annuls it. This annulling, or negating activity, which triumphs over the phase of being, is itself an immediate, and, in fact, is the true substance of each and every phase of being successively annulled by it; for each phase of being is the negation, or annullment of a relatively previous phase of being. Hegel, in this passage, calls attention to the nature of this immediateness, or independence, as arising from the activity of negation, which triumphs in reducing phases of being to appearances).¹

¹ Appearance is the "phenomenon" of the skeptics, or the "manifestation" of the Idealists—such an immediateness as is no somewhat, and no thing; in fact, no independent being at all, which would have existence outside of its relation to the subject beholding it, or outside of its apparent substance. *It exists*, is a predication which skepticism does not allow itself to make. Modern idealism does not allow itself to look upon knowledge as a knowing of the "thing in itself." The mentioned "appearance" is to have no foundation whatever of being, and the "knowledge" of this idealism is not to be able to attain to the "thing in itself." At the same time, however, skepticism attributes many determinations to its "appearance," or, rather, its "appearance" possesses the entire manifold wealth of the world for its content. ("Appearance" includes all objects of nature and history.) Likewise, the "phenomenon" of idealism includes the entire compass of these determinations. "Appearance" and "phenomenon" are thus conceived as manifold in their immediateness. It is true that there may be no being, no thing, or no "thing in itself," lying at the basis of this content; nevertheless, it remains for itself as it is (it manifests independence); it has only been transposed from being into appearance; and appearance possesses within itself those manifold determinations which are immediate existence, and opposed to each other (*i. e.*, the determinations of appearance have precisely the form of the determinations of being, according to the crude conception of this idealism). Appearance is, therefore, itself an immediate, particular somewhat. It may have this or that content; but whatever content it has is not something posited by it (*i. e.*, a result of its activity), but it has it immediately (*i. e.*, not as a result). The idealism of Leibnitz, Kant, or Fichte, has not transcended the category of being, nor its form of immediateness, any more than the other forms of idealism, or than skepticism (*i. e.*, they do not arrive at the concept of process or activity, as underlying immediate things). Skepticism admits the content of its "appearance," it finds it given as an immediate somewhat (not as a manifestation of an essence). The monad of Leibnitz evolves its own representations, but it is not the power which generates and combines these representations—they arise in it rather like bubbles; they are independent, indifferent toward each other, and likewise toward the monad itself. So, likewise, the Kantian "phenomenon" (*Erscheinung*) is a given content of perception, which presupposes affections—determinations of the subject—Independent, as regards each other, and as regards the subject (and hence, no manifestation of an essence). (The infinite occasion (*Anstoss*) of Fichtian idealism, it is true, may have no "thing in itself" at all for its basis, so that it may be a pure determinateness of the *ego*, but this determinateness is something independent of the *ego*, a limit of it, which the *ego* assimilates and deprives of its externality, and transcends, although it possesses a side of independence, which remains an immediate negation of the *ego* throughout the entire process).

(2.) Appearance, therefore, contains an immediate presupposition—a side of independence as regards essence. But it is impossible to show that appearance, if it is regarded as distinct from essence, is cancelled and returns into essence, (*i. e.*, that it is a phase of an including process); but the standpoint of being has been entirely annulled; appearance is nugatory in itself; it remains only to show that the determinations which distinguish it from essence, are in fact nothing but determinations of essence, and, moreover, that this determinateness of essence, which constitutes appearance, is annulled in essence itself.

It is the immediateness of non-being which constitutes appearance, (*i. e.*, the reality of appearance is the reality of the destructive process, a negative activity manifested in the change of things—things negated, rendered transitory, are mere appearance); this non-being however, is nothing else but the negativity of essence within itself. Being is non-being in the sphere of essence, (*i. e.*, immediateness is found only in connection with the negative or destructive phase of the activity of a process). Its nugatoriness is the negative nature of essence itself. But immediateness, or indifference (independence), which contains this non-being, is the absolute self-contained being (*Ansichseyn*), which belongs to essence. The negativity of essence is its identity with itself, or its simple immediateness and independence (*i. e.*, its negativity produces its identity etc., by the form of self-relation, as will be shown later on). Being is retained in essence in so far as the latter comes into identity with itself, through its infinite (*i. e.*, self-related) negativity; through this (in this phase) essence is, itself, being. Immediateness which, in the category of appearance has a determinateness opposed to essence, is, therefore, nothing else than the immediateness belonging to essence; but not the immediateness of particular existence, but the immediateness which is wholly mediated or reflected, namely, as found in the category of appearance. Being, therefore, as a phase of essence, is not being in its first phase, but only as a determinateness opposed to mediation; being has become a moment (*i. e.*, complemental element, or phase, of the process here called essence).

These two moments (phases), the negativity which takes on the form of persistence, and the being which is only a dependent determinateness (moment)—in other words, the self-existent negativity, and the reflected immediateness which constitute the elements of appearance, are, therefore, the elements of essence itself: it is not an appearance of being manifested in essence, nor an appearance of essence manifested in being—the appearance in essence is not

appearance of something else (than essence), but, it is appearance as such, the appearance of essence itself (*i. e.*, the elements of a process are continually vanishing and reappearing, not in and for themselves, but as manifestation of the power acting in the process). Appearance is the essence itself in the determinateness of being. Essence has appearance through the fact that it is determined (particularized), and through this has distinction from itself as absolute unity. But this particularity is likewise annulled. For essence is independent, that which mediates itself, being what it is through its negation; it is, therefore, the unity and identity of absolute negativity and immediateness. Negativity is the negativity in itself — is its relation to itself, and, consequently, it is immediateness (because a mediation which does not get beyond itself is no mediation, but is immediateness); but it is negative relation to itself, a negation that repels itself, and, therefore, this immediateness is a negative, or a particular opposed to it (*i. e.*, the process of self-determination involves identity — the relation of the same to the same — and difference, or the negation of the same by the same). But this determinateness is itself the absolute negativity, and this act of determination, which is, as active determination, the annulment of itself and, at the same time, return into itself.

Appearance is the negative which has a phase of being, but in another, viz: in its negation; it is dependence which is cancelled and nugatory. It is, therefore, the negative returning into itself, the dependent as dependent on the negative. This relation of the negative, or of dependence, to itself, is its immediateness; it is another than itself; it is its determinateness opposed to itself, or it is the negation opposed to the negative. But the negation opposed to the negative is a self-relating negativity, which is an absolute annulment of the determinateness itself. (Relation is negation, self-relation is self-negation, in the sense of self-determination; and this, as before shown, is both identity and difference.)

The determinateness, therefore, of essence, which is "appearance," is infinite (self-related) determinateness; it is only the negative directed against itself; it is, therefore, determinateness, which, as such, is independence and not determined through another (*i. e.*, not determinateness of another, but self-determination). Conversely, independence, as self-relating immediateness, is likewise simple determinateness and phase, and negativity only as relating to itself. This negativity, which is identical with immediateness, and the immediateness which is identical with negativity, is essence, (essence is the ac-

tivity of self-relation). Appearance is, therefore, the essence itself, but essence, in the phase of determinateness in which it manifests itself to itself (the activity of anything manifests its nature, and even the activity directed upon itself must manifest itself, though in the form of particularity).

In the sphere of being the non-being arises, as an immediate in opposition to the immediateness of being, and the truth (the unity) of these two immediates is becoming (transition is the only form of unity in which two immediates may be combined). In the sphere of essence we find, first, the categories of essential and unessential opposed to each other, and, next afterwards, the categories of essence and appearance; the unessential and appearance in these antitheses stand for what remains of the categories of being. But both, as well as the difference of essence from them, have no further independent validity than what is given them through the fact that essence is at first taken as an immediate somewhat (an utter misconception) not as it is in truth, namely, not as that immediateness which arises through pure mediation or absolute negativity, (*i. e.*, self-mediation, or self-negativity). That first form of immediateness is consequently only the determinateness of immediateness, (*i. e.*, only a phase of true immediateness, namely, the phase of self-relation, leaving out of sight the self-negation involved in it). The annulment of this determinateness of essence consists, therefore, only in this, that the unessential is shown to be only appearance, and that essential is shown to contain (as a negative process or activity) appearance in itself as its infinite (self-related) activity, which determines its immediateness as negativity, and its negativity as immediateness (its self-distinction being its identity, and its self-identity being through its negative relation to itself), and, therefore, in this activity is the manifestation of itself in itself. Essence in this its self-activity is reflection.

C.

Reflection

Appearance is the same as reflection; or rather it is the immediate phase of reflection. We use the word reflection, borrowed from the Latin language — for the category of appearance turned back into itself, and therewith estranged from its immediateness (a foreign word to express the category of self-estrangement, as the author suggests). Essence is reflection, the movement of becoming and transition which remains in itself; in which the different (the other) is defined as

appearance, as what is simply negative in itself (*i. e.*, not as an independent other). In the becoming of being, the determinateness of being lies at the basis, and becoming is a relation to another. The movement of reflection, on the contrary, involves otherness only as negation in itself, which has being only as a phase, the self-rélation of negation. Or, since this relation to itself is this negating of negation, the negation as negation is present as something which has its being in its being-negated (*i. e.*, appearance). Otherness is, therefore, in this place, not being with negation or limit, but negation with negation (the form of self-relation involves negation of negation, for relation is negation). The first which corresponds to this other, the immediate somewhat, or being, opposed to it, is only this identity of negation with itself, the negated negation, the absolute negativity. This identity with itself, or immediateness, is, therefore, not a first, a somewhat from which a beginning was made, and from which a transition into its negation was effected (as was the case in the categories of "somewhat" and "other" in the logic of being); nor is it an existent substrate which underlies the activity of reflection, but the immediateness is only this activity itself (*i. e.*, as before explained, the immediateness is a result of self-relation, sustained only through the persistence of the activity of self-negation, it is a phase, and the same phase as identity).

Becoming, in the sphere of essence, that is, its reflecting movement, is therefore, the movement from nothing to nothing, and through this a return into itself (*i. e.*, negation of negation is self-return). Transition, or becoming, annuls itself in its transition (*i. e.*, it sets out from itself but comes to itself, the *from* and the *to*, essential to becoming, are identical in the sphere of essence, hence transition and becoming are said to be annulled); the "other" to which a transition is made, is not a non-being, as it was in the logic of being, but it is the nothing of a nothing (negation of negation), and this negation of nothing is what constitutes its being. Being is only the movement from nothing to nothing in the sphere of essence, and essence does not have this movement in itself, but it is this movement as absolute appearance; pure negativity, which has nothing outside of it that negated it, but which negates only its negative self, and exists only in this activity of negation.

This pure absolute reflection which is the movement from nothing to nothing develops the following phases:

It is, first, positing reflection.

Secondly, it begins from a pre-supposed immediate and is, therefore, external reflection.

Thirdly, it cancels this presupposition, and since it presupposes in the very act of annulling presupposition, it is determining reflection.

(The foregoing paragraphs, commencing with "C," are in the nature of a general introduction to the subject of "Reflection," treating of its entire scope. The detailed treatment of this subject follows in the subdivisions, 1, 2, and 3, below. The first of which subdivisions begins properly with the results reached at the close of the discussion of Appearance, in Section B.)

1. Positing Reflection.

Appearance is the nugatory (negative), or devoid of essence, (*i.e.*, it has no persistence); but the nugatory, or devoid of essence, does not have its being in another in which it appears, but its being is its own identity with itself; this exchange or relation (*Wechsel*) of the negative with itself is defined as the absolute reflection of essence.

This self-relating negativity is, therefore, the negating of itself. It is, consequently, annulled negativity, so far as it is negativity at all. In other words it is the negative and the simply identity with itself, or immediateness. This, therefore, is involved in it, to be itself and not itself in one unity.

In the first place, reflection has been defined as the movement from nothing to nothing, and hence, as negation returning to itself. This act of returning to itself is nothing but simple identity with itself, immediateness. But this return is not transition of negation into identity — as though into another phase — but reflection is transition, as cancelling of transition; for it is immediate return of negation to itself. The first phase of this return to itself is identity with itself, or immediateness; but, secondly, this immediateness is the identity resulting from the negation of itself, consequently the negation of identity; immediateness, therefore, which is in itself negative and is the negative of itself — it is what it is not.

The relation of the negative to itself is, therefore, its return into itself; it is immediateness, as the cancelling of the negative; but it is immediateness only as this relation, or as a return out of a negative, consequently a self-cancelling immediateness (an immediateness which is a result, is a contradiction). This is posited-being (an immediateness which is a result) immediateness only as determinateness, or as self-reflecting (result of self-relation). This immediateness, which exists only as a return of the negative into itself, is that immediateness which has already been discussed as that which constitutes the determinateness of appearance, and that

from which the movement of reflection seemed to begin — (it would seem by all means necessary that an activity should act upon something — imply something, *i. e.*, an immediate, but in the realm of self-determination, of essence, of true being, we find that immediateness is only a phase, or result of the activity of self-relation, and not its substrate. Reflection is, therefore, the activity which, while it is the return, comes to be what it is, first, in the activity which begins or which returns (the beginning and the returning create the form whence the movement started!).

It (reflection) is positing in so far as it is immediateness as a return. There is, in fact, nothing else extant but the activity of reflection ; neither a somewhat from which it returned, nor to which it returned ; it is, therefore, nothing but return and thus the negative of itself, but besides this the immediateness is annulled negation, and cancelled return into itself. Reflection, as the annulment of the negative, is the annulment of its other, namely, of the immediateness. In the fact, therefore, that it is the immediateness as a return, a relating of the negative to itself, it is negation of the negative as negative. Consequently, it is the activity of presupposition. (Implying something already existent as its own condition ; this act of presupposition, here as a phase of self-relation is the second aspect of that activity ; while the positing is the first aspect of self-relation, namely, that in which the phase of identity, or immediateness, is seen as the result of the activity, on the other hand, the negativity of the relation produces self-opposition — difference ; this dualism, or antithesis, resulting from the negative aspect, is a presupposing activity, because its thought necessarily involves or implies a first phase against which the opposition is directed. The positing activity results in identity, in unity, in immediateness, in the annulment of all before and after — the utter collapse of all determination. The prepositing activity results in setting up an antithesis, a dualism, something dependent, something opposed to something else, a sharp distinction, or difference. In a word, contrast presupposes something immediate or self-identical, as the basis of distinction, and this activity of negation, acting upon itself, is just as effective in producing contrast as in producing identity). In other words, immediateness is as return only the negative of itself, the annulment of immediateness ; but reflection, in its activity, annuls the negative of itself, it comes into self-relation (N. B. the negative of reflection is immediateness) ; it therefore, cancels its positing, and since it is the annulment of positing, in the very activity of positing, it is presupposition (prepositing). In the activity of

presupposition, reflection turns the return into itself into the negative of itself, into that whose annulment is essence (N. B. the pre-supposing activity also involves the annulment of reflection, and the annulment of reflection is the annulment of the activity of the process called essence; and the annulment of presupposition is essence. It (this activity) is directed towards itself, but to itself as its negative, only in this aspect is it abiding, persistent, negativity relating to itself. Immediateness comes from no other source than return, and is that negative somewhat which is the beginning or substrate of appearance, which is negated through the return. The return of essence is, consequently, its repulsion from itself. In other words, reflection into itself is essentially the presupposition of that from which it is the return.)

It is the annulment of its identity with itself which constitutes the identity of essence with itself. It presupposes itself, and the annulment of this presupposition is itself; conversely, this annulment of its presupposition, is the presupposition itself. Reflection, therefore, finds an immediate already given, beyond which it proceeds, and from which it is the return. But this return is itself the very presupposition of the immediate which it found given. This presupposed immediate comes to be only through the fact that it is abandoned; its immediateness is the cancelled immediateness. The cancelled immediateness, conversely, is the return into itself, the arrival of essence at itself, the simple, self-identical being. This arrival at itself, consequently, is the annulment of itself, and the reflection which repels it from itself and presupposes it; and, on the other hand, its repulsion from itself is the arrival at itself.

The reflecting movement is, consequently, as here considered, to be taken as the absolute counter-impulse in itself—(a pure, self-repulsion, always in opposition to itself, its identity being the product of an activity which proceeds beyond itself into difference, and yet in this difference, or duality, finds again its identity, as shown in the text with some prolixity). For the presupposition of the return into itself, that from whence the essence proceeds and becomes essence through this act of return, is only in the return. The act of transcending the immediate, with which reflection begins, is rather itself a result of this transcending; and the transcending of the immediate is the arrival at the same. The movement turns itself round (inverts itself) as a forward progress, and is thereby self-movement (self-activity). Activity which proceeds from itself, in so far as the positing reflection, is the prepositing (presupposing), and,

likewise, the preposing reflection is precisely identical with the positing reflection.

Reflection is, therefore, itself and, at the same time, its non-being; and is only itself, while it is the negative of it, for only thus is the annulment of the negative at the same time the return to itself.

The immediateness which it presupposes as self-cancelling, is nothing else than the posited-being, the in-itself-annulled, which is not different from the return into itself, and, in fact, is just this return. But it is, at the same time, determined as negative, as immediately in opposition, and hence producing an antithesis of one and other within itself (self-opposition). Therefore, reflection is determined; it is—in-as-much as, according to this determinateness, it has a presupposition, and begins with an immediate opposed to it, as its other (found already extant)—*external reflection*.

(The above exposition has developed for us the insight into the ambiguity of reflection; all relation, when traced out, being found to be self-relation. Relation is transcendence, duality, a *from* and a *to*, negation; self-relation, while it bends back the procedure—outward to another, and directs it upon itself, differentiates itself, produces duality. Self-determination involves determiner and determined, active and passive, and, hence, difference from itself, within itself; the negation of itself cancels all otherness, and is pure identity; and yet it determines itself in the form of self-opposition, and is pure difference. The second of these phases, that of self-opposition, or difference, is that of external reflection, now to be considered.)

2. External Reflection.

Reflection, as absolute reflection, is the activity of essence in the phase of self-appearance, and presupposes only appearance, posited-being; it is as presupposing immediately the same as positing reflection. But the external, or real reflection, presupposes itself as annulled, as the negative of itself (reflection, it will be remembered, as self-return, produces identity, immediateness, as a result; this is positing reflection; the presupposing reflection implies identity, or immediateness, as a pre-existing condition; thus it is said to presuppose the positing reflection as annulled). It is in this aspect duplicated: in the first place, as presupposed, or reflection into itself, which is the immediate. Secondly, it is reflection, as relating negatively to itself, and thus to itself as its own non-being. (Thus what is really one activity with two aspects, may be seen as two entirely

different activities, independent of each other, and, in fact, the one succeeding the other in time. This is the *maya*, or illusion of external reflection.)

External reflection, therefore, presupposes a being, and this, too, not in the sense that its immediateness is a mere posited-being, or moment (as it really is, in the positing reflection), but rather, in the sense that this immediateness is the relation to itself (*i. e.*, independent—not a result of some antecedent activity), and the determinateness (produced by this presupposing activity, which is a negative, determining activity, directed against the immediateness, or identity, produced by the positing reflection), is looked upon only as moment (*i. e.*, as a modification of an already existent being). It (*i. e.*, external reflection) relates to its presupposition (*i. e.*, the result of the positing-reflection, viz: immediateness, identity), as though the latter were the negative of reflection (*i. e.*, an immediate which needs no antecedent reflecting activity to posit it), and yet this negative were cancelled as negative (*i. e.*, utterly indifferent to antecedent positing). (Again, in other words) Reflection in its positing, annuls immediately its positing, and hence has an immediate presupposition. It, therefore, finds the same already existent before it, as something with which it begins, and from which it commences the return into itself—the negating of this, its negative. But, the fact, that this presupposed is a negative, or posited, is not suspected by it. This determinateness (*i. e.*, “negative, or posited,”) belongs only to the positing reflection, but in the prepositing reflection it is cancelled (*i. e.*, the immediateness is not a posited, not a result). What the external reflection determines and posits on the immediate are, therefore, only external determinations (*i. e.*, external to the immediate, which is the result of the positing reflection). An example of this is the category of the infinite, as it is found in the logic of being; the finite is taken as a real somewhat, already existent before the infinite, and from which one begins as a basis for the infinite, to which he proceeds; and the infinite, in this connection, is a reflection into itself, standing in opposition to it (*i. e.*, the finite as the limited and particular, ought to be regarded as the dependent, as a phase merely, while the infinite should be the independent, the totality, including the finite as its phase. But the imperfect insight which thinks with the categories of being, looks upon the finite as one independent sphere, and the infinite as another, opposed to it. As here pointed out, the only distinction between them is that, in the finite the reflection into itself is annulled, while in the infinite, it is conceived as active. The imme-

dianess which results from the positing reflection, is regarded by external reflection as sundered from the positing activity, and as independent—this is the finite; the reflection, of self-relation, which results in pure identity, is the activity likewise sundered, by external reflection, and regarded as the infinite).

External reflection is the syllogism containing the two extremes, the immediate and the reflection into itself; the middle term is the relation of the two, the determined immediate conceived in such a manner, that the one part of it, viz., the immediateness, belongs exclusively to one extreme, and the other part, viz., the determinateness, or negation, belongs exclusively to the other extreme (*i. e.*, our external reflection unites the two extremes in a middle term; but it annuls its own work in the fact that it regards this unity still as a subjective product, and discriminates the two elements, still as belonging to the two extremes, and as not united so as to lose their identity in a third. We can still distinguish in a plum-pudding the various ingredients, not become identical, although united).

If we consider the doings of external reflection more critically, we shall find it a positing of the immediate, which, in so far, becomes the negative, or the determined; but it is immediately also the annulment of this its positing, for it presupposes the immediate; it is, therefore, a negative activity which negates its own negation (in this critical consideration, we discover why external reflection does not suspect the identity of immediateness and reflection into itself, but holds them asunder as two independent somethings; it is itself the positing activity, or reflection into itself, and through this it is led to regard the positing activity as entirely subjective). It is immediately a positing activity, a cancelling of the immediate which is negative to it, and this immediate with which it supposed itself to begin as a foreign (*i. e.*, independent, already existent) somewhat, comes to be in this activity of beginning. The immediate is thus not only in itself identical with reflection—and this would mean for us, subjectively or in external reflection—but this identity of the immediate and reflection is posited (established through an objective process). It is, namely, determined through reflection, as its negative, or its other, but it is its own activity that negates this very determining. And thus, the externality of reflection to the immediate is annulled; its self-negating positing, unites it with its negative, with the immediate, and this uniting is the essential immediateness itself. It is, therefore, proved that the external reflection is not external, but the immanent reflection of immediateness itself; or, in other words, that that which is through

the positing reflection is the in-and-for-itself existing essence (*i. e.*, the total process of essence). Hence it is *determining reflection*.

(The demonstration of the nature of external reflection in the above paragraphs, and as supplemented in the next section — “determining reflection” — forms one of the most wonderful movements of Hegel’s philosophy. In it he transcends all mere subjective idealism and all phases of philosophical nescience. The gist of the demonstration is to be found first in his subtle analysis of reflection; having shown in a former book, that all beings, or categories of being, are valid only in their relation to each other, and that relation is the truth of being, and thus that being is seeming — in other words, that particular beings are phases of a total, including process — it follows that all relation is self-relation when traced out. Self-relation is reflection and self-negation. Having discovered this he finds by analysis the two aspects in it; a positing aspect resulting in identity and immediateness, the prepositing aspect resulting in self-opposition and difference. The stage of external reflection takes on itself one of these aspects as subjective, and through this the connecting link between immediateness and reflection becomes invisible. To see this as *maya*, or illusion, is to have an insight into the dialectic of pure thought.)

Remark.

Reflection is taken in a subjective sense, by current usage, as the activity of the faculty of judgment, which transcends a given immediate representation, and seeks to find general predicates for the same, or to compare it with them. Kant contrasts the reflecting judgment with the determining judgment. He defines judgment as the general faculty which thinks the particular, as contained under the universal. If the universal is given — as rule, principle, law — the judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determining. But, if only the particular is given, for which the universal is to be found, the judgment is merely reflecting. Reflection is, consequently, in the latter instance, the transcending of an immediate, and the attaining of a universal. The immediate is partly defined as particular, and through this defined as relation of the same to its universal; for and by itself, it is only an individual, or something immediately existent. And, on the other hand, that to which it is related is its universal, its rule, principle, or law; in any case, it is something reflected into itself, relating to itself — essence, or the essential. (A rule, principle, or law, is said to be reflected into itself, because, in its application to a multiplicity of cases, it finds

only confirmation; that which is peculiar, and belongs only to one individual, in contrast with another, relates by that contrast to a beyond, to another; but, if the characteristic applies not only to the one, but to its other, and to another, and to all others, it is said to be reflected into itself, for it is affirmed, and continued by its others, by its limit).

But, in this place, we are not treating of the reflection of consciousness (consciousness, in general, has the form of reflection—it is self-relation, self-knowing); nor is it the narrower sphere of the reflection of the understanding which deals with the categories of particularity and universality. Here we are speaking of reflection in general (objective, as well as subjective). That reflection to which Kant ascribes the function of finding a universal for a given particular, is, evidently, only “external” reflection, which relates to the immediate, as something given. But the idea of absolute reflection is contained in it implicitly; for the universal—the principle, rule, or law—which it attains in its determining, is regarded as the essence of that immediate with which it began, and, consequently, the immediate is regarded as a nugatory; and the return from the immediate, the determining of reflection, is regarded as the positing of the immediate, in its true being (even external reflection, in finding the essence of an immediate, supposes itself to find the true nature of it); therefore, that which reflection predicates of the immediate—the determinations which it finds in it—is not looked upon as something external to that immediate, but as its real being.

External reflection, and in fact reflection in general, had the fortune for a long time to fall under the ban of modern philosophy; it was the fashion to attribute everything evil to it and to its activity, and it was regarded as the antipode and hereditary enemy of the “absolute” mode of viewing things. In fact the thinking reflection, in so far as it conducts itself externally, sets out from a given somewhat—an immediate, foreign to it—and regards its own activity as a merely formal affair, which receives its content and matter from without, and is for its own part only an activity conditioned through it. Moreover, as we shall learn in the consideration of the determining reflection, *reflected determinations* are of another kind than the merely immediate determinations of being. The latter are conceded to be transitory, merely relative determinations, standing each in relation to another; but the reflected determinations have the form of the being in and for itself (*i. e.*, they are independent, because self-related); they make themselves valid, therefore, as essential, and,

instead of effecting a transition into their opposites, they manifest themselves rather as absolute, free and indifferent towards each other. They refuse, therefore, stubbornly, to move; their being is their identity with themselves, in their determinateness, in which they are held asunder, although they reciprocally presuppose each other.

(Hegel's "remarks" sometimes are explanatory of the strictly scientific, or dialectic portions of the text, but more frequently they furnish digressions pertaining to matters which have a merely historical interest.)

3. Determining Reflection.

The determining reflection is the unity of the positing and the external reflection. This is to be considered more in detail:

(1). External reflection commences with immediate being; positing reflection commences with nothing. External reflection, which becomes determining reflection, posits another, viz., the essence, in the place of the cancelled being; but the positing reflection does not posit its determination in the place of another—it has no presupposition. But on this account it is not the completed determining reflection; the determination which it posits, is, therefore, a merely posited (*i. e.*, dependent); it is immediate, not, however, as self-identical, but as self-negating; it has absolute reference to the return into itself, and has existence only in reflection, although it is not this reflection itself.

That which is posited, is, therefore, another, but in such a manner that the identity of reflection with itself is entirely preserved; for that which is posited is only annulled—relation to the return into itself.¹

If some one says of anything that "it is only a posited-being," we may understand this expression in two meanings; it is this, as

¹ In the sphere of being the category of particular being (*Daseyn*) was a being which had negation attached to it, and being was the immediate basis and element of this negation, which, therefore, was itself immediate. To particular being (*Daseyn*) corresponds posited-being in the sphere of essence; it too is a particular being (*Daseyn*), but its basis is being as essence, or as pure negativity (pure= self-related); it is a determinateness, or negation, not regarded as existent, but as directly annulled. Particular being is nothing but posited-being; this is the proposition (principle or maxim) of essence in regard to particular being (in arriving at the idea of essence it had been found that particular being was a vanishing phase, something posited through a process of essence). Posited-being, therefore, stands, in one respect, opposed to particular being, and, in another respect, opposed to essence, and is to be looked upon as the middle term which connects particular being with essence, and, conversely, essence with particular being.

opposed to particular being, or, as opposed to essence. In the former meaning, particular being is taken as something higher than the posited-being, and the latter is ascribed to external reflection as something subjective. In fact, however, the posited-being is itself the higher of the two; for as posited-being, particular being is taken for what it really is in itself—as a negative, as something which exists only as a relation to the return into itself. Hence, the expression, “it is only a posited-being,” should be used in contrast to essence *i. e.*, as the negation of the being-returned-into-itself.

(2). Posited-being does not contain the full thought expressed by “determination of reflection”; it is determinateness merely as negation in general (posited-being expresses mere dependence, that which is, but, as being dependent, its being is in and through another; hence, it is annulled. The determinations of reflection are not mere phases of reflection like posited-being, but aspects of the totality of reflection, as will be seen below). But positing has been found in unity with external reflection; the latter is in this unity absolute presupposition, *i. e.*, the repulsion of reflection from itself, or the positing of determinateness as the presupposition itself. Posited-being is, therefore, as such, negation, but as presupposed, it is reflected into itself. In this sense, posited-being is “determination of reflection” (as above remarked, posited-being taken in the two aspects of reflection).

Determination (*Bestimmung*) of reflection is to be discriminated from determinateness (*Bestimmtheit*) of being, *i. e.*, from quality; quality is immediate relation to another, in general; posited-being, also, is relation to another, but to being, as reflected into itself. Negation, as quality, is negation as existent; being constitutes its ground, and element. Determination of reflection, on the contrary, has, as its basis, being reflected into itself. (Categories of being have validity directly in themselves, *i. e.*, independently; or, rather, they have not this validity, but are thought to have it, by the stage of thinking which gives validity to such categories; but, in essence, every category, or determination, is a result of a self-related process, called by Hegel, “reflection into itself”; thus, its determinations are posited-being—posited by the activity of self-negation; *e. g.*, identity is the self-relation of negation; so, also, is difference.) Posited-being fixes itself in the aspect of determination, precisely for this reason, that reflection is identity with itself in its self-negation; its being negated is, therefore, its very reflection into itself. The determination is effected, not through being, but through

identity with itself. Because being, which is the substrate of quality, is non-identical with negation, it follows that quality is non-identical with itself, and, therefore, transitory, a vanishing phase. (Quality is regarded as consisting of two elements, being and negation, two non-identical somethings, which do not produce a stable result; the negation appears in quality as its dependence, the occasion of its dissolution; but the determination of reflection is produced through self-relation, and its elements, therefore, have no subsistence outside of it—it is their subsistence; it is, thus, unlike the determinateness of being, whose elements have subsistence apart from it.) On the contrary, the determination of reflection is posited being, as negation—negation, which has lying at its basis annulled being, and, therefore, is not non-identical with itself, but is essential, and not a transitory determinateness. The self-identity of reflection, which has the negative, merely as negative, as cancelled or posited, is what gives persistence to the same (the negative, as negative, *i. e.*, not as another being).

On account of this reflection into itself, the determinations of reflection appear as free essentialities hovering in the empty void, without attraction, or repulsion, towards each other; in them, determinateness has, through relation to itself, been established, and infinitely fixed (a firm basis for imperishable individuality is found in self-relation, while individuality is impossible in the form of being or simple quality); it is determination which has subordinated its transition and its mere posited-being, or has bent back its reflection into another—into reflection into itself. These determinations constitute, therefore, the particular appearance, which is the “manifestation” of essence—essential appearance. For this reason, determining reflection is reflection which has emerged from itself; the identity of essence with itself is lost in the negation, which is dominant.

Therefore, in the determination of reflection there are two sides, which are to be distinguished. First, that of posited-being, negation, as such; secondly, reflection into itself. According to the posited-being, negation is taken as negation; this is consequently its unity with itself, but it is this at first only potentially (*an sich*); or it is the immediate as self-annulling, as the other of itself. Reflection into itself is, therefore, an abiding activity of determination; essence does not transcend itself in that activity, its distinctions are merely *posited*—taken back into essence, but, according to the other phase, they are not posited, but reflected into themselves; negation as nega-

tion is reflected into identity with itself, and not into its other — not into its non-being.

(3.) Since now the determination of reflection is both reflected relation into itself, as well as posited-being, its nature becomes through this fact immediately evident to us. As posited-being, namely, it is negation as such, a non-being opposed to another, namely, opposed to the absolute reflection into itself, or to essence. But as relation to itself it is reflected into itself. This, its reflection, and that, its posited-being, are different; its posited-being is rather its being-an-nulled; its being reflected into itself is, however, its persistence. In so far as it is the posited-being, which is at the same time reflection into itself, the determinateness of reflection is the relation to its *alterum* (other-being) within itself. It is not as an existent quiescent determinateness, which would be related to another in such a manner, that the related and its relation are different from each other, the former a being in itself, a somewhat, which excludes its other, and its relation to this other from itself. But the determination of reflection, is, in itself, the definite particular side and the relation to this definite particular side as definite, *i. e.*, to its negation. Quality through its relation makes a transition into another, its change begins in its relation. The determination of reflection, on the contrary, has taken up its other-being into itself. It is posited-being, negation which, however, bends back the relation to another into itself, and negation which, as self-identical, is the unity of itself and its other, and through this fact alone, essentiality. It is, therefore, posited-being, negation, but as reflection into itself, it is at the same time, the annulled-being of this posited-being, infinite relation to itself.

(In this first chapter of Essence, Hegel has exhibited the nature of reflection, relation, negation as totality; as self-relation, or totality, it has the two phases of identity and difference, of dependence within independence — *i. e.*, of posited-being, within reflection into itself; while in the sphere of being, no determinations were found that were persistent, abiding, here in Essence we find abiding determinations — which are such through their self-relation).

SECOND CHAPTER.

Reflection is determined reflection, consequently essence is determined, or essentiality (by the expression "determined" is meant *particularized*, since essence is reflection, according to the results of the first chapter, it follows that essence is particularized, *i. e.*, its

negative activity determines it, produces self-opposition, gives rise to its differences. “Essentiality” (*Wesenheit*) means the state of being essential; it refers to the abstract phase, or general aspect of the process to which the term essence is here applied.)

Reflection is the appearing (*Scheinen*) of essence in itself. Essence, as infinite return into itself, is not immediate simplicity, but negative simplicity. It is a movement containing different phases (*durch unterschiedene Momente*), constituting absolute mediation with itself (“absolute mediation,” because it is utterly a product of its own activity).

These, its phases, are its manifestation (and since it is reflection), therefore, these phases are determinations, which are reflected into themselves. (N. B. — If they were not reflected determinations they would not resemble essence — would not manifest it.)

First. Essence is simple relation to itself — pure identity. This determination is rather the lack of determinations (pure identity is the void of determinations).

Secondly. The determination properly so-called is distinction. Distinction, as external or indifferent to the nature of the somewhats distinguished, is called difference (*Verschiedenheit* = variety, difference between things not essentially related to each other, *e. g.*, a book and a lamp-post). But, as essential difference, it is the difference of contraries, antithesis — the difference of opposition (*Gegensatz* = antithesis — a difference or distinction in which the phases distinguished are dependent upon each other — *e. g.*, sweet and sour, positive and negative, same and different).

Thirdly. Distinction, as it exists in the form of contradiction (*Widerspruch*), reflects (bends back) the antithesis into itself (self-difference, self-negation, self-distinction, self-opposition, are forms of contradiction, *i. e.*, reflected distinctions). With the category of contradiction, distinction passes into that of ground or reason (*i. e.*, self-distinction implies, or presupposes, ground or reason).

Remark.

Determinations of reflection are usually given in the form of propositions, in which they are predicated as valid of all things. These propositions are set up as general laws of thought, which lay at the basis of all thinking, — which are absolute and indemonstrable, but which, at the same time, are assumed and acknowledged as true by every thinking being who can seize their meaning, and this directly and without contradiction.

Thus the essential determination of identity is expressed in the

proposition: Everything is identical with itself: $A = A$. Or, expressed negatively: A cannot be at the same time A and not- A .

In the first place, it is not easy to see why these simple determinations of reflection should be the only ones apprehended in this particular form. Why, for instance, should not other categories, say the determinatenesses of the sphere of being, take the form of propositions (and be laws of thought). There would be, for example, such propositions as, *everthing is*, *everything has particular being*, etc.; or, *everything has quality*, *quantity*, etc. For *being*, *particularity* (*Daseyn*), etc., are as logical determinations predicates of everything whatsoever. A "category" is, according to its etymology and the definition of Aristotle, that which is predicated of existences. But a determinateness of being is essentially a transition into its opposite. The negative of each and every determinateness is as necessary as itself. As immediate determinatenesses, each one stands in opposition to some other. If these categories (*i. e.*, of being), therefore, are put in the form of propositions, their corresponding antithetic propositions are suggested; both offer the same degree of necessity, and have equal validity as immediate assertions. On this account each assertion requires proof as against the other, and hence they do not possess the character of immediately or indisputably true propositions of thought.

Determinations of reflection, on the contrary, do not possess a qualitative nature (like the categories of being). They are self-relating, and on this account their relation to others has been removed (*i. e.*, they are self-relating, and, therefore, independent). Moreover, since their determinatenesses are self-relations, they contain in this fact the form of propositions already. For a proposition is to be distinguished from a judgment chiefly through this fact, that in the proposition, the content is the relation itself, *i. e.*, it is a particularized relation. But a judgment places all of its content in the predicate as a general determinateness, which is to be distinguished from its relation—the simple copula—and as possessing independence (*für sich*). If a proposition is to be changed into a judgment, its particular content—*e. g.*, if it lies in a verb, must be changed into a participle, in order, by this means, to separate the determination itself from its relation to a subject. The determinations of reflection, as before remarked, take the form of the proposition quite naturally, inasmuch as they are posited-being reflected into itself (dependence related to itself). Since they are expressed as general laws of thought, they require a subject of their

relation, and this is "All," or "A"—denoting each and every being.

In one respect this form of the proposition is superfluous, for determinations of reflection are to be regarded by themselves (and not as pertaining to a subject). Moreover, these propositions are incorrect in having *being* (*everything, something*) as their subjects. With this they recall the stand-point of being, and therewith they express determinations of reflection, such as identity, etc., in the form of mere quality (as though identity were an immediateness). By such predication in which the subject is posited in a quality as existing in it, the determinations of reflection lose their speculative meaning, so that identity, for example, is not predicated as the truth and essence into which the subject has passed over. ("Speculative" applies to the comprehension of things as wholes, or totalities. Thus, *identity* applies to categories of being, viewed in their entire process of change, or their transition from one to another, and their return from each other).

Finally, however, determinations of reflection have the form of self-identity, and are without relation to each other, and without antithesis; and yet, as we shall see upon consideration more in detail, or, as will become clear in the discussion of identity, difference, and antithesis, they do assume particular forms of opposition to each other, and through their form of reflection are not prevented from transition and contradiction. The several propositions which are set up as absolute laws of thought are, therefore, found, upon examination, to be in opposition to each other; they contradict and mutually annul each other. If everything is identical with itself, then it is not different, not opposed (within itself), and has, therefore, no ground (it is evident that a ground or identity-in-difference can exist only for what is self-opposed). Or, if it is assumed that there are no two things identical, *i. e.*, everything is different from everything else, it follows, that A is not identical with A, and that A is not in opposition, etc. (*i. e.*, without identity there is no ground for difference, and without difference there is no basis for the relation which constitutes identity). The assumption of universality ("each," "every," "all"), made by these propositions, leaves no room for the assumption of the other. The thoughtless consideration of these propositions enumerates them, one after the other, as though they had no relation to each other; it thinks rarely on their form of reflection (independence), and does not regard the other aspect—their posited-being—(dependence), *i. e.*, their determinateness, as such,

which impels them into transition and into their negation. (The foregoing remark is an “external reflection,” or digression, which has nothing to do with the logical treatment of the subject here. It may, of course, incidentally give one a valuable insight into the nature and form of the so-called laws of thought. What precedes the remark is the usual definition and division of the subject placed at the head of the chapter, and is not put forward as scientific demonstration. The demonstration proper begins in the following sections, in which are treated Identity, Difference, etc. It is also to be noted—and this is of the greatest importance to the student of Hegel—that the first part of the discussion of any and every category treats only its immediate phases; hence, only its most shallow and superficial regards. After this succeed paragraphs treating the subject in its forms of antithesis, *i. e.*, of relation, but not yet of self-relation. Here, accordingly, come in the antinomies and negative, or skeptical, modes of viewing the subject. Finally, the third part of the discussion considers the subject in its self-relation, its totality, and this part contains the insight into what is universal and necessary. Since each subject, in its totality, involves every other subject in the universe, it follows that in the third part of each discussion, one may find a solution identical with the solutions given in the third part of each and every other discussion throughout this logic. The chief difficulty met by the students of Hegel everywhere, and throughout the entire history of Hegelianism, has been the failure to distinguish these three stages in the discussion, and to discriminate their degrees of validity. One takes, for example, the first part as presenting a valid result; he goes forward to the second part, taking for granted that it harmonizes with what precedes. He soon discovers incongruities, and, as he proceeds, these become more striking and numerous. In the third part he loses all trace of logical connection and consistency. His natural conclusion is that the author has, by a high-handed disregard of logical rules, attempted to reconcile these incongruities, leaving each position in its validity and in its hostile attitude towards the others. For a notable illustration of this procedure see Feuerbach’s account of his studies in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*. The various attitudes of consciousness towards the objects of the senses, as there depicted, are taken as entirely valid. Feuerbach attempts to explain them and reconcile them, and failing in this, condemns Hegel’s dialectic. Not to continue this comment farther, it may be said that Hegel’s logic is a series of refutations, commencing with the emptiest and shallowest category, and refuting

it by finding that it presupposes another category opposed to it, and a third one including both. This series of refutations ends, necessarily, only when a category is discovered whose opposition is entirely within itself, and which, therefore, is its own totality. Although every category in this logic, except the last one—the Idea as conscious personality,—is refuted, yet its refutation is accomplished through an insight into its totality—a “speculative” insight, identical in kind with the insight into the category of the Idea.)

A.

Identity.

(1.) Essence is simple immediateness as cancelled immediateness. Its negativity is its being. It is self-identical in its absolute negativity, and through this, the otherness and relation to another, have utterly vanished in its pure self-identity. Essence is, therefore, simple identity with itself.

(This category of identity might be considered as the beginning of this second part of the Logic, and all of the previous portion treating of Appearance, Reflection, etc., might be omitted as an investigation belonging to the third part of this Logic. Hegel died just before revising this part of the work. From the extensive alterations and additions made to the first part, it may be supposed that many changes and additions would have been made in this part. In the Logic of the Encyclopaedia, the part treating of Essence is relatively much fuller than in this work, and it begins properly with the category of Identity).

Identity with itself is the immediateness of reflection (the only immediateness that we shall find after transcending the categories of being). It is not that identity with itself which being, or naught, is, but the identity with itself which consists in the restoring of itself to unity; not a restoration from something else, or by something else, but the pure restoration from, and by, and of, itself. This is essential identity. It is in so far not an abstract identity—not an identity that has its origin in a relative, or partial negation—a negation which precedes and conditions identity, *i. e.*, separates from it all distinctions, leaving them, however, still extant as they were. But being, and every determination of being (others and otherness), has been annulled, not relatively or partially, but wholly. This simple negativity of being in itself is identity.

It (identity) is in so far still the same as essence.

Remark.

The thinking activity, which is on the plane of external reflection, and which knows no other kind of thinking than that on this plane, never attains the ability to comprehend identity as it has been above defined, or, which is the same thing, to comprehend essence. Such thinking has always before itself abstract identity and difference, and it holds the two thoughts side by side, and independent of each other. It supposes that the faculty of reason is nothing but a loom upon which the warp is placed — “identity” — and then the woof — “difference” — is introduced and woven, thus making a texture composed of different threads (externally combined but still independent — *i. e.*, not become one as in a chemical unity, or vital unity in which the identity or individuality of the elements is lost). And so it happens that external reflection analyzing its result may unravel it and draw out first “identity” and afterwards “difference,” and place them side by side; finding at one time the identity of objects and at another time their non-identity — their identity when one abstracts their difference — their non-identity when one abstracts their identity. One must forget all these assertions and hypotheses as to what reason does, since they are merely historical in their character (“historical,” *i. e.*, descriptive — *i. e.*, without characterizing the logical necessity which connects the subject and its determinations). A consideration of everything that exists shows that it is in its very identity non-identical and contradictory, and, in its difference, in its contradiction, it is self-identical; it is within itself this movement of transition from one determination into another, and it is this because each determination is within itself its own opposite. The idea of identity — its definition — according to which it is simple self-related negativity, is not a product of external reflection, but has arisen in the consideration of being (out of its dialectical investigation). On the contrary, that identity which contains no difference, and that difference which contains no identity, are products of external reflection and abstraction which hold asunder in an arbitrary manner these predicates, and attribute to them independence (abstract identity and difference are conceived by external reflection as possessing permanent exclusion toward each other, and, though they mingle in the formation of concrete things, they are still as distinct as the threads in cloth; but the speculative idea of identity and difference makes them both to be phases of the same activity of self-negation or self-relation — an activity which produces identity in producing difference, and difference in producing identity).

(2.) This identity is in the first place essence itself, and not a determination of it—the entire movement of reflection, and not a part of that movement. As absolute negation, it is negation which immediately negates itself—a non-being and difference which vanishes in its beginning, or an act of distinguishing through which nothing is distinguished. The act of distinguishing is the positing of a non-being as the non-being of another. But the non-being of another is the cancelling of another, and consequently of the very act of distinguishing. The act of distinguishing is, therefore, negativity relating to itself—a non-being which is the non-being of itself; a non-being which has its own non-being not in something else, but in itself. It is, therefore, that which relates to itself—reflected difference—or pure, absolute difference (or “distinction”).

In other words, identity is reflection into itself, and this is nothing but internal repulsion, and it is this repulsion as reflection into itself,—a repulsion which immediately recoils upon itself. It is consequently identity as self-identical difference. Difference is, however, identical with itself only in so far as it is not identity, but absolute non-identity. But non-identity is “absolute” only in so far as it contains nothing derived from anything else, but is only itself, *i. e.* in so far as it is absolute identity with itself.

Identity is, therefore, in itself (*i. e.*, involves in its definition) absolute non-identity. But it is also the determination of identity (as a contrast to itself as the entire movement, it is the special form of identity). For as reflection into itself it posits itself as its own non-being; it is the entire movement, but as reflection it posits itself in this movement as a single phase of itself, as posited-being (dependent being) from which it returns into itself (dependent being manifests that upon which it depends, and is the appearance of the same. In this it points towards the independent being, and is its reflection; *i. e.*, the independent being reflects itself in what depends on it, or to use the words of the text, it is the return into itself from what depends on it, or is “posited” by it). Therefore, as a phase of its movement, it is first identity, as such, in the form of simple self-sameness, as opposed to absolute (*i. e.*, self-related) difference.

Remark.

In this remark I will consider more in detail the question of identity, as found in the principle of identity which is set up as the first law of thought.

This principle in its positive expression, $A=A$, is, in the first

place nothing else but the expression of empty tautology. It has, therefore, been truly said that this law of thought is without a content, and adds nothing to our knowledge. Thus the empty identity to which those adhere who are accustomed to regard it as true, and quote it on all occasions—this identity excludes all difference, and is different from difference. They do not see that in this they have already conceived identity as possessing difference; for they say that identity is different from difference. Now, since this must be conceded to be the nature of identity, the conclusion must be that identity does not possess difference externally but in its own nature (identity cannot exclude difference without possessing it as its very nature). Moreover, when they conceive it strictly as an unmoved identity (*i. e.*, devoid of activity), which is, therefore, the opposite of difference, they do not see that by this they conceive identity as a one-sided determinateness, which as such has no truth ("truth" means here actuality). It is conceded that the principle of identity expresses only a one-sided determinateness,—that it contains only formal, abstract, imperfect truth. In this concession, which is correct, is contained the admission that the truth is to be found only in the unity of identity and difference. When it is asserted that "identity" (as here conceived) is imperfect, there hovers before the mind this totality (*i. e.*, of identity and difference), compared with which "identity" is something incomplete. The totality is the complete. When, however, identity is separated from difference, and regarded as absolute—being held as something essential, valid, and true in this state of isolation—there is nothing to be seen in these contradictory assumptions but the inability of thought to bring together and reconcile the idea of abstract identity conceived as essential with the idea of its incompleteness,—its want of totality, or wholeness. It is an inability of consciousness to grasp identity as a negative activity (*i. e.*, self-relation of the negative), although in these very assertions identity is indirectly assumed to be such an activity; in other words, since identity is expressly stated to be such only as separated from difference, or that its essence consists in this separation, we have its truth expressed directly as consisting in separation,—its essential characteristic is separation,—without separation it could not be; therefore, this "identity" is nothing, considered for and by itself, but its existence lies wholly in this relation expressed in its separation from difference.

As regards that confidence which was expressed in the principle of identity as absolute truth, it was founded on experience,—

that is to say, the experience of every conscious being was appealed to, and the assertion made that in this proposition, *A is A, or a tree is a tree*, there is a direct concession and a complete conviction that the proposition is true and self-evident, and requires no proof whatever. This appeal to experience, that every conscious being acknowledges the truth of the principle of identity, is merely a rhetorical statement. For no one will say that he has ever made the experiment of testing every conscious being in regard to the abstract proposition that $A=A$. There is no serious attempt made at an appeal to real experience, but only an assurance that if such an appeal were made a universal assent would be the result. But, if the abstract proposition, as such, is not meant, but rather a concrete application of it, from which the abstract proposition could be deduced, then it follows that the assertion of its universal validity for every conscious being would amount to no more than this: that the principle of identity lies at the basis, implicitly, of every act of predication by a conscious being. But a concrete application is precisely the relation of simple identity to a multiplicity different from it. (Identity, as it appears in a concrete proposition, is in union with difference: *i. e.*, every proposition expresses in the act of predication a relation of its subject to some other subject, hence predication in its very nature asserts relation to others, and thus involves difference; in this predication the fact that the subject is posited as identical with the predicate signifies that the subject is dependent upon others. Dependence involves identity and difference. If a concrete proposition is reduced to the form of identity, or simple self-relation, the element of otherness is intentionally ignored, and the subject placed in the form of independence, or simple self-identity. It is evident in this that the reduction of concrete propositions to identical ones does violence to their nature, — what is dependent is stated as independent. “*A is B*,” means that the totality of *B* involves *A*, or that *A* is dependent upon the totality of *B*; this is the type of the concrete proposition. To change this to “*A is A*” is to omit entirely the totality of *B*, in so far as it transcends *A*; for the proposition, “*A is B*,” means that *A* is in a totality consisting of *A+X*, which equals *B*. “*The Earth is a planet*,” asserts the dependence of the Earth [upon a sun]; the solar system is the totality, containing this relation of dependence within it. “*The Earth is the Earth*,” although having the form of a proposition, and thus involving difference, really expresses only self-identity and independence. This, in the case of the Earth, is not its truth; it is partial only.) Expressed in the form of a proposition, that which is concrete requires a synthetical proposition; and the abstract propo-

sition of identity may be derived, through analysis, from the concrete itself, or from its synthetic proposition. But such derivation, through analysis or abstraction, does not leave experience as it found it, but changes it. For experience contains identity in unity with difference, and this fact refutes at once the assertion that abstract identity, as such, is something true (*i. e.*, actually existing), for experience finds exactly the opposite to be true,—it finds, *viz.*, identity only in union with difference in every example.

On the other hand, experience often enough learns the true character of this proposition of pure identity, and ascertains what truth it has. If, for example, to the question, “What is a plant?” the answer is given, “A plant is—a plant,” while the truth of such an answer would doubtless be conceded at once by the entire company present, yet there would be an equal unanimity on this point, *viz.*, that such a proposition had said nothing. If one opens his mouth for the purpose of announcing what God is, and says, “God is—God,” the expectation of the listener finds itself deceived, for it looked for a different predicate. If such a proposition is called “absolute truth,” such predications of “absolute” will be held very cheap. Nothing is more tedious and inendurable than a conversation which travels round and round the same point, or than such identity-predication which is offered as truth.

Upon analyzing the conditions of this tediousness, we find that the beginning of the proposition, “the plant is,” leads us to expect something else for a predicate. But when the subject recurs in the predicate, we find the opposite of what we had expected, and nothing is the result. Such identity-predication, therefore, contradicts its own form. Identity, instead of being the absolute truth, is therefore the opposite of the truth. Instead of being the unmoved simple, it has the form of transcending itself and resulting in self-dissolution. (If it states a dependent being in the form of the proposition of identity, it attributes to it independence; if it states independent being in the form of the proposition of identity, it puts it in the form of dependence, but does not exhibit its reflection into itself by predicating of the subject its dependent phases; such dependent phases reflect it into itself, and thus “manifest” the independence of the subject.)

Therefore, in the form of the proposition in which identity is expressed there is involved something else than simple abstract identity (*i. e.*, the form of the proposition involves difference, antithesis, dependence). The form of the proposition involves the movement of reflection, in which movement otherness enters only as

“appearance,”—*i. e.*, as a vanishing. “A is—” is a beginning, in which difference hovers before the mind as the end to be reached; but in the identity-proposition we do not arrive at the different: “A is—A;” the difference is only a vanishing, the movement returns to itself. The form of the proposition may be looked upon as a latent necessity to add to the abstract identity something else through its movement. Therefore the predicate adds to the empty form of the subject, which has no meaning on account of its emptiness, an “A,” or a “plant,” or some substrate; and this addition of the predicate makes the difference to be seemingly an accidental increment. If identity itself is taken as the subject, instead of “A,” or any other substrate—“identity is identity”—still it is conceded that, instead of this, any other substrate may be used. The significance of all this is that difference makes its appearance in the expression of identity; or, in other words, as shown, this identity is negativity, which is absolute distinction from itself.

The other expression of the principle of identity—“A cannot be at the same time A and not-A”—is its negative form; it is called the principle of contradiction. It is customary to regard this proposition as self-evident, and as requiring no explanation of its connection with the principle of identity through the form of negation. But the form of the principle of contradiction arises necessarily from the fact that identity, as the pure movement of reflection, is the simple negativity; and this negativity is expressed more explicitly in the principle of contradiction. There is “A,” and “a not-A,” the pure other of “A,” expressed in this principle, but the difference vanishes as soon as it appears. Identity is, therefore, expressed in this principle as the negation of negation. “A” and “not-A” are distinguished, and these distinct somewhats are related to one and the same “A.” Identity is, therefore, exhibited as this distinction of somewhats, which are in one unity, or as the simple distinction in itself (*i. e.*, a distinction of itself from itself through its negative self-relation—*i. e.*, through the relation of its negative activity to itself; self-determination is self-negation, or negative self-relation).

It is evident, from this, that the principle of identity,—and still more the principle of contradiction,—is not merely an analytic principle, but that it possesses a synthetic nature. For the principle of contradiction contains in its very expression not merely the empty, simple identity with itself, nor merely its opposite, but absolute non-identity, contradiction of itself. The principle of identity contains, as has been shown, the movement of reflection,—identity as the vanishing of otherness.

What, therefore, this investigation establishes, is this: first, the principle of identity, or that of contradiction, held abstractly in order to express truth by separating identity from difference, is no law of thought, but rather the opposite of it; secondly, that these principles contain more than is intended, viz., their opposite, which is absolute distinction itself.

B.

Distinction. ●

1. Absolute Distinction.

Distinction (*Unterschied*) is negativity as found in reflection. It is the “nothing” which is expressed in identity-predication (“the plant is a plant,” etc.). The essential movement of identity itself is the negating of itself; through this it determines itself, and distinguishes itself from difference.

(1.) This phase of distinction is absolute distinction (*i. e.*, self-distinction), — distinction as a phase of Essence. It is distinction in and for itself, — not distinction through an external somewhat, but through its relation to itself, and, therefore, simple distinction (*i. e.*, “simple” in the sense of not-involved-with-others). It is essential to apprehend absolute distinction as *simple*. In the absolute distinction of “A” and “not-A” from each other, it is the simple “not” which constitutes this (absolute distinction). Distinction itself is a simple idea; one expresses it thus: “two things are to be distinguished *in this*, that they, etc.” “In this,” — that is to say, in one and the same respect, in the same ground of determination. It is distinction as a phase of Reflection, not “otherness” as a category of Being. One particular being and another particular being are posited as excluding each other; each one of the two has immediate being (*i. e.*, not through each other, or through any other. The category of dependence belongs to the phase of Essence, and not to the phase of Being). The “other” in the sphere of Essence is the “other” of itself, not the “other” as existing independent, outside of it; it (the “other” in Essence) is a simple determinateness in itself (*an sich* sometimes means “in itself,” in the sense of “potential,” that which is contained in it implicitly, *i. e.*, in an undeveloped form; at other times *an sich* means “in itself” in the sense of independence, of not-being-involved-with-others, — simple identity with itself). Likewise, in the sphere of Being, “otherness” and determinateness of this character proved to be simple determinate-

ness,—identity in opposition; but this identity (in the sphere of Being) was only *transition* from one determinateness into the other. Here, in the sphere of Reflection, distinction enters as reflected, as that which is posited to be what it is in itself (*i. e.*, distinction is reflected when it is distinction not from another, but distinction from itself, and made by itself, as in human consciousness; a distinction from another forms only a transition to that other, and shows up the limit or the non-being of the determinatenesses distinguished; self-distinction, on the contrary, posits the true nature,—the “in itself” of the activity, which has the form of reflection).

(2.) Distinction in itself is distinction in the form of self-relation; hence the negativity of itself,—distinction not from another, but of itself from itself. It is not itself, but its other. But that which is distinguished from distinction is identity. (“Distinction” and “distinguished” are used for the German words, *Unterschied*, *unterschiedene*, etc; these might be translated by “difference,” “different,” etc., but “difference” is reserved as the equivalent of *Verschiedenheit*, and “distinction” is used as the general category, including the three phases of *difference*, *antithesis*, or *contrariety*, and *contradiction*; the use of “distinction” in this sense is, of course, at times somewhat awkward, and the word “difference” has occasionally been substituted for it.) It (Distinction) is, therefore, itself and identity; the two together constitute Distinction. It (Distinction) is, therefore, the whole and a phase of it (in the “external reflection” it was shown that the presupposing activity included the positing activity,—in other words, that the relation of the negative to itself produced identity or immediateness as one result, while at the same time it negated and determined the identity or immediateness as another result; the first result was called “positing,” the second result was called “pre-positing;” the total activity is this process of “distinction,” but the pre-positing activity within the total is also the process of distinction; hence, “Distinction is the whole and a phase of it”).

It can likewise be said that distinction, as simple, is no distinction. It becomes distinction through relation to identity; therefore it contains distinction and this relation to identity. Distinction is the whole and one of its own phases. And so, also, identity is the whole and a phase of itself. We must consider this as the essential nature of reflection, and as the primitive source of all activity and self-movement. Both identity and distinction are processes in which each becomes a moment as well as the total movement, and as a moment (reciprocally complementary element) it is a posited-being (*i. e.*, a

result, a dependent somewhat); inasmuch as identity and distinction both involve the activity of reflection (in fact, are constituted by it as the self-relation makes the identity, and relation being negation, the self-negation makes distinction,) they are both negative relation to themselves.

Distinction, inasmuch as it is the unity of itself and identity, is distinction which is particularized within itself (*i. e.*, containing contrast within itself). It is not transition into another,—not a relation to another outside of it. It has its other within itself; its other, namely, is identity (and identity is a phase of its own movement). And so, likewise, with identity; while it possesses the determination of distinction, it does not, for that reason, lose itself in distinction as its “other;” but it preserves itself in its other, and finds its reflection or return in it: Distinction is a moment of identity. (“To preserve itself in its other” means that it meets with its own activity in what should be its other or negation. For example, in the action of cause and effect, we may turn our attention first to the phase of identity: The cause reappears in the effect, the activity in the cause transplants itself into the effect; the cause determines or modifies the effect so as to bring it into identity with itself,—that is, to assimilate the effect to the cause. Turning our attention to the aspect of distinction or difference, we note that the activity of the cause *utters* itself,—*expresses* itself. Utterance and expression proceed out from the cause, and in obtaining independent subsistence—external realization—in an effect, they produce distinction. The original unity in the activity of the cause, conceived before its utterance or expression, is dualized, dirempted by its causal activity; and through its self-related negation results the distinction or contrast of cause and effect. In the simple, precise, technical language with which Hegel analyzes the categories of reflection, such as cause and effect, force and manifestation, identity and distinction, essence and phenomenon, etc., the underlying movement is characterized as negative self-relation,—self-relation having two aspects, the first one of identity, the second one of self-negation, contrast, or distinction).

(3.) Distinction has two moments, identity and distinction (or difference). The two moments are, therefore, posited-being,—determinateness (*i. e.*, as moments each determines the other, and the unity of both is the resultant determinateness). But in this posited-being each is self-relation (as explained in the next sentence, each moment is a self-determining activity, which evolves the other within itself; one activity, A, evolves another activity, viz., B; but the activity B evolves again the activity A; such a process is called

self-relation). The one,—namely, identity—is in its first aspect a phase of the movement of reflection into itself. In like manner, the other movement,—viz., distinction,—is distinction within itself (self-distinction),—reflected distinction (“reflected,” *i. e.*, an activity which produces another, but another which, in *its* activity, produces the first activity. For example, the generic process of life: the activity of reproduction propagates the species; the vital activity in the parents produces an independent vital activity having the same character. The species is identical in parents and offspring. The individuals are different on the plane of life,—“The species lives, and the individual dies.” But on a higher plane, that of thinking-activity, for another example, the universal reproduces itself in the same individual, and not in different individuals. This is consciousness. The ego, as universal subject, is an activity of knowing and willing; directed upon itself, it makes itself its own object; this is the stage of specialization; in its specialization it recognizes itself; hence in its third phase the activity returns into itself generically—just as it did on the plane of life in the propagation of the species—and *also* as particular individual; and this is personal, conscious identity). Distinction, inasmuch as it has two such moments within itself, both of which are reflections into themselves, is Difference (disparateness, *i. e.*, the reader will have noted that reflection into itself gives independence through the fact that it gives totality; the activity proceeds to its other, and through its other returns to itself; this totality or reflection-into-itself does not stand in contrast to another outside of it,—all of its contrast is within itself as self-distinction; now [N. B.], the two moments which are each a reflection into itself are necessarily independent of each other, being total processes; such independent moments of Distinction are indifferent to each other; this phase of distinction between independent, indifferent objects is called “difference,” “disparateness,” [*Verschiedenheit*] “variety.” The ordinary consciousness views distinction from this standpoint, but does not know that reflection-into-itself is presupposed by it).

2. Difference.

(1.) Identity is dirempted within itself in the category of difference, inasmuch as it (identity) has absolute distinction within itself, posits itself as the negative of itself, and these its moments, *viz.*, itself and its negative (*i. e.*, identity and distinction), are reflections into themselves, and hence self-identities; in other words, precisely because the identity immediately annuls its negative activity,

and is reflected into itself in its determination (*i. e.*, the determination produced upon itself by self-negation). The moments which are distinguished are contrasted with each other as different or disparate, because each is identical with itself — *i. e.*, because identity constitutes the ground and element of each. (N. B. Identity is always to be regarded as the product of self-relation.) In other words, the different or disparate is what it is only in its opposite,— *i. e.*, in identity.

Difference or disparateness constitutes what may be regarded as the otherness (other-being = *Andersseyn* = that phase of a being which exists in it because of external limitation) of reflection. The other, as a category of particular being, has for its ground immediate being—and in this immediate being, the negative inheres (*i. e.*, “the other” is a negative category, but a category to which negativity is only incidental and not essential; the “other,” as opposed to the “somewhat,” is itself an independent existence as much as the “somewhat,” and its relation to the “somewhat” as “other” is a mere external, subjective distinction; the “other” may itself be regarded as the “somewhat,” and what was regarded as the “somewhat” may be its “other”). But in Reflection, self-identity—reflected immediateness—constitutes the ground in which the negative inheres, and the basis of its indifference. (Self-relation, as the true ground of individuality, is not a relation founded on a being; being is, rather, founded on self-relation; being is the result of the process of self-relation or self-negation; but being is not the only result of this process; determination, or negation, in its annulling activity is *likewise* a result of self-negation. In the sphere of Being, in which the mind looks upon objects as essentially independent of each other, and regards each as having a substrate of being, all relation is considered to be incidental, or an external distinction made by the observer. But the result of the investigation of Being has shown that every phase of Being that can be conceived is necessarily transitory, and passes away into some other phase equally transitory. The entire system of the categories of Being forms a circular movement. The whole persists, but the parts continually vanish. Any one part, in vanishing into another, is on its way back to itself, just as the movement onward in a circle is a return to the starting-point. The process in which the parts vanish is a negating one; hence the return, which is self-relation, is self-negation. Self-relation, self-negation, is all that persists in the annulment of the categories of Being. Hence, the mode of view which regards objects as beings gives way, in the course of experience, to the view

which regards objects as appearances,—that is to say, as phases occurring in the course of the activity of a process of self-relation or self-negation. This view is able to understand the being and the annulment of objects. The aspect of the process wherein it is related to itself results in immediateness, or phases of being; the aspect wherein the process is negative results in determination, annulment, and transition. Both being and negation are seen as results. They have the same activity for their basis, but neither one of them is an ultimate basis or element itself. Thus the text in this paragraph draws attention again—as on former occasions—to the difference between Being and Essence, and to the negative as found in categories of Being as contrasted with the negative in the sphere of Essence. “Other” is a category of Being, has a basis of being, and is negative only in a superficial aspect. Difference is a category of Essence, and consists in pure relation, having no being as its basis, but arising in and persisting in self-negation, solely. For difference, whether subjective or objective, is necessarily in the last analysis based on self-distinction; and self-distinction is identity as well as distinction, and, in fact, all distinction is between identity as the one factor and difference as the other. An illustration in a more concrete sphere is found in the doctrine of the correlation of forces. A “thing” is regarded—like “somewhat” in the sphere of Being—as an independent existence; science shows the transitoriness of “things,” and finds them to be phases in the activity of “forces;” “forces,” like “appearance” in the sphere of Essence, are taken as the abiding, and, being found to constitute phases of a process of return,—*i. e.*, to pass over into each other reciprocally,—the entire process of force is seized as the persistent. Persistent force is a negative self-relation, producing particular forces; these are its distinctions and differences, and through the annulment of these distinctions, the vanishing of the individuality of the particular forces, the Persistent Force comes to identity with itself. Its distinctions as particular forces constituted its “otherness” [*Andersseyn*]; the vanishing of these distinctions constitutes its return into identity with itself. Since the return into identity is at the same time the act of further determination or particularization, it is the occasion for the continuance of the process. In this is found the idea or conception of an eternal activity).

(“The basis of its indifference”—the category of Difference, or Disparateness, is spoken of as possessing “indifference.” This refers to the fact that “Difference,” as an undeveloped, implicit category of “Distinction,”—a crude, first phase of distinction,—

regards the objects between which difference exists as independent of each other, — that is to say, as *indifferent*. For example, it compares disparate objects, — as a lamp-post and a lead-pencil, — and finds “difference;” the relation is an arbitrary one, — the objects are indifferent towards each other. On the contrary, *sweet* is not indifferent to *sour*, *light* to *dark*, nor *heat* to *cold*, nor the planet to its sun. The relation of dependence cancels indifference. The thoughtless consideration of objects discovers no dependence, no essential relation. It discovers only difference, variousness, disparateness, *i. e.*, external, “*indifferent*” distinction. “*Indifference*,” as the characteristic of true independence, arises from self-relation. Inasmuch as distinction is a phase of the process of self-relation, indifference appertains to it. There are all degrees of insight; the degrees of insight which perceive objects as phases of Being are superficial; the degrees of insight which perceive the processes of Essenee are more profound; but the first or crude phases of each and every category are the results of equally crude and imperfect insight. The category of Difference, *e. g.*, is used by a stage of insight which is unconscious of some of the phases of Distinction implied by the phases included in the term “*Difference*.¹” To use a figure: *identity*, *difference*, *antithesis*, etc., are portions of the total process of Distinction, above the surface of consciousness; other portions of the process of Distinction lie below the surface of consciousness, or, when brought to the surface, are not perceived to be identical with the former. So this phase, viz., the “*indifference*,” which is incidental to the self-relation underlying Distinction, is, first of all, above the surface of consciousness, when it begins to reflect on things. “*The basis of its indifference*” is, therefore, explained in the text to be the general form of self-relation, *i. e.*, of independence, underlying the category of Distinction.)

“*Indifference*” has been predicated of Essence in general. [See above, page 3, line 4.] The same category [*indifference*] is used in expounding the category of quantity in the sphere of Being. As above explained, indifference is the aspect of independence. Independence is a predicate applying only to a totality; hence only to what has the form of self-relation. In the sphere of Being, quality is finitude, *i. e.*, transitoriness, change; that which has its being in another finds its quality determined for it by what lies beyond it. The category of quality is transcended by the discovery that determination through another is, in the last analysis, determination through itself — because its determinateness being its character, its whatness [*quiddity*] is its being, and since this is derived from another being

lying beyond it, it follows that its being is outside of itself. The being of what is dependent lies in the independent; the being of that which is determined through another lies in this "other," and that same "other," in the act of determination, determines only itself; that which is dependent is only a determinateness of the independent, or self-determined. With this insight, all particular beings, as qualitative determinations, must be looked upon as parts of total processes of determination, which total processes are ones identical with each other—*independent*, and hence "*indifferent*" towards each other. This conception of *indifferent* ones is the insight into quantity. Hence the point of view of quantity is directed towards the aspect of *indifference*. The distinctions of quantity are *indifferent* as regards quality. Seven oxen are oxen as well as fourteen oxen; one house is as much a qualitative being as a million houses; the quantitative distinction of multiplicity is *indifferent* to quality. It has been remarked by acute lexicographers [*e. g.*, Noah Webster in his "*Unabridged*," 1st edition] that "quantity is undefinable;" that they have been unable to find its genus and differentia. But there will be no difficulty for us here to define "quantity;" "quantity" and "quality" are species of determinateness which is the genus; "quality" is the determinateness which is immediately one with being—change the quality or "whateness" of an object, and you change *it*; "quantity" is the determinateness *indifferent* to being—change the quantity of something, and you do not change its being. Hence the transition from quantity to a new category, through the idea of *maxima* and *minima*, as limits within which quantitative *indifference* prevails, and beyond which there results a qualitative change, or change in the being. *Indifference* appertains universally to the categories of *Essence*, but chiefly to *one* category of *Being*, viz., quantity. All the categories of *Essence* are founded on self-relation,—the form of self-relation being essential to every totality, to every independent being. "Quantity" is the second of the three phases of *Being*, or *Immediateness*. *Essence* is the second of the three parts of *Logie*, or the system of *Pure Thought*. *Being* is the first part, and *Idea* the third part. The second part of any dialectic or exhaustive consideration expounds its subject in the form of self-antitheses. Quantity is the self-antithesis of *Being*; *Essence* the self-antithesis of the *Idea* [personality]. *Indifference* recurs, therefore, in every second phase of consideration in this *Logic* as an aspect of the categories introduced, but affecting them with various degrees of validity. For instance, even in the category of *Becoming*, the second phase of its consideration

finds two species of it, viz., *beginning* and *ceasing*, each of which contains the other as its own moment, and is thus the totality of Becoming [a reflection-into-itself, in the language of Essence], and thus each is indifferent to the other; as sundered from the other,—excluding it,—its lack of the other would annul itself; but as containing the other, it reflects [bends back] its dependence upon another, thereby converting it into dependence upon itself, or independence and *indifference* of others).

The moments of Distinction are Identity and Distinction itself. They are *different*, *disparate*, inasmuch as they are reflected into themselves, self-relating; in the determination (or category) of Identity they are relations exclusively to themselves; Identity does not relate to Distinction, nor does Distinction relate to Identity; for since each one of these moments is exclusively self-related, they are not determined in opposition to each other. And since this is the fact the distinction is external to them; the different moments do not stand in relation to each other as Identity and Distinction, but only as different ones in general, which are indifferent towards each other and towards their determinateness.

(2.) In the category of Difference (variousness or disparateness) as the phase of indifference, of Distinction, the reflection (which lies at the basis of the category) is “external reflection.” Distinction is only a posited-being, or as annulled, but it is also the entire movement of reflection. If we take this into careful consideration we shall see that both its moments—Identity and distinction, as above determined—are reflections. Each one is a unity of itself and of the other—each is the total movement. Therefore the exclusiveness of the determinateness of Identity or of Distinction, according to which each was only itself and not the other, is annulled. They are, therefore, no *Qualities* (*quiddities*, *i. e.*, particular beings, determined through each other); but, on the contrary, their determinateness consists solely in reflection into itself, *i. e.*, solely in self-negation. Therefore we have this duplication, viz., reflection into itself as such, and determinateness as negation or posited-being. Posited-being is the self-external reflection. It is negation as negation. Hence, potentially, it is the self-relating negation and reflection into itself, *but only potentially*; for it is the relation to it as to an external (posited-being is the result of reflection considered as result, and, therefore, as dependent; dependence is not reflection into itself, but a portion of its cycle. Hence, as it implies reflection, it is *potentially* or *implicitly* self-relation).

Reflection into itself and external reflection are consequently the

two determinations in which are posited the moments of Distinction — *i. e.*, Identity and Distinction. They are these moments just as they are defined here. Reflection into itself is Identity, but defined as indifferent to Distinction, not as having no distinction at all, but as standing in relation to it as self-identical; it is *difference* or *disparateness*. It is Identity, which has therefore reflected its movement into itself in such a manner that it is really the one reflection of the two moments into themselves, the two being reflections into themselves. Identity is this one reflection of the two which has distinction within it as an indifferent somewhat, and is difference or disparateness. On the other hand, *external reflection* is the particularized distinction of the same, not as absolute reflection into itself, but as determination, opposed to which the in-itself-existent reflection is indifferent. Its two moments, Identity and Distinction, are, therefore, posited externally, not as inherent determinations. (It will be noticed that external reflection looks upon the distinction between identity and difference as something arising outside of the activity which constitutes them; in fact, it does not recognize either as an activity; it looks upon them as dead results.)

This external identity (as result of external reflection) is *equality*, *likeness*, or *sameness* (*Gleichheit*), and the external distinction is *unlikeness*, *inequality* (or *non-identity*=*Ungleichheit*). “Sameness” or “likeness” is identity, but only as a posited-being,—an identity which is not in-and-for-itself (*i. e.*, not essential, not appertaining to the nature of the things themselves). In like manner, *unlikeness* or *inequality* is distinction, but as an external one, not belonging to the objects themselves. It does not concern the objects themselves whether they are like or different (it is only a comparison made by the observer). Each object is self-related, and what it is is its own affair (there is in it no relation to another, and no occasion for the comparison which we make); the identity or non-identity, considered as likeness and unlikeness, is the result of an act of comparison, and is an external affair as regards the objects.

(3.) External reflection compares objects in regard to likeness and difference, and the act of comparison deals with no other categories than these, and it flits to and fro between objects, in order to ascertain points of resemblance or of difference. But its flitting to and fro is an external affair, even to these very distinctions. They are not related to themselves, but each only to a third (the observer). Each makes its appearance in this interchange *prima facie* for itself (independent). External reflection is, as such, self-external. Particularized distinction is absolute distinction as annulled; it is consequently

not simple, not reflection into itself, but *external* to the reflection into itself. (It is unconseious of the phases of the activity which unite the two sides.) Its elements (or “moments”) fall asunder (identity and difference are not seized as the same activity), and they relate, as opposed to each other, to the reflection-into-itself (the objects are regarded as independent,—“reflection-into-itself,”—and yet are compared with each other to discover likenesses and differences which have nothing to do with the dependence of the objects upon each other).

To reflection, estranged from itself (producing what is exactly the opposite of its own activity,—it being return-to-itself as identity, while its product is a relation of an alien to an alien,—and hence no return, but only a going abroad), likeness and difference, therefore, appear as utterly without connection, and it separates them by the use of such categories as “in so far,” “sides,” and “points of view,” when they relate to the same thing. Thus, different things, which are one and the same as regards the fact that likeness and unlikeness are attributed to both, are according to *one side* like, and according to *another side* unlike; and *in so far* as they are like, they are not unlike. Likeness, therefore, relates only to itself (is not dependent on unlikeness), and unlikeness is, in like manner, only unlikeness.

Through this separation of the categories of likeness and unlikeness from each other they mutually annul themselves. Precisely the very distinction which has been introduced to prevent them from contradiction and dissolution, namely, that something is like another in one respect and different from it in another respect—this isolation of likeness from unlikeness is their destruction. For both likeness and unlikeness are determinations of distinction. They are relations to each other—the one is defined to be what the other is not: Like is not unlike, and unlike is not like. The two have essentially the same relation, and outside of it have no meaning at all. As determinations of distinction (*i. e.*, as subordinate phases of the category of Distinction), each one is what it is in distinction from its other. But through their indifference to each other, likeness or equality is only a self-relation, and so also is unlikeness its own “point of view” and a “reflection” (*i. e.*, when likeness and difference are predicated of the same subject, but are explained through different “points of view,” the “point of view” belongs essentially to the predication, and must be added to the category predicated; “likeness” predicated with a “point of view” is thereby conditioned, and its meaning is limited through the implication of unlikeness thereby conveyed; likewise, “difference” predi-

cated in a certain "point of view" implies as its conditioning limit the "likeness," which is not expressly stated. Any category in the form of not-A is dependent wholly upon the extension and comprehension of A for its signification; in the separation of likeness and unlikeness by different "points of view," the essential limit is expressed which is common to both, and hence their indissoluble unity is posited). Each one of these categories thus isolated (by "points of view") is self-identical (in the "point of view" is contained its own difference from itself, which really belongs to the totality of its thought; "external reflection" is always trying to save its thoughts from contradiction; therefore it places their essential self-opposition in something else outside of them, which it regards as subjective and unessential; "a point of view" for example, is a merely subjective distinction,—the self-difference having been removed, nothing but abstract identity remains). The distinction between likeness and unlikeness has vanished, for they have no determinateness remaining in which they can be contrasted (all determinateness has been placed in the "point of view"—a mere external consideration); hence each is a mere abstract identity.

This aspect of indifference—in other words, this *external* distinction—annuls itself, therefore, and is the negativity of itself through itself. (This refers to the contradiction involved in placing all of the determinateness in the "points of view," and in holding the same to be subjective and unessential; the very distinction between likeness and unlikeness which external reflection thinks it necessary to preserve from annulment, and, therefore, seeks to prevent self-contradiction by such devices as "points of view" and "in so far," is annulled by this very procedure; for the distinction between likeness and unlikeness vanishes when their characteristic determinatenesses are removed and placed in something else. Hence this activity of distinguishing is a self-negating activity.) It is that negativity which, in the act of comparison, belongs to the objects compared. The act of comparing passes to and fro from likeness to unlikeness, and from the latter to the former; it lets one vanish in the other, and is in fact the negative unity of both. The act of comparison is an external affair—a subjective performance outside of the objects compared, and outside of the aspects in which they are compared. But this negative unity is in fact the very nature of likeness and unlikeness, as we have seen above. This independent "point of view," which constitutes the validity of likeness in contrast to unlikeness, and which in the same manner gives validity to unlikeness, is precisely the respect in which they lose their distinction from each

other, and become self-identical and identical with each other. (Their difference is posited in the point of view, and outside of their difference — *i. e.*, except wherein they differ — they are the same; but their difference is posited in the “point of view,” *i. e.*, it is in a unity; hence this external reflection contradicts itself by doing precisely what it attempts to avoid, *viz.*, it brings together the contradiction in a “point of view” in order to save likeness and difference from unity and consequent contradiction.)

Accordingly, likeness and difference as moments of external reflection, and as excluding each other, vanish in their identity. But this negative unity of likeness and difference is posited (explicitly contained) in them, namely, the activity of reflection is stated as belonging to them, but as external to them; in other words they are the likeness and difference of a third somewhat — *i. e.*, of something different from them. Thus likeness is not the likeness of itself, nor is unlikeness the unlikeness of itself, but of a somewhat unlike *it*, and the unlike is self-identical. Likeness and unlikeness are, therefore, each a self-contradiction. Each one is consequently an activity of reflection (a return into itself through its opposite), inasmuch as likeness is the identity of itself and unlikeness, and unlikeness is the identity of itself and likeness.

Likeness and difference were seen to constitute the sides or phases of posited-being, as opposed to the objects compared, — *i. e.*, the objects held as different, — and these objects were regarded as an objectively-existent reflection opposed to the distinction of likeness and unlikeness (*i. e.*, the objects were regarded as independent; and their relation to each other only an external act of comparison). But this independence has been lost. Likeness and unlikeness, the determinations of external reflection, are determinations of the objectively-existing reflection, which reflection the different objects are supposed to be — likeness and unlikeness are only the undefined distinction between the existing objects. The objectively-existing Reflection (*an sich seyende Reflexion* = implicit or potential reflection; the expression is used throughout this logic to characterize whatever is apprehended as independently existing, without stating, however, its mediation as return through the annulment of its other), is the relation to itself without negation (*i. e.*, without the annulment of its other), the abstract identity with itself. Consequently, it is nothing but the posited-being itself. The mere difference passes over, through posited-being, into the negative reflection (*i. e.*, the “posited-being” immediateness as a result; hence dependent; hence self-negative);

hence that phase of reflection which negates or determines the immediate. Difference is nothing but the *posed* distinction; hence, distinction which is none; hence a self-negation of distinction. Thus likeness and difference — posited-being — return through their indifference, or the objectively existing reflection, into negative unity with themselves; they return into the reflection which is potentially the distinction of likeness and difference. The difference (disparateness) whose indifferent sides are mere moments and also negative unities, is ANTITHESIS.

Remark.

Difference, like Identity, has been expressed in a principle of its own; these two principles are held in a relation of indifference towards each other, each one having independent validity.

“Everything is different from everything else” (*Alle Dinge sind verschieden*), or in another form: “there are no two things which are identical with each other.” This principle is, in fact, the opposite of the principle of Identity, for it states that A is something different; therefore that A is also not-A; in another form, A is non-identical with another, and therefore it is not A-in-general, but rather a definite, particular A. (“A is something different”— *i. e.* it has no meaning except a negative one of dependence upon some other term; *i. e.*, the predication made of A is limited or conditioned through the other term of the relation posited in the predicate “different;” since difference posits relation and dependence, its predication of A amounts in fact to the predication of not-A, as stated in the text, viz: “Therefore A is also not-A.”) If A were a universal existence, *i. e.*, “true” in the Hegelian sense, it would not stand in opposition to something else, but would possess only self-distinction. Hence, if “A is something different,” it is partial and complementary — and, as a “definite particular,” demands another to complete the totality of its sphere of being). In the place of A in the principle of Identity any other substrate may be substituted, but for A in the principle of Difference there can be no such exchange. It is not intended by this principle to affirm of something that it is different from itself, but only that it is different from another; but this difference is (in truth) its own determination. As self-identical, A is an indeterminate somewhat; but, as determinate or particular, it is the opposite of this; it has not only identity with itself, but also negation, and, consequently, difference of itself from itself.

That everything is different from everything else, is a superfluous

principle, for in the plural "things," involving multiplicity, there is implied unparticularized difference. But the principle: "There are no two things perfectly identical with each other," expresses more than this, to-wit: particularized difference. Two things are not merely *two*; numerical multiplicity implies sameness of quality, but the two spoken of are different through a "qualitative" determination. The principle which states, that there are no two things identical with each other, calls to mind the anecdote in which Leibnitz suggested to the ladies at the court, the impossibility of finding two leaves in the forest that were just alike.—Those were happy times for metaphysics, when people at court busied themselves with it, and when it needed no greater exertion to prove its principles, than to compare the leaves of trees!—The reason why the mentioned principle attracts attention, lies in the explanation given that "two," or numerical multiplicity, contains no definite, or particularized difference; and, that difference, as such, in its abstraction, is indifferent as regards likeness and unlikeness. For the imagination, (*Vorstellen*) since it attains only to qualitative determination, (*Bestimmung*) these moments (the "two"), are presented as indifferent towards each other, so that the one or the other—the mere likeness of things obtains determination without unlikeness, or that things are different if they have mere numerical multiplicity, difference in general, and are not unlike. On the contrary, the principle of difference asserts that things are different through unlikeness, from each other (qualitative opposition), that the determination of unlikeness belongs to them as well as the determination of likeness, for it requires the two to make a definite distinction.

Now, this principle that the determination of unlikeness belongs to each and everything, requires a proof. It cannot be appealed to as a self-evident truth, (*unmittelbarer Satz*); for the ordinary stage of consciousness demands a proof for every combination of different predicates in a synthetical proposition; it asks for a third term in which they are mediated. This proof must show the transition of Identity into Difference, and likewise the transition of the latter into particularized (*bestimmte*—qualitatively determined) difference, *i. e.* into unlikeness. But this is not usually attempted. For it is evident that difference, or external distinction, is, in truth, reflected into itself; it is distinction in itself; the indifferent attitude of the different ones towards each other is a mere posited-being, and hence not an external, indifferent distinction, but one (including) relation of the two moments.

There is also involved in this, the dissolution and nugatoriness

of the principle of Difference. Two things are perfectly like (equal): then they are like and unlike at the same time; like, in the fact that they are both "things," or that they are "two;" for each one is a "thing" and a one of two; each is, therefore, the same as the other; but they are assumed as unlike. Consequently the two moments, likeness and unlikeness, are different in one and the same respect, or in that their distinction is one and the same relation. Consequently they have passed over into Antithesis (*Entgegensetzung* = opposition, or contrariety).

When the two predicates are affirmed *at the same time*, contradiction is prevented by the reservation, "in so far." Two things are like *in so far as* they are not unlike; or, they are like according to one *side*, or *respect*, and unlike according to another, etc. By such a process the unity of likeness and unlikeness is supposed to be removed from the things, and this unity held to be an external reflection. This is, however, a process in which the two sides of likeness and unlikeness are distinguished, although they are contained in one and the same activity, and it is one and the same activity which distinguishes them—each one reflects the other, and manifests itself in it. That kind considerateness for the welfare of "things," which sees to it that they are not allowed to contradict themselves, is utterly oblivious here as elsewhere of the fact that it does not do away with the contradiction, but it only places it in another, viz.: in the subjective or external reflection, and leaves in this external reflection both moments (of the contradiction) which are expressed by this removal or transposition as mere posited-being, as annulled, and as related to each other in one unity (annulled, *because* posited in one unity — being negative toward each other).

3. Antithesis.

In Antithesis the particularized reflection as found in the category of Distinction is perfected. It (antithesis) is the unity of identity and difference. Its moments are in one identity, but in this identity are differentiated. Being different and yet identical, they are contraries (opposites — antithetic).

Identity and distinction are the moments of distinction as found within it. They are reflected moments of its unity ("reflected" in that each is a return to itself through the other; each moment develops its "other" within itself). Likeness and unlikeness (sameness and difference), however, belong to reflection as externalized (*i. e.*, are a distinction supposed to be subjective and arbitrary). Their identity with themselves is not only the indifference of each towards the

other, but it is the indifference towards being in-and-for-itself (*i. e.*, towards essence — towards the independent being or totality). Their identity is an identity of each as opposed to the identity reflected into itself; it is, therefore, immediateness which is not reflected into itself. The posited-being of the sides (opposite phases) of external reflection is, therefore, a *being* while its not-posed-being is a non-being.

The moments (elements or terms) of Antithesis when examined carefully, prove to be posited-being or determination reflected into itself. The posited-being takes the form of likeness and unlikeness, (sameness and difference). The two, as reflected into themselves, constitute the determinations of antithesis. Their reflection into themselves consists in this, that each is in itself the unity of sameness and difference. Sameness, for example, is found only in the movement of reflection, which makes comparison of different somethings; consequently, sameness is mediated through its other moment, which is indifferent to it (*i. e.*, not dependent upon it, for difference seems to be independent of sameness). Likewise, also, difference is found only in the same activity of reflection, which makes comparison and involves sameness as one of its results. Each of these moments is, therefore, in its determinateness the entire process. It is the whole, because it contains its other moment, (its opposite); but this, its other, exists indifferently, or independent of it; and so each contains a relation to its own non-being; and, in fact, is only reflection into itself, or the total process in its relation to its own non-being.

This "sameness" (identity) which is reflected into itself — which contains within itself relation to difference — is the *Positive*; and, in like manner, difference which contains within itself its relation to its non-being, to sameness, is the *Negative*. In other words, the two are posited-being. In so far as the determinateness of distinction is taken as the relation of posited-being to itself, in a particularizing (differentiating) form of relation, the antithesis is reflected into its self-sameness as one aspect of its posited-being; in another aspect it is reflected into self-difference. Thus arises the distinction of positive and negative. The positive is the posited-being, reflected into itself as self-sameness. But what is reflected is the posited-being, *i. e.*, negation as negation; therefore, this reflection into itself contains relation to another as its own determination. The negative, on the other hand, is posited-being, as difference reflected-into-itself. But the posited-being is difference itself; hence this reflection (involved in the "negative") is the identity of difference with itself, or its absolute self-relation. Therefore, each contains the other;

the posited-being reflected into itself as sameness contains difference ; and reflected into itself as difference contains sameness.

(The reader must not fail to remember that we are treating here of relation. Sameness is relation, and difference is relation. The distinction of sameness and difference belongs to posited-being. In “posited-being” the distinction made is regarded as an external or arbitrary one. Sameness and difference are distinguished in it, and are referred to independently-existing somewhats between which comparison is instituted. The *Maya* of reflection — the illusion of abstract knowing is found right here. It sees the distinctions of sameness and difference, but sees no essential inter-dependence existing between the objects which it compares. It, therefore, in its impotency, supposes the individuality of the objects compared to be perfect without reference of each to the other. But all distinction which it makes, rests upon, and presupposes objectively-existent distinction. And, in general, every existence possesses individuality and preserves the same through such distinction. But this distinguishing is a process of relation, essential to the existence of things, and hence the arbitrary subjective distinguishing of external reflection, explains no real process of distinguishing, and in so far as it supposes all relations to belong to external reflection, it completely shuts its eyes to the fact that all real existence is such through relation — essential relation. Since the individuality of objects depends on distinction, such objects are, in reality, terms of a process ; in relating to another — distinguishing itself from another — an object is obtaining its own individuality. In this process the relation is first an expression of its own dependence: the object seems to depend upon another — seems to point out or manifest the other — directing us, so to speak, to the other as its essence. But the other in the process manifests the first somewhat, depends upon it in like manner ; hence the total process re-affirms our first object. The total process is a reflection into itself made up of two positings — the positing of the other by the first, and the positing of the first by the other. The two positings are two manifestations — two expressions of dependence ; and, hence, the positing phases are negative, and express the nugatoriness, or lack of essentiality of the dependent somewhats. A somewhat, regarded as through another, is regarded as a posited-being, a somewhat regarded as positing another is a presupposed-being, *i. e.*, presupposed by that which it posits. In the total process which contains two positings — or two negations, *i. e.*, expressions of dependence — there results identity, self-relation, but self-relation which contains self-distinction, viz., the two-fold nega-

tive expression contained in the double-positing. The total process which as a whole, is identity, has been shown to be a two-fold differentiation. The differentiation or negative aspect of the process is essential to the identity. Unless the two negative movements are of equal value, the return into itself or reflection is not realized. But if it is realized, the equality of the movements named is presupposed, and with this the validity of the distinction and the independence of its moments. This contradiction has its solution only in the fact pointed out, namely the mutual reflection into themselves of the two moments, each through the other. This reflection into itself makes each moment a total movement, and elevates each one to independence — in short, makes each an identity with itself, containing distinction between itself and its other, within itself. This is the idea of Antithesis or self-opposition, the moments whereof are “contraries.” But external reflection, while it discovers sameness and difference in objects, and vainly supposes these distinctions to be due to its own exploits, in this conduct does both too much and too little. In one respect, it is modest in regarding its distinctions as unessential to the existence of things. But in another respect, it is the height of presumption on its part to deny the objectivity of sameness and difference, as essential relations. In other words, to deny that relation has more validity than immediate being has. For relation is the essence of particular things. They exist only as moments of total processes, and whatever identity they have is derived solely from the process of self-relation. But the self-relation, being a process of self-determination, is a process of self-particularization, or self-distinction. In the text, Hegel has shown the implication of this external reflection, which treats sameness and difference as subjective distinctions. He has shown that in all cases such distinctions imply each other, and that each contains within itself the contrary of itself. They are distinctions of posited-being, and each involves duality — a duality of dependence and independence, of identity and distinction, of self-relation and self-negation.)

The Positive and the Negative are thus the two extremes of the antithesis which have become independent. They are independent through this fact, that each one of them is the reflection of the whole, of the totality, into itself, and they belong to the antithesis in so far as it is the determinateness which is reflected into itself as the totality (the positive is within itself the antithesis of identity and distinction, *i. e.*, it is itself as the opposite of something which is negative; so likewise the negative. Hence, since each is the antithesis, each is the totality including the other, and each is reflected into itself through

the totality, and the totality is the “determinateness, which is reflected into itself as totality”). On account of their independence they constitute an antithesis which is particularized in itself. Each is itself and its other, and through this each has its determinateness, not in and through another, but in itself. Each relates to itself, and is only self-relation when it relates to its other (for the other relates back to the first, and thereby produces a return or reflection). This has two aspects; each is relation to its non-being as a cancelling of this other-being in itself; therefore, its non-being is only an element within it. But, on the other hand, the posited-being has here become a being, and possesses an aspect of indifference. Its other, which each contains, is, therefore, the non-being of that in which it is supposed to be contained as a mere element. Each, therefore, is only in so far as its non-being is, and therefore its being as a totality is the being of its non-being (*zwar in einer identischen Beziehung*).

The determinations which constitute the positive and negative, sustain themselves, therefore, through this fact, that the positive and the negative are, in the first place, absolute moments or elements of the antithesis. Their existence is one undivided reflection; it is one act of mediation in which each exists through the non-being of its other, and, hence, through its other, or through its own non-being. Therefore they are *contraries* in general; in other words, each is only the contrary of its other, and, in this respect, one is not positive and the other negative, but both are negative to each other. Each, therefore, exists in so far as the other does. It is, through the other — through its own non-being — what it is; it is only posited-being. But, on the other hand, it is in so far as the other is not; it is through the non-being of its other that it exists; it is reflection into itself. These two phases are, however, the one mediation of the antithesis, and in this they are only *posited* somewhat.

But, besides this, the mere posited-being is reflected into itself. The positive and the negative are, in this respect — according to external reflection — indifferent to the first identity in which they are only moments. In other words, since that first reflection belongs to the positive and the negative as their own reflection into themselves, each is within itself its own posited-being, and, therefore, each is indifferent towards (independent of) its reflection into its non-being and towards its own posited-being. The two sides are, therefore merely different (*i. e.*, are distinguished from each other, without relation of dependence), and in so far as their determinateness of positive and negative constitutes their posited-being (relation of mutual dependence), each is not determined in itself in that manner, but is

only determinateness in general. To each side belongs, therefore, one of the determinatenesses of positive and negative; but they could be interchanged, and each side is of such a kind that it can be taken as positive or as negative.

But the positive and the negative are in the third place not merely a posited-being, nor merely an indifferent being, but their posited-being or the relation which each has to the other within one unity—which unity neither one is—is recalled from each. Each is within itself both positive and negative; the positive and the negative are determinations of reflection, each *per se*; in this reflection of the contraries into themselves they first become positive and negative, properly so called. The positive possesses relation to the other within its own being, in as much as the other contains the *determinateness* of the positive. Likewise the negative is not negative, as the opposite of another; but it has the determinateness through which it is negative, within itself.

Therefore, each one is an independent, for-itself existing unity with itself. Although the positive is a posited-being, it is this in such a manner, that the posited-being for it is such only as annulled. It is the not-opposed (not in an antithesis, not a contrary), the annulled antithesis, but as a term of its own antithesis (*e. g.* the positive, containing as it does identity and distinction, is totality and, therefore, exists as its own element or as part and whole at the same time. So also exists the negative as its own negative and positive, or totality. The nature of this process to be whole and part of itself, is the nature of the universal as a process of self-determination, to be general or generic, and special or particular as a result of its own process, at the same time. All self-activity dirempts or dualizes itself in the form of antithesis, and this dualizing process is the origin of all particularity. But the process which produces particularity by its self-determination, is the total—generic—universal). As a positive, something is described as in relation to another but in such a relation to this other, that it is not a posited (dependent); it is within itself the activity of reflection which negates otherness. But its other, the negative, is also no posited-being or dependent element, but an independent being. Hence the negating reflection which belongs to the positive, must exclude from itself, this, its non-being.

Therefore the negative as absolute reflection is not the immediate negative, but the negative as a cancelled posited-being. The negative is in and for itself, and the positive rests upon itself alone. As reflection into itself it negates its relation to another; its other is the positive, an independent being. Its negative relation to the latter is,

therefore, one of exclusion. The negative is an opposite, or contrary, which exists independently, although opposed to the positive which is the determination of the annulled antithesis, the entire antithesis opposed to the self-identical posited being.

The positive and the negative are, consequently, not only *in themselves* positive and negative, but *in and for themselves* positive and negative (*i. e.*, not only by nature, but as realized through the activity of a process). “*In themselves*” they are positive and negative in so far as their excluding their other is not considered, but each is taken only in its own determination. Something is positive or negative “*in itself*” when it is thus described as not merely in opposition to another. But the positive or negative not as a posited-being, and, consequently, not as antithetic, would be the immediate — being or non-being. But the positive and the negative are the elements of antithesis; their nature consists only in this form of reflection into themselves. Something is positive “*in itself*” outside of its relation to the negative, and something is negative in itself outside of its relation to the positive. In this predication a close regard is had to the abstract phases of this reflected-being. But the positive or negative, as existing in itself, is understood to be that which is opposed to another, and not merely as dependent moment nor as belonging to the comparison (*i. e.*, objectively relative), but to be the determination which belongs to the sides of the antithesis. They are, therefore, positive or negative in themselves, not outside of the relation to another, but this relation to another constitutes their very nature, or the function of their process, and in fact as excluding. In this process they are, therefore, positive or negative in *and for themselves* (*i. e.*, and at the same time independent).

Remark.

This is the proper place to refer to the terms “positive and negative,” as they are used in mathematics. They are employed as well-known expressions needing no definition. But for the reason that they are not defined accurately, their treatment does not escape insoluble difficulties. There occur, first, the two concepts of positive and negative as *real* distinctions — apart from their distinction as contraries. In this sense, there lies at the basis an immediate particular being, taken thns, in the first place, as mere difference — disparateness: the simple reflection into itself is distinguished from its posited-being — the relation of opposition. The relation of opposition is, therefore, taken as an arbitrary distinction, as something

which does not objectively exist, and does not belong to the disparate somewhats. In that case, each one may be regarded as an opposite, or, on the other hand, as existing independently. And it is a matter of indifference which of the two things is regarded as positive or as negative. The second view which one may take of the positive and negative, regards each of these terms as essentially antithetic; the positive as in-itself positive, and the negative as in-itself negative, in such a manner that the two different somewhats stand in essential relation to each other. These two views of the positive and negative are found in the first definitions given of the positive and negative in arithmetic.

The $+a$ and $-a$ are in the first place opposite magnitudes; a lies at the basis of each, and is an independent unity which is indifferent to the antithetic relation; a lifeless substrate if no further determination is added. The $-a$ is characterized as the negative, the $+a$ as the positive, and each is treated as antithetic.

Moreover, a itself is not only the simple unity which lies at the basis, but, as $+a$ and $-a$, it is the reflection into-self of these contraries. There are two different a 's, and it is indifferent which of the two is characterized as positive or as negative. Each has a particular phase of persistence, and is positive.

According to the first view, $+y - y = 0$; or in the expression $-8 + 3$, the three is positive, but negative as regards -8 . The contraries cancel each other in the combination. An hour's journey towards the East and a similar journey back towards the West cancel each other. A given sum of liabilities cancels an equal amount of assets. And whatever assets are on hand balance a like amount of liabilities. The hour's journey towards the East is not positive as regards direction, nor the return towards the West negative; but these directions are indifferent as regards the terms of antithesis; they become positive and negative only when referred to a third point of view, external to them. So, too, the liabilities are not *essentially* negative; they are negative only in relation to the debtor; for the creditor they are positive assets; for him they are equivalent to a sum of money, or a certain definite value which becomes assets or liabilities through an external standpoint.

Contraries cancel each other, so that the result is zero. But there is a relation of identity in them and in this relation they are indifferent to the antithesis; this constitutes the unity underlying it. The sum of money mentioned above, which was only one sum, although from one point of view, liabilities, and from the other point, assets, is a unity of this kind; so, also, the a which is the same in $+a$

and $-a$; and the journey which travels over the same road, and not over two roads, one of which extends to the East and the other to the West. In like manner an ordinate y is the same whether taken on this side or that side of the axis; in this sense $+y - y = y$. It is only the ordinate, it is only one determination and its law.

From another point of view the contraries are not one independent somewhat (*i.e.*, as underlying the antithesis), but they are two independent somewhats. They are namely as opposed, also reflected into themselves, and they have independent subsistence as disparates.

In the expression $-8 + 3$, considered in this manner, there are 11 units; $+y - y$ are ordinates upon opposite sides of the axis. Each one is an independent being opposed to this limit, and opposed to the antithetic relation; therefore, $+y - y = 2y$. Also, the journey to the East and back to the West over the same road is the sum of two exertions, or the sum of two periods of time. Likewise in political economy, a quantity of money, or of value, is not merely this one quantity as a means of subsistence, but it has a two-fold validity: it is means of subsistence both for the creditor and for the debtor. The wealth of the nation includes not merely the cash, and besides this the value of real and personal property in the nation, still less what remains after deducting liabilities from assets; but its capital, even if the liabilities and assets balance each other, remains positive capital; as $+a - a = a$; but, in the second place, since the capital may be regarded as liabilities over and over again, being loaned repeatedly, it becomes a multiplied means.

But the antithetic quantities are not merely *contraries*; in another respect they are real or independent, and indifferent to each other. But whether a quantity is the particular being with indifferent limits or not, the positive and negative belongs to it potentially. For example, a , in so far as it has no sign of $+$ or $-$ attached to it, is taken in a positive sense as though the $+$ belonged to it. But if it was intended to be a *contrary* only, it might be taken as $-a$, just as well. But the positive sign is readily given it, because the positive is regarded as somewhat which is identical with itself, and the self-identical is the immediate independent, that which is not in a relation of antithesis to anything.

Moreover, when positive and negative magnitudes are added or subtracted they are taken for such as would be positive or negative by themselves, and not as though this distinction depended upon the operation of addition or subtraction. In the expression, $8 - (-3)$, the first *minus* is opposed to 8 , but the second *minus*, (-3) is taken as

though the 3 were negative in itself, independent of its relation within the entire expression.

This peculiarity comes out more clearly in multiplication and division: in these operations the positive is essentially *not* antithetic, but the negative, on the contrary, is taken as antithetic. The expressions *positive* and *negative* are not taken as opposites of each other. While the text-books, in their demonstrations of the mathematical operations in which positive and negative occur, treat them in all cases as *contraries*, they mistake their nature, and, therefore, involve themselves in contradictions. *Plus* and *minus*, in the operations of multiplication and division, obtain this more specific meaning of positive and negative, for the reason that the relation of the factors (which are that of sum and unity — *Einheit und Anzahl* — *i. e.*, multiplier or divisor being the “sum,” or the how-many-times, and the multiplicand or quotient being the “unity,” or the that-which-is-repeated), is not a relation of mere increase and diminution, as is found in addition and subtraction, but it is a qualitative relation; wherefore *plus* and *minus* receive the qualitative meaning of positive and negative. Unless this distinction is kept in mind it is easy to show, on the supposition that these are mere antithetic magnitudes, that if the product of $-a$ into $+a$ is $-a^2$, conversely, the product of $+a$ into $-a$ will be $+a^2$, obviously a false conclusion. When the one factor is taken as sum (how-many-times), and the other factor is taken as unity (the unit of repetition) — and the first factor is usually written first in the expression — the two expressions $(-a) \times (+a)$ and $(+a) \times (-a)$ differ in this respect: in the former, $+a$ is the “unity,” and $-a$ the “sum,” and in the other the converse is true. In explaining the former it is customary to say: “If I take $+a$, $-a$ times, then I take $+a$ not merely a times, but at the same time in a negative manner, *i. e.*, $+a$ times $-a$; hence the $+a$ has to be taken negatively, and the product is $-a^2$. Now, in the second case, if $-a$ is to be taken $+a$ times, then $-a$ ought likewise to be taken not $-a$ times, but in the opposite relation, *viz.*: $+a$ times; if the *plus* sign indicated antithetic relation, the reasoning which holds good in the case of the negative multiplier would prove here in the case of a positive multiplier that the product should be $+a^2$. The same remark applies to division. (But Hegel holds, as above shown, that in multiplication and division the *minus* sign indicates a negative quantity, *negative* having the sense of *contrary*; while the *plus* sign does not indicate a positive quantity, *i. e.*, “positive” in the sense of a term of an antithesis).

This consequence (that a *plus* multiplier should give as product a

positive result, while a negative multiplier gives a negative result), is a necessary one, provided that $+$ and $-$ are taken as indicating antithetic magnitudes (as they are taken in the demonstrations usually found in text-books). To *minus* is ascribed the power of changing the *plus*; but, on the other hand, no such power of changing *minus* is ascribed to *plus*, notwithstanding *plus* is looked upon as an antithetic quantity just as much as *minus* is. In fact, *plus* does not possess this power of changing *minus*, because it is here taken in its qualitative relation to *minus*, inasmuch as the factors have a qualitative relation to each other. Hence, in so far as the negative is here taken as antithetic, the positive, on the other hand, is taken as indeterminate, indifferent. The *plus* is, indeed, also, the negative, but the negative of the *minus*, not the in-itself-negative as the *minus* is. Hence, the negative effect of changing the sign of the unity (multiplicand) appertains to the *minus* and not to the *plus*.

Therefore $-a$ into $-a$ gives $+a^2$, for the reason that the negative *a* is not to be taken merely as antithetic (for it would be thus taken if multiplied by *minus a*) but because it is to be taken negatively. The negation of negation is the positive.

C.

Contradiction.

(1.) Distinction contains its two sides as moments; in the phase of difference (disparateness) they are sundered and indifferent towards each other; in the phase of antithesis, these moments are sides, each one of which is determined through the other, so that they are reciprocally complementary elements. They are, however, likewise determined in themselves (as well as through each other), and, therefore, indifferent towards each other, and at the same time reciprocally excluding each other. These are the independent determinations of Reflection.

The one is the positive, the other the negative; the former, however, as the in-itself positive, the latter as the in-itself negative. Each one possesses this indifference and independence for-and-by-itself through the fact that it has the relation to its other moment, in itself; in this manner it is the entire antithesis—including both moments in itself. (It was shown that the identity was a phase of activity of the entire process of self-difference, and that difference was another phase of the same process. The “positive” is this process looked upon as self-determined in the form of identity, while the negative is the same in the form of difference). Each moment, as

this entire process is mediated through its other within itself, and contains the same. But it is mediated, also, through the non-being of its other, within itself; hence, it is a unity existing for itself (as independent), and it excludes the other from itself.

Since the independent determination of reflection excludes the other, and in the same respect in which it contains it, and thereby is independent, it follows that it excludes its independence from itself in the very attitude in which it is independent. For this independence consists in the fact that it contains the other determination within itself, and has, through this very circumstance, no relation to an external somewhat; but, at the same time, this independence consists also in the fact that it is itself, and excludes from itself its negative determination. In this, it is CONTRADICTION.

Distinction is always contradiction, at least implicitly. For it is the unity of moments which are only in so far as they are not *one*, and it is the separation of moments which are separated only as existing terms of the same relation. But when distinction develops into positive and negative, we have the contradiction as *posited*; because they, as negative unities, are the positing of themselves, and, at the same time, each one of them is the cancelling of itself and the positing of its opposite. They constitute the determining reflection as an excluding reflection; because the act of exclusion is one of distinguishing, and each of the terms distinguished, as also excluding, is the entire process of exclusion, and hence each, within its own activity, excludes itself.

The two independent determinations of reflection, considered by themselves, are the following: (a) the positive is the *posited-being* as reflected into identity with itself; and this is the posited-being which is not relation to another, and is, therefore, independent subsistence, in so far as the posited-being is cancelled and excluded from it. With this, however, the positive enters into relation to a non-being — to a posited-being. It is, therefore, contradiction in that as the positing of identity-with-itself through the act of excluding the negative, it makes itself into a negative somewhat, and, therefore, into another, which it excludes from itself. This other is, as excluded, posited as independent of that which excludes it; hence, as reflected into itself and self-excluding. Therefore, the excluding reflection is the positing of the positive as excluding the other, and, therefore, this positing is immediately the positing of its other which excludes it. This is the absolute contradiction of the positive, but it is at the same time, also, the absolute contradiction of the negative, for the one reflection posits both.

(b) The negative considered for-and-by itself as the contrary of the positive, is the posited-being as reflected into non-identity with itself, *i. e.*, the negative *as* negative. But the negative is itself the non-identical, *i. e.*, the non-being of another; consequently the reflection in its non-identity is rather its relation to itself. Negation in the first place is the negative as quality, or as immediate determinateness; but the negative as negative, is the same, as related to the negative of itself, *i. e.*, to its other. If this negative is taken as identical with the former (qualitative) negative, it is then only an immediate negative, in which case it would not be taken as other opposed to other, consequently not as negative at all; the negative is not an immediate. Furthermore, since each one is the same that the other is, this relation of the non-identical somewhats is at the same time an identical relation.

This (the negative) is, therefore, the same contradiction that the positive is, namely, posited-being, or negation as relation to itself (*i. e.*, dependence which is dependence on itself). But the positive is only potentially this contradiction; the negative, on the other hand, is the posited contradiction; for in its reflection into itself, in which it is for-itself negative, or identical with itself as negative, it is non-identical or the exclusion of identity. While it is in opposition to identity it is identical with itself, and hence, through its excluding-reflection it is the exclusion of itself from itself.

The negative is, therefore, the entire movement — the antithesis which is self-antithesis; the distinction which does not relate to another but only to itself; it excludes, as antithesis, identity from itself; and consequently it excludes itself, for as relation to itself it determines itself in the form of identity which it excludes.

(2) Contradiction cancels itself.

In the self-excluding reflection which has been considered, the positive and the negative cancel — each itself in its independence; each is nothing but the transition, or rather the translation, of itself into its opposite. This ceaseless vanishing of the opposites is the first unity in which the contradiction results. It is that of zero.

Contradiction contains, however, not merely the negative, but also the positive; in other words, the self-excluding reflection is, at the same time, the *positing* reflection; hence, the result of the contradiction is not merely zero. The positive and negative constitute the posited-being of independence; their negation through themselves cancels the posited-being of the independence. It is this posited-being which is annulled (*geht zu Grund*) in contradiction.

Reflection into itself, through which the sides of the antithesis are

reduced to independent self-relations, is, in the first place, their independence as separate moments. They are, therefore, only potentially this independence, for they are still in opposition to each other, and this *potential* or *implicit* state which belongs to them is their *posited-being*. But their excluding reflection cancels this posited-being, and reduces them to independent somewhats — *i. e.*, to somewhats that exist, not only *in potentia* but, to such as through their negative relation to their others, are independent. Their independence becomes *posited* in this way. But they still reduce themselves to a posited-being through this *positing* which they have. They cancel themselves, in that they determine themselves into self-identical somewhats, but in the same, being still negative — a self-identity which is a relation to another.

But this excluding reflection is not merely this formal determination. It is excluding independence, and is the annulling of this posited-being, and through this annulling it becomes for itself, and in fact, a truly independent unity. Through the annulling of the other-being, the posited-being again makes its appearance as the negative of another. But, in fact, this negation is not again a merely first, immediate relation to another, not a posited-being as cancelled immediateness, but as cancelled posited-being. The excluding reflection which belongs to independence, for the reason that it is excluding, becomes a posited-being, but is at the same time a cancelling of its posited-being. It is a cancelling relation to itself. It annuls in this relation, first, the negative ; secondly, it posits itself as negative, and thereby becomes the very negative which it cancels : in the annulling of the negative it posits it and annuls it at the same time. This activity of exclusion is, therefore, the other whose negation it is ; the annullment of this posited-being is, therefore, not again posited-being in the sense that it is a negative of another, but it is the identification with itself, a posited unity with itself. Independence is, therefore, through its own negation, unity which returns into itself through the circumstance that it returns into itself by negating its posited-being. It is the unity of Essence, a unity which arises, not through the negation of another, but through a negation of itself, being through this act self-identical.

(3.) According to this positive side of the question, and through the fact that the independence which we find in the Antithesis has reduced itself, through its excluding activity of reflection, to posited-being, and at the same time annullled this posited-being, the Antithesis has not only been destroyed, but has gone back into its ground.

The excluding activity of reflection which appertains to an independent contrary makes it a negative, and therefore a mere posited somewhat. Through this it reduces its determinations, which at first have the phase of independence (the positive and negative), to mere determinations — (*i. e.*, to dependence). Since the posited-being is by this means made to become posited-being, it returns into unity with itself (its becoming is a becoming of itself; herein the circular movement of reflection makes itself manifest); it is the simple essence, but the simplicity of essence in this phase is the category of Ground, or Reason (*Grund*). Through the annulling of the self-contradictory determinations of essence, we have the restoration of the simplicity of essence, but as an excluding unity of reflection. This is a simple unity which determines itself as negative, but in this posited-being is immediately self-identical.

The independent Antithesis, through its contradiction, is cancelled, and results in a ground which is the first immediate whence issued the antithesis; the annulled antithesis, or the annulled posited-being, is itself a posited-being. Hence, essence as ground is a posited-being, a result which has become. But, conversely, only this has resulted: that the antithesis, or the posited-being, is annulled or only as posited-being. Essence is, therefore, as ground, this excluding reflection, which makes itself a posited-being, so that the antithesis with which it began, and which was immediate, is only the posited, definite independence of essence, and that at the same time it is only the self-annulling; but essence is reflected into itself in its determinateness. Essence as ground excludes itself from itself, and thereby posits itself. Its posited-being, which is that which is excluded, is only as posited-being, as identity of the negative with itself. This independent somewhat is the negative, posited as negative. It is a self-contradictory which, therefore, remains immediately in essence as its ground. (Posited-being is the immediate being which has shown itself to be transitory or *dependent* upon something else; this dependence, traced out, is found to be a relation to that which posits it, again; so the dependence is a dependence on its own dependence, and this is independence; or, in the language of the text, the posited-being is an “annulled posited-being,” being annulled through this very self-relation; it is a posited-being which is annulled by being posited, again, as posited-being; *i. e.*, its dependence is cancelled by being made self-dependent. N. B. It is only the tracing out of the entire relation which changes the aspect of the category here involved.)

The annulled contradiction is, therefore, the ground ; it is essence as the unity of positive and negative ; in antithesis, determination attains to independence, but its independence is perfected in the category of Ground. The negative is developed into independent essence in it, but still as negative. Therefore, it is at the same time the positive, while it is self-identical in this negativity. The antithesis and its contradiction are, therefore, annulled in the category of Ground, as well as preserved. Ground is essence as positive identity with itself ; but it at the same time relates to itself as negativity, and, therefore, determines itself, and becomes the excluded posited-being. This posited-being, however, is the wholly independent essence ; and the essence is ground through the fact that in this, its negation, it is self-identical and positive. The self-contradicting, independent antithesis was, therefore, ground already. There was added only the determination of unity with itself. This (unity) made its appearance through the fact that the independent opposites cancelled each itself, and each became its other, and consequently was annulled. But in that annulment each one came into self-identity ; and, therefore, proved itself to be self-identical essence, a somewhat reflected into itself, even in its destruction, in its posited-being, or self-negation.

Remark 1.

The positive and the negative are the same. This expression belongs to external reflection in so far as it institutes a comparison of these two determinations ; but the question is not what the relation is between two categories, as found by external comparison ; they must be considered in themselves, and their own reflection discovered. And in the case of these two categories, we have seen that each is essentially the manifestation of itself in the other, and the positing itself as the other.

The thinking which deals with images (*Vorstellen*), does not consider the positive and negative in themselves, and has recourse to the act of comparison in order to seize these distinctions, which are evanescent, but which it nevertheless holds to be fixed and abiding opposites to each other. A very little experience in the habits of reflecting-thinking will suffice to convince one that when it defines a somewhat as positive, it will often invert the same into negative upon very slight pretexts ; and, conversely, what it has defined as negative, into positive. The reflecting-thinking falls into confusion and self-contradiction in dealing with these categories. To one who is ignorant of the nature of these categories, it looks as though this confusion were something improper, and which ought not to happen ; it there-

fore ascribes it to subjective incompetency. This transition of one contrary into the other does, in fact, produce mere confusion so long as the necessity for the transformation has not been seen. It is, however, even for external reflection, a matter of simple observation that the positive is not a somewhat immediately identical with itself, but it is opposed to a negative, and has significance only in this relation; therefore, the negative itself is involved in the positive; and, more than this, the positive is the self-relating negation of the negative, which is the mere posited-being; therefore, the positive is the absolute negation in itself. Likewise the negative, which is opposed to the positive, has its meaning in this relation to its other. Its totality, therefore, involves the positive. But the negative has also—outside of its relation to the positive—a subsistence of its own; it is self-identical. Hence the negative has all that belongs to the definition of the positive.

The opposition of positive and negative is most commonly understood in the sense that the positive is something objective, notwithstanding its very name expresses *posited-being*. On the contrary, it understands the negative, in a subjective sense, as belonging only to external reflection, which never concerns itself with the objective; and, indeed, for which the objective does not exist. In fact, if the negative expresses nothing else than an arbitrary abstraction, or the result of an external comparison, then, of course, it has no existence for the objective positive, and the positive is not in itself related to such an empty abstraction. But in that case the determination of "positive" is likewise merely an external and arbitrary designation. For an example of these fixed contraries of reflection: light is generally taken as the positive, and darkness as the negative. But light has in its infinite expansion, and in the force of its unfolding and vitalizing influences, the nature of absolute negativity. Darkness, on the contrary, as devoid of multiplicity, or as the womb of productive activity, in which no distinctions are produced by its own energy, is rather the simple identity with itself, the positive. It is taken as negative in the sense that it, as the mere absence of light, does not exist at all, and has no relation to light; so that light, inasmuch as it is a self-relation, and is regarded as not depending upon others, but as related purely to itself, should cause darkness to vanish before it. But it is a familiar fact that light may be dimmed through the agency of darkness, so that it becomes gray; and besides this merely quantitative change into gray, it also suffers qualitative changes through relation to darkness, and is modified into color. So, too, for an example: virtue is not without struggle; it is rather the highest, most

perfect struggle ; therefore, it is not only the positive, but it is absolute negativity. Virtue, moreover, is not such merely in comparison with vice, but it is in its very nature opposition and struggling. In other words, vice is not only the absence of virtue — innocence, too, is this absence — and not distinguished from virtue by external reflection, but it is in its very nature opposed to it ; it is *evil*. Evil consists in self-persistence in active opposition to good ; it is the positive negativity. But innocence is the absence of good as well as of evil, is indifferent toward both determinations, and is neither positive nor negative. But at the same time this absence is to be taken also as determinateness. On the one hand, it is to be regarded as the positive nature of something, and, on the other hand, it relates to a contrary ; and all natures emerge from their state of innocence — from their indifferent identity with themselves, and come into relation to their others, and through this go to destruction, or, in the positive sense, go back into their ground. The truth also is the positive, as the knowing which corresponds to its object ; but it is only this self-identity in so far as the knowing conducts itself negatively towards its other, penetrates the object, and cancels its negation (for the object is the negation of the subject). Error is something positive, as an opinion known and asserted regarding that which does not exist. Ignorance, however, is either indifferent towards truth and error, and, consequently, neither positive nor negative, in which case the distinction belongs to external reflection ; or, when taken objectively, as a quality of a person, it is the impulse which is directed against itself, a negative which contains a positive direction in itself. It is one of the most important principles of philosophy, this insight into the nature of the determinations of reflection, as here considered ; that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and that each includes (in its totality) the other. Without this principle there can be no true step made in philosophy.

Remark 2.

The determination of Antithesis has likewise been set up as a principle — the so-called principle of Excluded Middle :

Something is either A or not-A ; there is no middle term.

This principle involves, in the first place, the proposition that everything is a contrary, an antithetic somewhat, and that it is either positive or negative. This is an important principle, which finds its necessity in this fact that identity involves (*übergeht*) difference, and difference involves antithesis (*i. e.*, the totality of each includes the other).

But it is not usual to take these determinations in this meaning. Ordinarily, the principle is understood to assert that of the predicates belonging to a thing, a given predicate either does or does not belong to it. The opposite signifies in this case merely *absence*, or, rather, *indefiniteness*; and the principle taken in this sense is so empty of meaning that it is not worth the trouble of quoting. If the qualities *sweet*, *green*, *square* are taken — and all predicates are allowable by this principle — and predicated of the mind thus: *the mind is sweet or not sweet, green or not green, etc.*, this would be pronounced trivial, and as leading to nothing. The determinateness contained in the predicate is related to something; every proposition expresses that something is determined. It ought essentially to contain this: that the determinateness expresses what is essential, in the form of antithesis. Instead of that, however, the proposition quoted goes in the opposite direction, back to indeterminateness, in the fact that it predicates in a trivial manner the determinateness, or its indefinite non-being.

The principle of Excluded Middle is further to be distinguished from the principles of Identity and Contradiction, already discussed. It asserts that there is no thing which is neither A nor not-A, no *tertium quid* indifferent to the antithesis. In fact, however, this very principle gives a *tertium quid* which is indifferent to the antithesis — viz.: A, itself. This A is neither + A nor — A, and it is equally + A and — A. That which is to be either + A or not-A is hence related to + A, as well to not-A; and, again, in the fact that it is related to A it ought not to be related to not-A, nor when it is related to not-A should it be related to A. The somewhat itself is, therefore, the *tertium quid* which was to be excluded. Since the contraries are both posited and annulled in the somewhat, the *tertium quid*, which is here a lifeless abstraction, if taken in a more profound meaning, is the unity of reflection into which, as the ground, the Antithesis recedes.

Remark 3.

If the first determinations of Reflection, viz., Identity, Difference, and Antithesis (Polarity), can be set up as principles, as has been shown, it is certain that Contradiction ought also to admit of statement in the form of a principle; for contradiction is the result of the mentioned determinations of reflection (*i. e.*, the truth or totality of which Identity, Difference, and Antithesis are phases. Contradiction is their “pre-supposition”), and if stated in the form of a principle would run thus: All things are in themselves contradic-

tory; and this principle should be understood in the sense that it expresses the truth and essence of things better than the former principles mentioned. Contradiction, which succeeds the category of Antithesis, is only the category of Naught, fully unfolded (become explicit) — the category of Naught as contained in the category of Identity; and this was partially seen in the expression that the principle of Identity says nothing (adds nothing in the predicate to the contents of the subject). This negation was further defined in the categories of Difference and Antithesis, and still further in the posited Contradiction. (The principle of Contradiction as here set up by Hegel, is the basis of all relation and of all being. Being has been found to depend upon Relation, and all Relation has been found to be Return or Reflection; Reflection is a phase of self-relation or of self-negation; all relation is negation; self-relation or self-negation is the origin at once of all identity, subsistence, persistence, repose, and individuality, as well as of all distinction, opposition, activity, dependence, and manifestation. Contradiction makes explicit what was implicit in the determinations of Reflection previously discussed. "All things are in themselves contradictory," means nothing more nor less than that all finite or dependent things, when traced out as totalities, will be found to belong to self-relation, self-determination, self-negation. And all independent things are self-determining and totalities.)

It is, however, one of the fundamental prejudices of the formal logic and of the ordinary mode of viewing things, that Contradiction is not a determination of such essential and immanent character as that possessed by Identity. Yet, if order of rank is the question, and the two determinations are to be compared as separately valid, Contradiction will certainly be found to be the deeper and more essential. For Identity is in comparison with Contradiction only a determination expressing simple immediateness, the immediateness of dead being; but Contradiction, on the other hand, is the root of all activity and vitality (self-movement is the basis of all movement, for no thing can move another until it originates movement within itself; but self-movement is self-negation, contradiction). Only in so far as something contains a contradiction within itself, does it move itself, and possess impulse and activity.

Contradiction is usually held to be excluded from things, from all existence and from all truth. In fact, it is asserted that there is nothing self-contradictory; on the other hand, regardless of this assertion, Contradiction is thrust into the subjective reflection which posits it through its act of relating and comparing. (The activity of

reflection brings disparate objects into relation and compares them; it thereby unites contradictories.) But it is denied that Contradiction really exists in this subjective activity of reflection; for it is said that the self-contradictory cannot be conceived or thought. If it were found in reality, or in the thinking reflection, it would pass for an accident or for something abnormal, or a transitory state of delirium.

Now, as regards the assertion that there is no Contradiction, and that it cannot appertain to reality, we need not give ourselves any concern. A category of Essence will certainly be found in all experience, and in all reality as well. Already, when speaking of the category of the Infinite, we have made the same remark; and indeed Contradiction is the category of the Infinite as occurring in the sphere of Being (*i. e.*, Contradiction is self-determination in the category of Essence, and the Infinite is the category of self-determination in the sphere of Being). But even common experience itself bears testimony to the fact that there are a multitude of self-contradictory things, of self-contradictory plans, and so forth, whose self-contradiction is not merely one of external reflection, but is inherent. And moreover, their self-contradiction is not to be taken as something abnormal which is found only here and there, and not in a majority of cases; but it is the negative in its essential characteristic, the principle of all self-activity; for self-activity is nothing else than an exhibition of self-contradiction. External movement perceptible by the senses is the immediate existence of self-contradiction. Something moves, not through the fact that it is now here, and in the next moment there, but through the fact that in one and the same moment of time it is here and not here—through the fact that in this “here” it is and is not, at the same time. It is necessary to acknowledge the contradictions which the ancient philosophers have shown up in the category of movement, but in conceding the validity of the contradiction shown by their dialectic, we must not adopt their conclusion and deny the existence of movement; on the contrary, we must affirm that movement is the real existence of contradiction.

Likewise, the internal, real self-activity, *viz.*, impulse in general (*Trieb*)—appetite or *nitus* of the monads (*Leibnitz*) the Entelechy of absolute, simple essence (*Aristotle*)—is nothing else than this contradiction that something is *in itself*, and at the same time the lack of itself, its own negative, and this in one and the same respect. (Instinct, impulse, desire, are manifestations within a being of its dependence upon another; they express its lack or want of its own true being, that upon which it depends; and at the same time they express this want as the true nature, the being-*in-itself* of the thing.

itself. Even gravity in matter is a similar expression of self-contradiction; the very essence of matter expresses its own non-being.) The mere abstract identity is not yet the category of vitality (it is not adequate to it), but the category of vitality demands that the positive shall be the negative in itself, and through this fact issue forth from itself, and thereby posit change within itself. Something is vital, therefore, only so far as it contains the contradiction within itself, and nevertheless is a force sufficient to preserve itself in spite of this contradiction within itself. If, however, an existence does not possess the capacity to retain its positive determination in the face of its negative, and to hold the one in the other, in other words, cannot endure the contradiction within itself, then it is not a vital unity, not a Ground, but the contradiction destroys it. Speculative thinking consists only in this, that the thinking activity grasps firmly the category of contradiction and holds it within itself, but not as conceived by the ordinary thinking which thinks only in images; for the picture-making thinking thinks contradiction only as a principle which rules thought and which allows of no other solution for contradictory determinations than zero.

The contradiction contained in movement and in *impulse, desire*, and the like categories is concealed from the thinking which deals only with images through the appearance of simplicity which belongs to such categories. But, on the other hand, in the categories of Relation the self-contradiction involved becomes immediately manifest. The most trivial examples, those of *above* and *beneath*, of *right* and *left*, of *father* and *son*, etc., etc., contain each the antithesis in unity. *Above* is that which is *not beneath*; *above* is thus defined to be only the non-being of *beneath*, and is only in so far as the *beneath* is (the totality of its being is one with the totality of the being of the other); and *vice versa*, in each category is contained its opposite. *Father* is the other of *son*, and *son* the other of *father*, and each is only as this other of another; and at the same time the one determination exists only in relation to the other; their being is one totality. *Father* is besides this relation to *son* also something independent, it is true; but as such he is not father, but only man in general. So also, *above* and *beneath*, *right* and *left*, reflected into themselves (*i. e.*, considered not as terms of relation to another, but in regard to themselves), are something independent outside of this relation, but as such they are only places in general. Contraries (polar opposites) contain self-contradiction in so far as they are in one and the same respect related negatively to another, or reciprocally annulling and at the same time indifferent to

each other. The thinking which deals in images, when it passes over to the phase of indifference in categories, forgets their negative unity, and treats them, consequently, only as disparate in general; and thus regarded, "right" is no longer "right," "left" no longer "left," etc. But when it has right and left really before it, it has these determinations in their self-negating activity, the one existing in the other, and in this unity at the same time not annulling itself, but each one existing indifferent and independent.

The thinking which deals in images has, therefore, self-contradiction always for its content, but is never conscious of this fact. It remains external reflection, therefore, and flits to and fro from likeness to difference, or from the negative relation of objects distinguished to their reflection into themselves. It holds these two determinations (of *negative*-relation and of *self*-relation) apart and opposite to each other, and has in mind only their indifference and not their transition, which is the essential thing, and contains the contradiction. The genial reflection (the speculative form of reflection), if we may mention it here, consists—in contrast to the forms of reflection mentioned—in the apprehension and expression of contradiction, although it does not express the comprehension (*Begriff* = ideal totality) of things and their relations, and has only image-forms of thought for its materials and contents, yet it brings them into a relation which contains their contradiction, and thereby manifests their comprehension (ideal totality). The thinking reason, however, sharpens, so to speak, the blunted distinction of Difference, the mere multiplicity of image-thinking, to *essential* distinction, to *antithesis*; multiplicity when sharpened to the point of contradiction becomes vital and active, each of its individuals manifesting itself against the others, and thus multiplicity obtains for itself the negativity which is the in-dwelling pulsation of self-movement and vitality.

In speaking of the ontological proof of the existence of God, we have already mentioned that the basis of that proof is the idea of an including totality of all real things. Of this idea it is customary to prove first its possibility; this being done by showing that it contains no contradiction, because reality merely as reality has no limits. Attention has been called to the fact that with this proof, the mentioned including totality is reduced to the simple, indeterminate being; or if the realities are taken in fact as a multiplicity of particulars, then it becomes an including totality of all negations. Critically examined, the distinction of realities passes from the category of difference to antithesis, and then to contradiction, and the including totality of all realities goes over into absolute self-contradiction.

diction. The prevailing horror of contradiction which possesses the thinking that deals with images, but not the speculative thinking — a feeling similar to that which nature is said to have for a vacuum — objects to this result; for it holds fast to the one-sided solution of self-contradiction in zero, and ignores the positive side of it, according to which contradiction becomes absolute activity and absolute ground.

We have seen from the consideration of the nature of contradiction that it is, so to say, no fault, or lack, or failure of a thing to exhibit a contradiction within it. On the contrary, every determination, every concrete thing, every idea, is essentially a unity of distinct, and separable moments, which pass over into contradictory moments through the particular essential distinction in them (forming the basis of their difference). This contradictory unity, of course, resolves itself into a zero — it goes back into its negative unity. The thing, the subject, the idea, is precisely this negative unity itself; it is an in-itself-contradictory, but at the same time equally a resolved contradiction; it is the ground which retains and carries with it its determinations. The thing, subject, or idea is as reflected into itself, as regards its own sphere, its solved contradiction; but its entire sphere is a particularized one, a "different" as regards some other sphere; hence it is a finite somewhat, and to be a "finite" is to be a contradiction. Of this higher contradiction, in which its entire sphere is involved, the thing, subject, or idea is not itself the solution; but there is a still higher sphere as its negative unity, as its ground. Finite things, in their indifferent manifoldness, involve always a contradiction; for they are within themselves sundered, and exist only in their ground (into which they return through the activity of the process to which they belong). As will be shown further on, the true inference from a finite and contingent to an absolutely necessary essence does not consist in this: that the latter is inferred from a finite and contingent being which is an abiding ground underlying it, but rather that the inference is made because contingency implies an in-itself-contradictory being, a merely transitory one. In other words, the inference is based on the fact, that the contingent being returns into its ground necessarily, and therein annuls itself; and, moreover, that through this return into its ground, it posits that ground (furnishes the basis for the inference that it exists) only by exhibiting itself as a posited (*i. e.*, as a dependent being, and thereby positing an independent being). In the ordinary syllogism, the being of the finite appears to be the ground of the absolute: "therefore, because the finite is, it follows that the absolute is." The true inference,

however, is this: "Therefore, because the finite is an in-itself-contradictory antithesis — *i. e.*, because it *is not* — the absolute *is*." In the former case the conclusion is: The being of the finite is the being of the absolute. In the latter case it is: The non-being of the finite is the being of the absolute.

THIRD CHAPTER.

Ground or Reason.

Essence defines itself as ground (or reason).

As Naught was found (in the dialectic of Immediateness) to be in simple, direct unity with Being, so here is found the immediate unity of the simple Identity of essence with its absolute Negativity (the Identity of Essence attains and preserves itself through its activity of negating; through its negating arise all particular determinations which constitute the different elements of its content, and through the same determining activity this multiplicity is negated, and disappears; only the process, the negative activity, abiding as ground or essence). Essence is only this negative activity, the same which pure Reflection is. (All proving or demonstration depends upon reflection — *i. e.*, on the fact that a finite, or immediate being is a process of manifesting its dependence; its incompleteness, its imperfection, its fragmentariness, are all only a manifestation of the independent being, its ground. This reference of a finite somewhat to its ground, as that upon which it essentially depends, is *reflection*; it comes from the ground, and is a process of return to the ground.) It is this pure negativity, as the return of being into itself. Hence, it is in-itself, or for-us determined as (*i. e.*, seen to essentially consist in or depend upon) ground into which being (immediateness) dissolves. But this determinateness (*i. e.*, ground) is not posited through itself (*i. e.*, through the immediate being, because the immediate being is only an appearance — its essence lies outside of itself, in the ground; it cannot posit anything, because it possesses no essence to bestow upon another). In other words, the determinateness of immediate being, through which immediate being is cancelled, is a result of the determining activity of ground or essence acting upon immediate being from without; and, therefore, this determinateness is not self-posed. Its reflection consists in this: what the immediate being is, is posited as negative, and thereby determined (*i. e.*, negated by the activity of the ground). The distinction of positive and negative constitutes the essential determination in which it (being) is lost, as in its negation. These independent determinations of reflection cancel each

other, and the determination thus annulled — gone to the ground — is the true determination of essence.

Ground is, therefore, also one of the determinations of reflection which form the categories of essence; but it is the final one, and its determination consists rather in being the annulment of determination. The determination of reflection, when it annuls itself, "goes to the ground," obtains its true significance, that of absolute counter-impulse within itself, viz., that the posited-being which belongs to essence is only an annulled posited-being; and, conversely, only the self-annulling posited-being is the posited-being of essence ("posited-being" = the being-established through another; all categories of essence are categories of mediation, categories posited through another; but the starting-point in this positing or mediating is, of course, always being or immediateness; its positing is always due to its self-annulment, to its transitoriness, its evanescence; on the other hand, that which is posited is the totality of its negative process; hence the abiding, the essence, the ground; but the essence or abiding thus posited is posited as the primordial source, the origin whence the evanescent being proceeded; hence the immediate being which posited the essence, posits rather the being which posited it — its positing is rather a presupposing activity, or, in the words of the text, "its positing is only a cancelling or annulment" of its positing; it is a return movement, or reflection, rather than an origination or positing). Essence, when it defines itself as ground, defines itself as the non-determined, and it is only the annulment of this, its being-determined, which determines it as essence (*i. e.*, the cancelling of its other being — the particularized somewhats which have arisen from essence, and stand over against it as immediate being — the cancelling of this otherness is the true determination of essence). In this being-determined (of essence), as the self-annulling essence, it is not a derivative somewhat derived from another (originating in immediate being), but it is self-identical in and through this negativity (*i. e.*, through this cancelling of all otherness, it exhibits itself as primordial).

In so far as the category of Ground is reached through the annulment of Determination (*i. e.* Particular Being), as the first or immediate from which we begin, and which proves transitory ("goes to the ground") — a result which follows from the very nature of Determination — the category of ground is, as such result, conditioned through its origin, and thus a determined somewhat. But this determining is, in the first place, an annulment of determination,

and hence only a restored, purified, or revealed identity of Essence—it is what the determination of reflection is potentially (and not yet realized). In the second place, this determining is, as annulment of determining, the positing of that determinateness of reflection which was called the Immediate (on its appearance in the positing reflection), but which is posited only by the self-excluding reflection of Ground, and in this is only as posited or as annulled (in its independence). Essence, when it is defined as ground in this sense is a self-result. As Ground, therefore, it posits itself as Essence; and in this fact, that it posits itself as Essence, consists its determination. This positing is the reflection that appertains to Essence—a determining that annuls itself in the very act of determining itself—being in one respect a positing, and in another respect a positing of Essence, and, consequently, both in one act (the positing of itself, and of Essence which is its own annulment).

Reflection is pure mediation; Ground, on the other hand, is real mediation of Essence. Reflection is the movement of Naught to Naught, through itself; it is its manifestation of another; but since the antithesis does not attain to independence, as regards its sides (the contraries), it follows that in Reflection the first is not a positive—that which appears; nor is the other the negative—that in which it appears. The two are mere substrates of the imagination; they are not purely self-related terms. Pure mediation is only pure relation without any terms that stand in relation. (The relation is that of self-determination, and hence an activity which produces itself through the pure activity, and is not a relation which exists between two already existing somewhats.) The “Determining Reflection” posits such terms as are self-identical, but at the same time are particular (concrete) relations. Ground, on the contrary, is the real mediation, because it contains reflection as annulled reflection; it is Essence positing itself and returning into itself, through its non-being. (Ground, thus defined and distinguished from the activity of reflection, which has been discussed at such length, is here called by Hegel a real mediation, instead of a pure mediation, because its result is a reality, and not simply a negation of something that exhibits itself as a phenomenal or transitory being, or a mere appearance; in this determination, the real something is restored to validity again, so that it finds its explanation and justification, and, in short, is shown to be a well-grounded something. Of course, it is only a more entire view that yields us this insight. We see the general form of the activity which at first seemed

to have only a negative result; it is seen to have a positive result, and to produce reality, instead of mere annulment. This insight is akin to the insight which sees Law underlying change—it sees Return where at first there appeared to be only a vanishing of whatever appeared. But the idea of Law is much more concrete or deeper than this idea of Ground, which here is only the explanation of multiplicity by means of the distinction of form and matter.) According to this phase of annulment of Reflection (that in which it is found that the vanishing of the immediate being is not into nothing, but into a process which returns again to the being which had before vanished—and so the reflection is thereby annulled), the posited somewhat is determined as an immediate—as a somewhat that possesses self-identity outside of its relation or outside of its appearance (*i. e.*, outside of its relation of dependence.) This immediateness is the phase of Being restored through the process of Essence; it is the non-being of Reflection, as that through which essence mediates itself. Essence returns into itself as negating; hence it determines itself in this return, and for the reason that this is a determination arising in the identity of the negative, in its self-relation, which is the annulment of the positing (of the dependence); it is, therefore, existing—*or real*; it is the identity of Essence as Ground.

Ground is first to be considered as Absolute Ground (*i. e.*, because that is its most immediate phase, its most abstract, or emptiest phase). In the phase of Absolute Ground, Essence is regarded as the “Basis” for the distinction; when defined with more attention, it is stated as the distinction of Form and Matter, or as Form and Content.

In the second place, it becomes a still more definitely seized distinction—that of Ground of a special content; and since the relation of Ground is one in which the Essence is regarded as externalizing itself in this distinction of Ground and Content, it becomes Conditioning Mediation.

Thirdly, Ground presupposes a condition, but the condition likewise presupposes a ground; the unity of the two is the unconditioned—the nature of the thing whereby it realizes itself in the category of Existence, through its mediation with its conditioning relations.

(It will be understood that the preceding is a general characterization of the entire contents of the third chapter of this work; this chapter concludes the first division of the treatment of Essence, and

inducts us into the consideration of more explicit categories of Relation. This introduction to the chapter merely states the general results, which we may expect to see proved in detail in what is to follow.)

Remark.

Ground, too, like the other categories of Reflection, has been expressed in the form of a Principle: Everything has a sufficient Ground, or Reason. The general meaning of this principle is nothing more than this: that whatever is, is to be considered, not as a something existing isolatedly for itself, but as a dependent something. It implies, therefore, that we must look beyond that which we see, and seek a ground or explanation for it—a ground in which the somewhat is not as it at first seemed, but is annulled as regards its immediateness, and is seen as it is in its being-in-and-for itself (*i. e.*, in its law or in the general type of its process). In the principle of Ground the essentiality of Reflection-into-itself, as compared with mere immediate being, is expressed.

That the ground must be a “sufficient” ground needs not be added, for it is superfluous; that for which the ground is not sufficient, would not have a ground at all. Leibnitz, who placed a high estimate upon the principle of sufficient reason, and made it the basis of his whole system, attached to it a deeper signification and a more important conception than is ordinarily given to it. Yet even in the ordinary acceptance it has a very important meaning, inasmuch as it implies that being, as such, in its immediateness, is to be taken as untrue, and essentially as a posited (*i. e.*, as a dependent), but its ground is to be taken as the true immediate (*i. e.*, as the true individuality). But Leibnitz added the designation “sufficient,” in order to distinguish it sharply from the mechanical conception of cause as an external activity or influence. When causality is conceived as a form external to its content, as an activity that produces a determination in an effect that is, after all, a merely external modification superinduced upon the so-called “effect,” this category is merely a loose and fortuitous connection of the determinations involved. The fact that the parts belong to the whole is comprehended in causality, but the definite relation of these parts is not stated in the concept of mechanical cause. This relation, the whole as the essential unity of the parts, lies only in the idea (ideal, the totality of its being), or in the final cause. Mechanical causes are not “sufficient” for this unity, because the final cause, as the unity of their determinations,

does not lie at the basis of mechanical causes. Under the concept of sufficient cause, therefore, Leibnitz has conceived a cause that sufficed for this unity; and, therefore, not a mere cause, but the final cause. This definition of ground, as understood by Leibnitz, is not the proper one of ground as it belongs here; the teleological ground is a category of the Idea (or *Begriff*), and its mediation is the Reason.

A.

The Absolute Ground.

1. Form and Essence.

The determination of Reflection, in so far as it returns to a ground (*i.e.*, shows that the idea of ground underlies the immediate being), constitutes only an immediate being in general with which a beginning is to be made. But the immediate being has only the meaning of a posited (dependent) being, and presupposes a ground, of necessity. It presupposes a ground in the sense that it does not posit this ground, but rather that this presupposition on its part is indeed a negation of itself (for it is a confession of its own dependence and consequent lack of individuality); the immediate is only the posited, and the ground is the non-posed. As it has been shown, the presupposition, which is a positing that points back to that which posited it, is the ground, but not as undetermined, in the annulment of all determinateness, but the self-determined essence that is undetermined or determined only as cancelled posited-being. It is the essence that is identical with itself in its own negativity.

The determinateness of essence as ground is therefore duplicate—that of ground and grounded. It is, first, essence as ground, determined as essence, as non-posed-being, in opposition to the posited-being. Secondly, it is the grounded, the immediate, which, however, is not in-and-for-itself, but the posited being as posited-being. This is, consequently, self-identical, but the identity of the negative with itself. The negative which is self-identical, and the positive that is self-identical, are one and the same identity. For the ground is identity of the positive, or of itself, and of the posited-being; and that which is grounded is the posited-being as posited-being, and this reflection-into-itself is the identity of the ground. This simple identity is, therefore, not the ground itself; for the ground is the essence, *posed* as the non-posed, in opposition to the posited-being. As this unity of the definite identity — of ground — and of the negative

identity — of the grounded — it is the essence in general, distinguished from its mediation.

This mediation, compared with the reflections that have preceded it, and from which it has originated, is, in the first place (as is obvious), not the pure reflection, as which it is not distinguished from the essence ; nor is it the negative, as which it would possess the independence of the determinations within itself. In the category of Ground as the annulled reflection, however, these determinations have a persistence. Moreover, it is not the determining reflection whose determinations possess essential independence ; for this independence of determinations has been shown to be groundless when we were demonstrating the category of Ground, and within its unity those determinations are as merely “ posited ” determinations. This mediation of Ground is, therefore, the unity of the pure reflection and the determining reflection. Its determinations, or the posited, have persistence ; and, conversely, the persistence of the same is a posited somewhat. For the reason that this persistence which it has is a posited one, or has determinateness, it follows that its determinations are different from its simple unity, and constitute the form as opposed to the Essence.

Essence has a form, and determinations of that form. First, as ground it has a fixed immediateness, or is a substratum. Essence is one with its reflection, and its movement is indistinguishable from it. It is, therefore, not the Essence which it penetrates ; and, moreover, it is not that which constitutes its commencement. This circumstance makes the exposition of reflection very difficult ; for it is not proper to say that the essence returns into itself, that it appears in itself, because it is not before its movement, nor in its movement, and the movement has no basis which supports it. A related somewhat makes its appearance in the ground according to the moment of annulled reflection. Essence, as the related substratum, is, however, the particularized Essence ; and on account of this posited-being it has the form as essentially belonging to it. The form-determinations, on the other hand, are the determinations as belonging to Essence. Essence lies at the basis, as the indeterminate, which in its determination is indifferent towards them. They have in it their reflection into themselves. The determinations of reflection are defined as possessing their subsistence in themselves, and as being independent ; but their independence is their dissolution ; therefore, they have their independence in another ; but this very dissolution is at the same time their very identity, or the ground of their persistence.

Form belongs to everything that is determined (or to all particular being); form-determination is distinguished from that whose form it is, and it is always a posited somewhat; the determinateness as quality is one with its substratum, with immediate being. Being is that which is immediately determined, that which is not distinct from its determinateness; it is that which is not reflected into itself, and hence it is an existent, and not a posited. The form-determinations of essence are, moreover, as determinations of reflection and as regards their definite particularity of content, the moments of reflection that have been considered above. Identity and distinction, the latter partly as difference, partly as antithesis, are these moments of reflection. Besides these, the determination of ground belongs to these form-determinations — that is, in so far as it is the annulled determination of reflection, or through this, essence is at the same time a posited. On the contrary, Identity does not belong to form, namely, that which is contained in the ground, that the posited-being as annulled, and the posited-being as such — the ground and the grounded — is one reflection, which constitutes the essence as simple basis — that is, the subsistence of the form. But this subsistence is posited in the ground; in other words, this essence is essentially as determined; consequently, it is also a moment of ground-relation and of form. This is the absolute reciprocal relation of form and essence: this simple unity of ground and grounded which is in this, at the same time a particular, or a negative, and distinguishes itself from the form, but at the same time is ground itself, and a moment of form.

Form is, therefore, the complete totality of reflection; it contains, moreover, this determination of reflection — it is annulled. Therefore it is likewise a unity of its determinations, and also related to their annulment, to another which is not form, but to which the form belongs. As the essential negativity which relates to itself, it is the positing and determining as opposed to this simple negative; as simple essence, on the other hand, it is the undetermined and non-active basis in which the determinations of form have their inherence or their reflection into themselves. External Reflection takes its stand upon this distinction between essence and form. (It has not the ability to transcend this category). It is necessary to discriminate between matter and form, but this very discrimination is their unity; and this unity of ground is essence which repels from itself and reduces what is repelled to a posited-being. Form is the absolute negativity itself, or the negative, absolute self-identity, through which essence is essence, and not mere being. This identity, taken abstractly, is essence as

opposed to form; just as negativity, taken abstractly as the posited-being, is the particular determination of form. This determination, however, as has been shown, is, in its truth, the total self-relating negativity, which is, consequently, as this identity, the simple essence in itself. Form, therefore, has essence as appertaining to its own identity; so, likewise, essence has as its own negative nature, the absolute form. Therefore, the question cannot be asked: how form is added to essence; for form is only the manifestation of essence in itself; it is the inherent reflection of essence. Form likewise is, by itself, the reflection which returns into itself; or, in other words, it is the self-identical essence. In its act of determining, it reduces its determination to posited-being as posited-being. It, therefore, does not determine essence as though it were presupposed, as though it were divided from the essence; for, as thus existing, it would be the unessential, a mere determination of reflection, restless, and perishing (going into its ground), and with this it would be rather the ground (or result) of its own cancelling, or the identical self-relation of its determinations. Form determines essence, in the sense that form, in its separation from essence, annuls this very separation, and is the self-identity of essence as the persistence of the determination. It is the contradiction which is annulled in its posited-being, and in this being-annulled finds its persistence; consequently it is ground as essence, which is self-identical in its being determined or negated.

These distinctions, therefore, of form and essence are mere elements or phases of the simple form-relation itself. But, considered more in detail, the determining form relates to itself as posited-being which has been annulled; and, therefore, it relates to its identity as though it were another. It posits itself as annulled, hence it presupposes its identity; essence is, in this phase, the indeterminate for which form is its other. Therefore, it is not essence which is the absolute reflection into itself, but this reflection is determined as the formless identity; it is *matter*.

2. Form and Matter.

Essence becomes matter, in the fact that its reflection determines itself, so that its reflection relates to it as to the formless indeterminate. Matter is, therefore, the simple identity devoid of distinctions, the identity which is essence determined as the other of Form. It is, therefore, the real basis or the substrate of Form; since it constitutes the reflection into itself of the form-determinations, which reflection is the independent, to which it relates as to its positive subsistence.

If abstraction is made from all the determinations which belong to

the form of a somewhat, there remains nothing but the undetermined matter. Matter is a pure abstraction. One cannot see matter, nor feel it; what one sees or feels is the determinations of matter, *i. e.*, the unity of matter and form. This act of abstraction from which the idea of matter proceeds is, however, not a mere external removal and annulment of form; but the activity of form (the self-determination which belongs to form) evolves this simple identity of and from itself, as we have already seen in the above consideration.

Moreover, form presupposes matter to which it relates. But for this reason form and matter are not found as two external categories accidentally opposed to each other; neither of the two is self-originating, or, in other words, *eternal*. Matter is *indifferent* as opposed to form, but this indifference is the determinateness of self-identity into which form returns as into its basis. Form presupposes matter. In this very fact that it posits itself as annulled, and consequently relates to this, its identity (matter), as to another, it presupposes matter. Conversely, form is presupposed by matter. For matter is not the simple essence which is the absolute reflection itself, but it is the same determined as the positive, *i. e.*, that which is only as annulled negation. But, on the other hand, because the form posits itself only as matter, in so far as it annuls itself and presupposes matter, matter is also determined to be persistence without a ground. Likewise, matter is not determined as the ground of form; but since matter posits itself as the abstract identity of the annulled form-determination, it is not identity as ground; and form, as opposed to it, is groundless. Form and matter are consequently defined as not posited through each other, and as not the ground of each other. Matter is rather the identity of the ground and the grounded—*i. e.*, as the basis (foundation) which stands opposed to this form-relation. This determination of indifference, which belongs in common to form and matter, is the determination of matter as such (*i. e.*, its definition), and constitutes also the relation of the two to each other. And in the same manner the definition of form, that it is the relation of distinct somewhats, is also the other side of the relation of the two to each other. Matter which is defined as indifferent is the *passive* opposed to the form as active. And this as the self-related negative is the contradiction within itself, the self-annulling, self-repelling, and self-determining. It relates to matter, and it is posited to relate to its subsistence as though to another. Matter is, therefore, posited as relating only to itself, and as indifferent towards others; but it relates to form potentially (*an sich*); for it contains annulled negativity, and is matter only

because of this characteristic. It relates to matter, therefore, as though matter were another being, because form is not posited as belonging to it—*i. e.*, because the same is only potentially attached to it. It contains the form involved within itself, and is the absolute receptivity for it, and only for this reason: that it has the same within it, and that this is its undeveloped nature. Matter must, therefore, receive form, and form must materialize itself; in other words, form must come into self-identity, or must reach its reality in matter.

(2.) Form, therefore, determines matter, and matter is determined by form; since form is the absolute self-identity, it follows that it contains matter within itself; in the same manner, matter possesses in its pure abstraction or absolute negativity the form within itself. Hence the activity of form upon the matter, and the being-determined of the latter through the former is only the annulment of the apparent indifference and independence of each as regards the other. This relation of the activity of determining is, therefore, the mediation of each with itself, by means of its own non-being. But these two mediations are one activity, and the restoration of their original identity—the re-collection from their externalization.

First. Form and matter presuppose each other reciprocally. As we have seen above, the one essential unity is negative relation to itself, and, therefore, dirempts itself into the essential identity, determined as the indifferent basis, and into the essential distinction or negativity as the determining form. That unity of essence and form which posits form and matter in opposition to itself is the absolute ground which determines itself. Since it reduces itself to a disparate somewhat, the relation, on account of the identity of the dispartes which lies at the basis, becomes reciprocal presupposition.

Secondly. Form, as independent, is the self-annulling contradiction; and it is also posited as such inasmuch as it is at the same time both independent and essentially related to another; it therefore annuls itself. Since it is ambiguous, this annulment has two aspects: In the first place, it annuls its independence, reduces itself to a posited-being, to a somewhat that belongs to another—this, its other, being matter. In the second place, it annuls its distinction from matter, its relation to the same, consequently its posited-being; and, therefore, attains self-subsistence. Since it cancels its posited-being, the latter is its reflection and its own identity, into which it passes. But since this identity externalizes itself and polarizes against itself as matter, the mentioned reflection of the posited-being into itself is a union with a matter, and as such it obtains its self-subsistence. Therefore, in this union with a matter as with another

being, as regards the first aspect in which it reduces itself to a posited-somewhat, it passes into identity with itself.

Therefore, the activity of form through which matter is determined consists in a negative relation of form to itself. But, conversely, it, too, relates negatively to matter; but this being-determined of matter is likewise the activity that belongs properly to form itself. Form is free as regards matter (*i. e.*, independent of or indifferent to matter), but it annuls this independence; however, its independence is matter itself, for to this belongs its essential identity. Since it reduces itself, therefore, to a posited-somewhat, this is one and the same activity which gives particularity to the matter. But, considered from the other point of view, the identity that belongs to form is expressed, and matter is the "other" thus expressed; to that extent matter is not particularized, for the reason that form annuls its (matter's) own independence. But matter is independent only as opposed to form; since the negative annuls itself, it annuls also the positive; therefore, since the form annuls itself, the particular determinations of matter fall away—those determinations which it has as opposed to form, *viz.*, its indeterminateness and persistence.

This which seems to be an activity of form is, therefore, likewise the movement which belongs properly to matter itself. The nature of matter, or its ideal destiny (what it should realize) is its absolute negativity. Through this, matter relates not only to form as to another, but this external (*i. e.*, this relation itself) is the form which it contained in an undeveloped state within itself. Matter is the same contradiction potentially as that which form contains, and this contradiction is like its resolution, only one. Matter, however, is in itself a contradiction, because it is absolute negativity while it is an undetermined self-identity; it therefore annuls itself within itself, and its identity is dirempted in its negativity, and the latter preserves its independence through the former. While, therefore, matter is particularized (determined or rendered definite) by form as by somewhat external to it, it by this means realizes itself; and the externality involved in the relation, as well on the part of form as on the part of matter, consists in this: that each of the two, or rather that their original unity, is in its positing likewise a presupposing; whence it follows that the relation to itself is a relation to itself as annulled, and, therefore, a relation to its "other."

Thirdly. Through the activity of form and matter their original unity is restored, but as a posited. Matter determines itself, although this determining is, as far as matter is concerned, an external deed emanating from form. Conversely, form determines only

itself, or contains matter that is determined by it within itself, although at the same time this self-determining appears to be a determining of something else. And finally, the two—the activity of form and the activity of matter—are one and the same; only that the former is an activity (*ein That*, a deed) in which the negative appears as a posited, while the latter is an activity (*Bewegung*, *i. e.*, a movement) which is a becoming, in which the negativity appears as characteristic of its very nature (*i. e.*, its potentiality, or its ideal). The result is, therefore, the unity of the being-in-itself (its nature, or potentiality, or ideal) and its being-posed (*i. e.*, its dependence upon others, or what it derives from others). Matter, as such, is determined (particularized, made special), or, in other words, has necessarily a *form*; and form, on the other hand, necessarily implies matter, or is self-subsistent form.

Form, in so far as it presupposes matter as its other, is finite. It is not Ground, but only activity. So also matter, in so far as it presupposes form as its not-being, is finite matter; it is likewise not the ground of its unity with form, but only the basis or substrate for the form. But this finite matter, as finite form, has no truth; each of the two relates to the other, and their unity only is their truth. In this unity the two determinations have their return, and in it they annul their independence; hence this unity is proved to be their ground. Therefore, matter is the ground of its determination of form only in so far as it is not matter as matter, but the absolute unity of essence and form. Form, too, is the ground of the persistence of its determinations only in so far as it is the same one unity. But this one unity as the absolute negativity, and more definitely as excluding unity, is in its act of reflection a presupposing somewhat. In other words, it is an activity which, in positing itself as a posited, preserves itself in the unity, and repels itself from itself, *i. e.*, relates to itself as itself, and to itself as though itself were another. Or, again, it may be stated in this way: The particularizing (*die Bestimmtwerden*) of matter through form is the mediation of Essence as Ground in one unity, through itself and through its own negation.

Matter which has received a form, or form which has obtained realization on a matter, is not merely that absolute unity of the ground with itself which has been mentioned, but also the posited unity. The movement already considered is that in which the absolute ground has exhibited its movements (or phases) as at the same time self-annulling, and hence as posited. In other words, the restored unity has, in its return to itself, at the same time repelled itself and determined itself (reduced itself to particularity); for its

unity, inasmuch as it has come into existence through negation, is also a negative unity. It is, therefore, the unity of form and matter as their basis which, however, is their definite, particular basis or substrate; and this matter that has received its form is indifferent to form and matter as to something that is annulled and unessential. It is *content*.

3. Form and Content.

Form, in the first place, stands opposed to Essence; hence it is a relation which belongs to the category of Ground, and its determinations are the Ground and the grounded. In the next place, it stands opposed to matter; and in this phase it is a "determining reflection," and its determinations are the determination-of-reflection itself and its persistence ("determination of reflection" includes Identity, Difference, Antithesis, and Contradiction; its persistence is its reality). Thirdly, and finally, it stands opposed to Content (*Inhalt*); in this phase its determinations are itself (*i. e.*, form) and matter. That which was previously self-identical, to wit, Ground, in the first place, and afterwards its persistence (or reality), and, finally, matter, now comes under the dominion of form, and is again one of its determinations.

Content has, in the first place, one form and one matter, which belong to it, and are essential; it is their unity. But since this unity is at the same time a particularized or posited unity, it stands opposed to form; the latter constitutes the posited-being of the unity (*i. e.*, the form is that which comes from the activity of that on which it depends), and is, as regards the content, unessential. The content is, therefore, indifferent to the form; it comprehends both the form, as such, and also the matter; and it has, therefore, a form and a matter, and it constitutes their basis, and they are for it a mere posited-being (mere result of its activity).

The Content is, in the second place, that which is identical in the form and matter; and in this respect the difference between form and matter would be a mere indifferent externality. They are nothing but posited-being, which, however, has returned to its unity in the content, and thus into its ground. The self-identity of the content is, from one point of view, therefore, the identity which is indifferent to the form; but from the other point of view it is the identity of the ground. Ground has vanished into Content; but content is meanwhile the negative reflection of form-determinations into themselves. Its unity, which in its first aspect is only indifference as regards form, is, therefore, also the formal unity or ground-relation as such. Con-

tent has, therefore, this unity for its essential form; and the Ground, conversely, a content.

The content of the Ground is therefore the Ground, which has returned into its unity with itself. Ground, in the first place, is Essence, which is identical with itself in its posited-being; as distinct from and indifferent towards its posited-being it is the undetermined (the indefinite) matter; but as content, it is the identity which has received form, and this form becomes on this account a ground-relation, because the determinations of its antithesis are posited in the content as also negated. Content is, moreover, determined (defined, particularized) within itself (by its own nature), not only as matter in the phase of indifference in general, but as matter that has received form, so that the determinations of form have a material reality, an indifferent persistence (independence). In one respect the content is the essential identity of the ground with itself in its posited-being. In another respect it is the posited identity as opposed to the ground-relation. This posited-being, which as form-determination belongs to this identity, is opposed to the free posited-being — *i. e.*, it is opposed to the form as the totality of the relation of the Ground and the grounded. This form is the total posited-being which returns into itself. The first-mentioned form, therefore, is only the posited-being as an immediate somewhat — determinateness, as such.

Ground with this has become determined (particularized) ground, and the determinateness itself is twofold: First, that of form; secondly, that of content. The former (the determinateness of form) is the determinateness which is external to the content, the content being indifferent to this relation. The latter is the determinateness of content that belongs to the ground.

B.

The Definite (particular) Ground.

1. The Formal Ground.

Ground has a definite content. The definiteness of the content (its particularity) is, as we have seen, the basis for the form, or the simple immediate that is opposed to the mediation of the form. Ground is identity relating to itself negatively (*i. e.*, annulling its indeterminateness and proceeding into determinations), and this, therefore, reduces itself to posited-being (*i. e.*, to dependent somethings). It relates negatively to itself (determines itself), since it is self-identical, in this its negativity; this identity is the basis or the con-

tent which constitutes in this manner the indifferent or positive unity of the ground-relation, and that which mediates it.

In this content the determinateness of ground and grounded, as opposed to each other, has vanished. The mediation is, however, besides this, negative unity. The negative as belonging to the indifferent basis is its immediate determinateness, and through it the ground possesses a definite content. But in the next place, the negative is the negative relation of form to itself. On the one hand, the posited annuls itself and goes back into its ground; but the ground, essential independence, relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to posited-being. This negative mediation of the ground and grounded is the mediation peculiar to form, as such — *the formal mediation*. The two sides of form now, since they pass over into one another, posit themselves in one common identity as annulled; through this, at the same time, they presuppose this identity. It is the definite, particular content to which, therefore, the formal mediation relates, as the positive act of mediating itself through itself. It is the identical phase of both, and while they are different, each, however, being in its distinction in relation to the other, the content is the persistence (reality) of the same, and of each one as being the whole.

According to this, it results that the following is present in the particularized ground: In the first place, a particularized content is regarded from two points of view, viz.: (1) in so far as it is posited as ground; (2) as grounded. The content itself is indifferent as regards this form; it is only one determination in both. Secondly, the ground itself is as much an element (*Moment*) of the form, as it is a somewhat posited by it; this is its identity according to the form. It is indifferent which of the two determinations are taken as the first — from which as the posited to proceed to the other as its ground, or from which as the ground to proceed to the other as the posited. The grounded, considered for and by itself, is the annulling of itself; with this it reduces itself on the one hand to a posited, and is at the same time the positing of the ground. The same movement is the ground as such; it reduces itself to a posited, and through this it becomes a ground of something — that is to say, it is present in this as a posited, and also as ground. That a ground exists implies a posited as a ground of this fact; and, conversely, through this the ground is in so far the posited. The mediation begins with the one just as well as with the other; each side is just as much ground as posited, and each is the entire mediation of the entire form. This entire form is furthermore the basis of the determinations as their self-identity, and since

the determinations are the two sides of the ground and the grounded, the form and content are thus precisely one and the same identity.

On account of this identity of the ground and grounded, and as well according to the content as according to the form, the ground is sufficient ("sufficient ground" is an important category used by Leibnitz)—the "sufficient" being limited to this relation. There is nothing in the ground which is not in the grounded, and nothing in the grounded which is not in the ground. If one asks for a ground, he expects to see the characteristic which constitutes the content used in a twofold manner: First, in the form of the posited; secondly, in the form of the reflection into itself of the particular being, *i.e.*, in the form of essentiality.

In so far as ground and grounded are each the entire form in the category of determined (particularized) ground, and their content is one and the same, although particularized ground is not yet fully determined (*i.e.*, particularized) in its two sides, they have not a different content; the determinateness is first simple, and not a determinateness that has passed over into the two sides. We have here the determined (particularized) ground first in its pure form—"the formal ground." Since the content is only this simple determinateness, to which the form of ground-relation does not belong, it is a self-identical content, indifferent as regards form, and form is external to it; it is another than the form.

Remark.

If reflection goes no further than the consideration of determined ground, as here defined, it follows that to adduce such a ground for any thing is a mere formalism, an empty tautology, which expresses over again the same content in the form of reflection-into-itself, or in the form of essentiality, what has already been expressed in the form of an immediate somewhat. Such a mention of grounds for any thing is as empty an affair as the appeal to the principle of identity which has been mentioned. Sciences, and more especially the physical sciences, are full of tautologies of this kind, and indeed this seems to constitute a sort of prerogative. For example, it is mentioned as the ground of the fact that the planets move around the sun—that there is an attractive force existing between the former and the latter. The content of this statement expresses nothing besides what the phenomenon contains, *viz.*, the relation of these bodies to each other in their movement, but it expresses it in the form of a reflected determination—that is, by means of the category of "force." If it be

asked, in reference to this, what kind of a force the attractive force is, the answer given is, that the force is what causes the planets to move around the sun; in these statements there is the same content throughout: First, as the fact to be explained; secondly, as the ground or reason given for it. The relation of the planets to the sun, as regards movement, is the basis of the ground and the grounded alike. If a crystalline form is explained by the particular arrangement which its molecules have, we have the same tautology; the fact of the crystallization is this arrangement itself, which is again expressed as the ground. In ordinary life, these *ætiologies* (methods of causal explanation) which are in vogue in the sciences pass for what they really are—for tautology, for empty talk. For example: if to the question, why this man goes to the city, it should be stated, as a reason, that he goes to the city because there is an attractive force which draws him there, such an answer would pass for trivial, although it would have the high sanction of being scientific. Leibnitz urged, as an objection against the Newtonian force of attraction, that it was an occult quality, similar to those which the scholastics employed for the purposes of explanation; but one might urge the opposite objection that it is a too well known, *too obvious* quality, for it has no other content than the phenomenon itself. Precisely what recommends this mode of explanation is its great clearness and intelligibility; for there is nothing clearer and more intelligible than to say, for example, that a plant is produced by (*i. e.*, has its ground in) a vegetative power, *i. e.*, a plant-producing power. It could be called an “*occult*” quality only when the ground had a different content from that which it is intended to explain. But such grounds are not given. The power which is used as an explanation is an “*occult*” ground, in so far as it is not such a ground as is demanded for explanation (*i. e.*, the ground demanded is not given, but remains “*occult*”). Through this formalism there is as little explained as there is explained of the nature of a plant when I say of it: It is a plant. Notwithstanding all the clearness of this proposition, or of that other proposition, that it has its ground in a plant-producing power, one might still call this a very “*occult*” method of explaining things.

Secondly. As regards form, we find in this mode of explanation the two opposite phases of ground-relation, without recognizing in them their definite relation to each other. Ground is ground, (1) as the into-itself-reflected content of a being of which it is the ground; (2) it is the posited. It is that by means of which the being is to be comprehended. But, on the other hand, the ground is an inference from

the being; so that it in turn is comprehended by reference to the being. The chief business of this sort of reflection consists in finding grounds for particular being—*i. e.*, in converting immediate beings into the form of reflection. The ground, instead of being independent, and in and for itself, is, therefore, rather what is posited and deduced. Now, for the reason that this procedure of finding a ground is guided by the phenomenon investigated, and the character of the ground determined by the latter, it follows quite smoothly and prosperously from its ground. But scientific knowledge has not by this means gone forward a particle; it has busied itself only with a difference in form, which has been confounded and annulled by this very procedure. One of the chief difficulties met with in the study of the sciences, in which this method prevails, consists in this confounding of the positions of the ground and grounded; placing that beforehand as ground which in fact is deduced, and arriving at a sequence which in fact should have been placed first, as the ground of the alleged ground. In the exposition the beginning is made with the grounds; they are set up in the air as principles, or first ideas; they are simple definitions, without any apparent necessity in and for themselves; that which follows is deduced from them; whoever, therefore, would master these sciences must begin with the study of those grounds, a task which reason finds unpleasant, because it has to take that which has no ground as a basis. He will come out best who takes these principles for granted without much reflection, and uses them as the fundamental rules of his intellect. Without this method he cannot make a beginning, and without them he can make no progress. This inconsistency, however, impedes his progress: he contradicts his method by deducing—from grounds which have been assumed—sequences which contain grounds of the former assumptions. Moreover, since the sequence proves to be the fact from whence the ground was deduced, this method of treating it causes one to distrust the exposition of it; for it is not expressed in its immediateness, but as a result of the ground. Since, however, the ground is likewise deduced from the immediate fact, one demands rather to see the fact in its immediateness, in order to decide upon the validity of its alleged ground. In such an exposition, therefore, in which that which is properly the ground is brought in as a deduction, one knows neither how to regard the ground nor the phenomenon. The uncertainty is increased by this circumstance, especially if the exposition is not strictly consequent, but is given out on authority, *viz.*, that every where in the phenomenon there are traces and conditions which point to other and quite different things from those con-

tained in the mere principles. The confusion is, finally, still greater when reflected and merely hypothetical determinations are mixed in with immediate determinations of the phenomenon, and the former are spoken of as if they belonged to immediate experience.

Thus, many who take up the study of these sciences with implicit faith are of the opinion that the molecules, and the void spaces, the repulsion, ether, single beams of light, electric or magnetic matter, and a multitude of the like distinctions, are real things which may be found in actual observation existing in the same manner as described in the sciences. They serve as first grounds for another; are expressed as actualities, and confidently applied. And they are allowed in good faith to pass for realities, before one is aware that they are determinations derived from those things for which they are offered as the grounds, being mere hypotheses formed by an uncritical reflection. In fact, one finds himself in a kind of *witch's circle* when he uses them, in which determinations of particular being and determinations of reflection — ground and grounded, phenomena and phantoms — course through each other promiscuously, and are all received as of equal rank and validity.

In this formal occupation of explaining things by means of grounds, one hears again and again, notwithstanding all this explanation by means of well-known powers and matters, that we do not know the internal essence of these powers and matters. In this, we have only a confession that this activity of explanation is wholly insufficient, and that it demands something quite different from the grounds which it offers; and the only difficult thing that remains for us to understand is, why all this trouble has been taken to make such explanations; why something else has not been sought, or at least that species of explanation dispensed with, and the simple facts themselves accepted without any explanation.

2. The Real Ground.

The determinateness of ground is, as has been shown, in the first place, the determinateness of basis (substrate) or of the content; in the second place, it is the other-being in the ground-determination itself, *viz.*, the difference between its content and the form. The relation of ground and grounded becomes a mere external form to the content, which is indifferent to these determinations. But in fact the two are not external to each other; for the content is really the self-identity of the ground in the grounded, and *vice versa*, of the grounded in the ground. The side which belongs to the ground has shown itself to be a posited somewhat, and the side which belongs to the grounded

has shown itself to be the ground itself; each is in itself the identity of the whole, but because they belong at the same time to the form, and constitute its special distinctions, each of them is in its determinateness the self-identity of the totality. Each has consequently a separate content opposed to the other. In other words, considered from the side of content, inasmuch as it is self-identity as ground-relation, it has essentially this form-distinction in itself, and is, as ground, another than the grounded.

In this fact, now that ground and grounded have a different content, the ground-relation has really ceased to be a formal distinction. The return into the ground, and the procedure out of it into posited-being, is no longer a mere tautology, and thus the ground is realized. When one asks for a ground, he desires to be answered by the statement of some other content-determination than the very one for which he has asked a ground or sought an explanation.

This relation can now be defined more accurately. In so far, namely, as its two sides are different in content, they are independent of each other; each is an immediate self-identical determination. Moreover, as ground and grounded are related to each other, the ground is reflected into itself in the other as in its posited-being; the content, therefore, which belongs to the side of the ground is likewise in the grounded; and the grounded, as the posited, has in that content its self-identity and reality. Besides this content of the ground, the grounded has also its proper, peculiar content, and is consequently the unity of a twofold content. Although this unity is, as a unity of contents which differ, their negative unity; for the reason that these content-determinations are indifferent towards each other, it follows that this unity is only an empty one, a relation devoid of content, and not their mediation; it is a one or a somewhat as an external bond of union.

In the real ground-relation, therefore, the twofold content is to be found, in the first instance, as content-determination, which is continued as self-identical in the posited-being, so that it constitutes the simple identity of ground and grounded. The grounded contains, therefore, the ground perfectly within itself; its relation, therefore, is an essential continuity, without break or separation. What therefore appertains to the grounded as additional to this simple essence, is, therefore, only an unessential form, external content-determinations which, as such, are independent of the ground, and possess an immediate manifoldness. And hence, the mentioned essential relation is not the ground of this unessential (superfluity and immediate manifoldness); it is the ground of the relation of the two to each other in the

grounded. It is a positive, identical somewhat which inheres in the grounded; although it is posited within it, not as in a form-distinction, but as a self-relating content is an indifferent positive basis or principle. Finally, that which is externally connected to this basis or principle is an indifferent content as the unessential side. The chief thing is the relation of the basis or substrate to the manifoldness which is regarded as unessential. But this relation, since the determinations which stand in relation constitute the indifferent content, is also not the ground, although the one is essential, and the other is defined as unessential or a posited-content; but this form is external to both, as self-relating content. The one of the somewhat which constitutes their relation is, therefore, not form-determination, but only an external bond which contains the unessential manifold content, but not as a posited somewhat; it is, therefore, only basis or substrate.

Ground, determined as real on account of the diversity of the content which constitutes its reality, falls asunder, therefore, into external determinations. The two relations—on the one hand, the essential content, as the simple immediate identity of ground and grounded; and, on the other hand, the somewhat, as the relation of the different elements of the content—these two relations are two different substrates. The self-identical form of the ground, according to which the same thing is at one time essential and at another time posited, has vanished, and the ground-relation has, therefore, become self-external.

There is, therefore, now an external ground, which brings into external relation different elements of the content, and determines what is ground and what is posited through the ground; in the two phases of the content itself, there is not to be found the means for determining this question. The real ground is, therefore, relation-to-other, on the one hand, of content to other content, and, on the other hand, of ground-relation, or form, to something else, viz., to an immediate that is not posited through it.

Remark.

The formal ground-relation contains only one content for ground and grounded; and in this identity of content lies its necessity, but, at the same time, its tautology. The real ground contains a diversity of content, but through this diversity there enters contingency and externality as regards the ground-relation. In the first place, that which is regarded as essential, and on this account as ground-determination, is not the ground of the other determinations which are connected with it. In the second place, it is not determined which

of the several content-determinations of a concrete thing is to be assumed as essential and as ground. The choice between them, therefore, is left free; thus, in the first aspect, for example, the ground of a house is its foundation; wherefore this ground depends upon the gravity inherent in sensuous matter, and gravity is identical in this case in the ground and grounded. The fact that there belongs to heavy matter such a distinction, viz., that one part should be a substrate and the other a modification different from it: this distinction appertaining to a dwelling-house is perfectly indifferent to gravity itself. Its relation to the other content-determinations of the final cause, the arrangement of the house, etc., is external to it; it is therefore a substrate, a foundation, but not a ground or cause of the same. Gravity is the ground or cause to which is to be attributed the fact that a house stands, and, as well, the fact that a stone falls. The stone has this ground, gravity, in itself; but the fact that it has other determinations of content besides gravity—determinations which make it to be a stone—is a fact indifferent to gravity. Moreover, the stone is a somewhat posited through another somewhat: that it was previously at a distance from the body to which it fell, and also that the time, the space, and their relation, the movement, are another content than gravity, and are capable of being conceived without it—to use the ordinary mode of expression—and are accordingly not essentially posited through it. They are also the ground that a projectile makes a flight opposed to gravity. It is evident, from the diversity of the determinations whose ground it is, that something else is demanded, which makes it the ground of this or of another determination.

If the assertion is made regarding nature, that it is the ground of the world; on the one hand, that which is called nature is identical with the world, and the world is nothing but nature itself. And yet they are also different, so that nature is rather the indeterminate, or at least determined only in such general characteristics as natural laws, for example; so, too, that nature is the self-identical essence of the world, and requires a multitude of determinations to be added to it in order to become the world. But these determinations have their ground not in nature as such; they are rather to be regarded as contingent and indifferent to it. We have the same relation between God and nature when God is defined as the ground of nature. As ground, He is its essence. Nature contains God within it, and is identical with Him; but nature has further manifold determinations which are different from the ground itself. Nature is the third term, therefore, in which these two different factors unite. The men-

tioned ground is neither the ground of the manifoldness different from it, nor for its connection with it. Nature is, therefore, not cognized as having its ground in God; for in that case He would only be the general essence of nature, whereas the ground of nature is a definite, particularized essence.

This producing of real grounds is, therefore, a formalism just as much as the formal ground itself, because of this diversity in the content of the ground, or the difference between the substrate and that which is connected with it in the grounded somewhat. In this formal ground, the self-identical content is indifferent as regards the form; in the real ground, the same thing is true. Through this fact, moreover, it does not contain within itself the ground or reason for deciding which of the many determinations shall be taken as the essential one. A somewhat is concrete, and has a manifold of determinations which show themselves self-subsistent and abiding. Therefore, one of them as well as another may be taken as ground, and may be held to be essential, and in comparison with it the others are a mere posited. What was formerly mentioned applies here: that if a determination occurs which in one aspect is viewed as the ground of another, it does not follow that the other is to be regarded as posited by it in any other, or in all aspects. Punishment, for example, has a variety of aspects in which it may be regarded, — that of retribution, that of a warning example, deterring from the infraction of law, and also that of the reformation of the criminal. Each of these different aspects has been regarded as the ground or reason of punishment, because each one is an essential determination; and, viewed in reference to it, the other determinations are defined as contingent. But the one which is assumed as ground is not identical with the total compass of punishment (in all its aspects); punishment, as a concrete, contains not only one, but all of the aspects which are connected with each other, being contained in punishment, but are not the ground of each other. As another example: an officer has fitness for the duties of his office, and as an individual has relations to kindred, and to this and that acquaintance; he possesses a character of his own, and has been in these or those circumstances, and has had such and such opportunities to show his capacity, etc. Each one of these things may be taken as the ground or reason for his possession of this office; they constitute a diversified content, whose elements are united in a third. The form, as the essential and as determined, in antithesis to the posited, is external to it. Each of these things is essential to the officer, because as a particular indi-

vidual he needs them for his realization. In so far as his office may be regarded as an external posited determination, each one of the things mentioned may be regarded as the ground of the office ; but, on the contrary, the office could also be regarded as the ground of each one of them, and in that case they would be the posited. As they actually stand—that is to say, considered in an individual case—the office is an external determination as regards content and ground. It is a third, which confers upon them the form of ground and grounded.

Every being may have a variety of grounds ; each one of the determinations of its content, as self-identical, penetrates the concrete totality, and for this reason may be regarded as essential. The various aspects, *i. e.*, determinations which lie outside of the thing itself, have no limit as to number, for the reason that the method of making combinations is a purely arbitrary one. Whether a ground has this or that sequence is, therefore, quite an accidental affair. Moral motives, for example, are essential determinations of an ethical nature ; but what follows from them is an external affair quite different from them ; it follows, and it does not follow, from them ; it is added to them by the agency of a third somewhat. In fact, when a moral determination is taken for a ground, it is not contingent that it shall have a result or a ground, but it is a contingency whether it shall become a ground or not ; but since the content, which is its result when the moral determination has been taken as a ground, is an externality, it may be annulled through another externality. From one moral motive, therefore, there may or may not result a deed. Conversely, a deed may have a variety of grounds ; it contains as a concrete many essential determinations, each one of which, therefore, may be assigned as the ground. The search for grounds, in which ratiocination principally consists, is, therefore, an endless procedure. Each and every thing may have one or more good grounds assigned for it, and there can be a multitude assigned for a thing without any result following from them. That which Socrates and Plato called sophistry is only ratiocination by means of assigning grounds. Plato opposes to this process the consideration of the Idea, *i. e.*, of the necessary nature of things, or their ideal totality (*Begriff.*) Grounds are selected only from essential determinations of content, essential relations, and aspects ; and each thing, as well as its opposite, possesses several of these. In their form of essentiality, one does as well as the other ; and since no one of them contains the entire compass of the object, each of them is a one-sided

ground, which does not exhaust the object which contains all these sides within it; no one of them is a "sufficient" ground, *i. e.*, ideal totality (*Begriff*).

3. The Perfect Ground.

(1.) In the real ground, the ground as content and the ground as relation are contained as mere substrates. Ground as content is only *posited* as essential and as ground. Ground as relation is the somewhat of the grounded, as the indefinite substrate of a diversified content, a connection between the different elements of the content, which is not its own reflection, but something external, and, consequently, only a posited. The real ground-relation is, therefore, rather the ground as annulled; and, therefore, it is rather the side of posited-being or of the grounded. As posited-being, however, the ground has returned into its own ground, and hence is a grounded, and has another ground; this other ground, therefore, determines itself to be identical, in the first place, with the real ground as grounded through it; both sides have, therefore, one and the same content; the two determinations of content, and their union in the somewhat, are therefore contained in a new ground. Secondly, the new ground, in which that merely posited external union (*Verknüpfung*) as been annulled, is, as their reflection into themselves, the absolute relation of the two determinations of content.

Through this fact—that the real ground has returned into its own ground—the identity of the ground and grounded, or formal ground, is restored. The ground-relation which has arisen is, therefore, the perfect ground, which contains within itself the formal and the real grounds, and which mediates in the latter, through each other, its immediate content-determinations.

(2.) The ground-relation has thus far developed the following determinations: *First*, a somewhat has a ground; it contains the content-determination, which the ground is, and a second determination posited through the ground. But as indifferent content, the one is not within itself ground, nor the other within itself the grounded of the former; on the contrary, this relation is, in the immediateness of the content, annulled or posited, and as such has another somewhat for its ground. This second relation, which differs only in respect to form, has the same content as the former, *viz.*, the two determinations of content, but is the *immediate* union of the two. Since, however, the different elements of the content, thus united, are consequently indifferent as regards each other, the union is not their true, absolute relation, in which the one of the determinations would

be self-identical in the posited-being, while the other would be only this posited-being of the same self-identical determination; but a somewhat is their substrate, and constitutes their relation, which is not reflected, but is only an immediate relation, and which, therefore, is only a relative ground as opposed to their union in another somewhat. The two somethats are, therefore, the two different relations of content which we have found; they stand in the identical ground-relation of form; they are one and the same content as a totality, viz., the two determinations of content and their relation. They are, therefore, distinct only through the nature of this relation, which in the one is an immediate and in the other is a posited relation; through which the one is distinguished from the other only according to form, as ground and grounded. *Secondly*, this ground-relation is not only formal, but also real. The formal ground passes over into the real ground, as we have seen. The moments of form are reflected into themselves; they are an independent content, and the ground-relation contains also a peculiar content of its own as ground, and one as grounded. The content constitutes the immediate identity of the two sides of the formal ground, and hence they have one and the same content. But it has also within itself the form; hence it is a two-fold content, which stands in the relation of ground and grounded. One of the two determinations of content which belong to the two somethats is, therefore, defined not as merely common to them, as found by external comparison, but as their identical substrate and the basis of their relation. Opposed to the other determination of content it is essential and the ground of it as posited, viz., in the somewhat whose relation the grounded is. In the first somewhat, which is the ground-relation, this second determination of content is also immediately united to the first, and according to its nature. The other somewhat, however, contains only the one potentially, as that in which it is immediately identical with the first somewhat; but it contains the other as a posited within it. The first determination of content is the ground of the same, through this fact: that it is united within the first somewhat primordially to the other determination of content.

The ground-relation of the determinations of content in the second somewhat is mediated, therefore, through the first self-existent relation of the first somewhat. The conclusion is this: for the reason that within a somewhat the determination B is united with the determination A by nature (*an sich*), there is in the second somewhat, to which only the determination A belongs, immediately also united with it the determination B. In the second somewhat this second determina-

tion is contained not only mediately, but also the inference that its immediate ground is, viz., through its immediate relation to B, in the first somewhat. This relation is consequently the ground of the ground A, and the entire ground-relation is in the second somewhat as posited or grounded.

3. The real ground thus appears as the self-external reflection of ground; the perfect mediation thereof is the restoration of its self-identity. But since the latter has retained at the same time the externality of the real ground, it follows that the formal ground-relation in this unity of itself and the real ground is self-positing as well as self-cancelling ground. The ground-relation mediates itself through its self-negation. In the first place, the ground, as the original relation, is the relation of immediate determinations of content. The ground-relation has, as essential form for its sides or terms, such somewhats as have already been cancelled or reduced to moments. Therefore, as form of immediate determinations, it is the self-identical relation, which is at the same time relation of its negation. Hence it is ground not in and for itself (by its own nature), but as a relation to the annulled ground-relation. In the second place, the annulled relation, or the immediate, which is the identical substrate in the original and in the posited relation, is a real ground likewise not in and for itself, but it is posited through that original bond of union to be ground.

The ground-relation in its totality is, consequently, essentially presupposing reflection; the formal ground presupposes the immediate content-determination; and the latter, as real ground, presupposes the form. The ground is therefore the form, as immediate bond of union, but in such a manner that it repels itself from itself, and presupposes the immediateness, and in this relates to itself as to another. This immediate is the determination of content, the simple ground; but as this simple ground it is repelled from itself, and relates to itself as to another. In this manner the total ground-relation is determined as conditioning mediation.

C.

The Condition.

1. The Relatively Unconditioned.

(1.) Ground is the immediate, and the grounded is the mediated. But ground is the positing reflection, and, as such, it reduces itself to posited-being, and is presupposing reflection; it therefore re-

lates to itself as annulled, as an immediate through which it, itself, is mediated. This mediation, as progress from the immediate to the ground, is not an external reflection, but, as has been developed, it is due to the activity of ground itself; or, what is the same thing, the ground-relation is, as reflection into self-identity, likewise essentially self-externalizing reflection. The immediate to which ground relates as to its essential presupposition is the *Condition* (*i. e.*, the conditioning limits—*Bedingung*); the real ground is, therefore, essentially conditioned; the determinateness which it contains is the otherness of itself.

The conditioning limit is, therefore, in the first place, an immediate, manifold being. In the second place, this being is related to another, to a somewhat which is ground, not of this being, but of something else; for the being itself is immediate, and without ground. In this relation it is a posited somewhat; according to it, the immediate being would be a conditioning limit, not of itself, but of another; but at the same time this being for another is itself only a posited-being; that it is a posited-being is annulled in its immediateness, and a being is indifferent as regards its function as conditioning limit. In the third place, the conditioning limit is, therefore, an immediate, so that it constitutes the presupposition of the ground. In this phase it is the form-relation of the ground, which has returned into self-identity, and hence it is its content. But the content, as such, is only the indifferent unity of the ground as it is in the form—without form, no content. The content frees itself from the form through the fact that the ground-relation in the perfect ground becomes a relation external to its identity; through this the content preserves its immediateness. In so far, therefore, as the conditioning limit is that in which the ground-relation possesses its self-identity, it constitutes its content; but for the reason that it is indifferent to this form, it is only potentially its content—that is, it ought to be the content, and hence it constitutes the material for the ground. Posited as conditioning limit, the being, according to the second moment (element or phase), possesses this peculiarity; it loses its indifferent immediateness, and becomes a moment of another being. Through its immediateness, it is indifferent to this relation; but, in so far as it enters this relation, it constitutes the nature (*Ansichseyn*) of the ground, and is the unconditioned for it. In order to be conditioning limit, it has its presupposition in the ground, and is itself conditioned, but this characteristic is an external (accidental) one for it.

(2.) A somewhat is not through its conditioning limit; its condi-

tioning limit is not its ground. It is the moment (phase) of unconditioned immediateness for the ground, but it is not the activity and the positing which relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to a posited-being. The ground-relation, therefore, stands opposed to the conditioning limit. A somewhat has, besides its conditioning-limit, also a ground. This is the active movement of reflection, because it has the immediateness outside of it as its presupposition. But it is the entire form; and the independent activity of mediation for the conditioning limit, is not its ground. For the reason that this mediating activity relates to itself as a positing activity, it is in this respect, also, an immediate and unconditioned, although it presupposes itself as externalized and annulled positing activity; hence, that which it is, according to its determination (*Bestimmung* = destination), it is in and for itself. Therefore, in so far as the ground-relation is independent self-relation, and possesses the identity of reflection within itself, it has a peculiar content, opposed to the content of the conditioning limit. The former is the content of the ground, and therefore possesses an essential form. The latter, therefore, is only immediate material, for which the relation to the ground is external, while it constitutes also its nature. Consequently it is a mingling of the independent content, which possesses no relation to the content of ground, with that which goes into itself, and as its material becomes a moment of the same.

(3.) The two terms of the totality—the conditioning limit and the ground—are therefore, in one respect, indifferent and unconditioned as opposed to each other; the one, which is the non-related, is external to the relation in which it is conditioning limit; the other as the relation or form, for which the particularized being of the conditioning limit is only as material, as a passive something whose form, which it possesses for itself within it, is an unessential somewhat. Moreover, both are mediated. The conditioning limit is the being in itself of the ground. It is essential moment of the ground-relation to the extent that it is its simple self-identity. But this simple self-identity is also annulled; this being in itself, or nature, is only a posited; the immediate being is indifferent as regards the phase of conditioning limit. The fact that the conditioning limit of the being in itself is for the ground, constitutes its phase of mediation. Likewise, the ground-relation possesses, in its independence, a presupposition, and has its being in itself (nature) outside itself. Consequently, each of the two phases is a contradiction, inasmuch as it includes the indifferent immediateness and the essential mediation

both in one relation. In other words, the contradiction consists in being an independent self-subsistence and a mere element at the same time.

2. The Absolutely Unconditioned.

The two relatively unconditioned somewhats manifest themselves each in the other. The conditioning limit, as immediate, manifests itself in the form-relation of the ground, and the latter manifests itself in immediate being as its posited-being (dependence). But each of these relatively unconditioned somewhats is independent of this manifestation of its other within it, and has a proper content of its own.

In the first place, the conditioning limit is immediate being. Its form has these two phases: the posited-being, according to which it is, as conditioning limit, material and element of the ground; and (the other phase is) being-in-itself (*Ansichseyn*—its own nature, which is through itself, and not a mere “posited-being,” or being derived from another, and dependent on it), which constitutes the essentiality of the ground, or its simple reflection-into-itself (“reflection-into-itself,” it will be remembered, is always the form of self-relation in its positive aspect of identity, independence, and infinitude). The two sides of form are external to the immediate being, for immediate being is the cancelled ground-relation. But, first, being is by itself only the process of self-annulment in its immediateness, and of ceasing to be (*i. e.*, of “going to the ground”). The sphere of Being (treated in the first part of this logic, and including all categories of immediateness, such as quality, quantity, and measure) is only the becoming of Essence (transition to Essence); it is its essential nature to reduce itself to a posited-being, and to an identity which is the immediate, through the negative of it (as a posited). Therefore, the determinations of form, *viz.*, of posited-being, and of self-identical being-in-itself—the form through which immediate being is conditioning limit—are therefore not external to it, but immediate being is this reflection itself. Secondly, as conditioning limit, what being essentially is, is now also posited; it is, *viz.*, a moment, consequently a phase of another, and at the same time likewise the being-in-itself of another; but it is *in itself* only through the negation of itself, *i. e.*, through the ground, and through its reflection, which is self-annulling, and consequently presupposing. The being-in-itself of the categories of the sphere of Being is, consequently, only a posited. This being-in-itself of the

conditioning limit has these two aspects: (1) its essentiality as ground, and (2) the immediateness of its particular being. These two are the same. The particular being is an immediate, but the immediateness is essentially what is mediated—mediated, viz., through the self-annulling ground. As this immediateness, which is mediated through the self-annulling mediation, it is the being-in-itself of ground, and at the same time its unconditioned. But this being-in-itself is, at the same time, likewise only a moment or posited being, for it is mediated. The conditioning limit is, therefore, the entire form of the ground-relation. It is the presupposed being-in-itself of the same. But, as such, is as a posited-being, and its immediateness reduces it to posited-being; it consequently repels itself from itself, so that it is annulled (goes to the ground) as ground, which reduces itself to posited-being, and consequently to the grounded. And the two are one and the same.

Being-in-itself is likewise found in connection with the conditioned ground, not merely as manifestation of another upon it. It is independent, and this means that it is the self-relating reflection of the activity of positing. Hence, it is the self-identical—*i. e.*, it is its being-in-itself, and its content. But at the same time it is presupposing reflection. It relates negatively to itself, and posits its own being-in-itself as something opposed to it in another; and the conditioning limit is the real phase of ground-relation, as well according to the moment of being-in-itself as according to that of immediate being. Immediate being is essentially and solely through its ground, and is a moment of its ground as a presupposing activity; hence, this presupposing activity is likewise the entire movement.

For this reason, there is only one totality of form extant, and likewise only one totality of content. For the proper content of the conditioning limit is essential content only in so far as the identity of self-reflection in the form, or in so far as this immediate being is in itself the ground-relation. This immediate being is, moreover, conditioning limit only through the presupposing reflection of the ground. It is its self-identity, or its content, posited by it in opposition to itself. Particular being is, therefore, not merely a formless material for the ground-relation, but it is matter that has received form; for it already possesses this form, and it is content since it is indifferent towards it, while it is in identity with it. Finally, it is the same content which ground has, for it is content precisely in so far as it is the phase of self-identity in the form-relation.

The two sides of the totality—the conditioning limit and the ground—are therefore one essential unity, both as content and as

form. They pass over into each other through their own activity ; or, in other words, since they are movements of reflection, they posit themselves as annulled, and relate to this annulment, which is their negation, and therefore mutually presuppose each other. But this is, at the same time, only one movement of reflection for both ; their mutual presupposition is therefore only one activity ; the antithetic attitude of the two passes over into the phase in which they presuppose their one identity as their persistence (self-dependence) and as their substrate. This substrate, which is the one content and form unity of both, is the truly unconditioned ; it is the thing in itself (*die Sache an sich selbst*). The conditioning limit, as defined above, is only the relatively unconditioned. It is usually, therefore, regarded as itself conditioned through something else, and a new condition is asked for ; hence the progress, *ad infinitum*, from condition to condition is introduced. Why one asks for the condition which limits another condition means the same thing as the question, why does one assume it as conditioned ? The answer to this is, because it is a finite being. But this idea of finite being is something which does not belong to the conception of conditioning limit. The conditioning limit, as such, is therefore itself conditioned through something else, because it is the posited being-in-itself. The conditioning limit is therefore annulled in the absolutely unconditioned.

The absolutely unconditioned contains the two moments : (1) the conditioning limit and (2) the ground. It is the unity into which they have returned. The two together constitute the form or the posited-being of the absolutely unconditioned. The unconditioned thing (*Sache*) is the conditioning limit of both, but it is the absolute—that is to say, the conditioning limit, which is ground itself. As ground, it is the negative identity which has repelled itself into the two moments mentioned, viz., (1) into the shape of the annulled ground-relation, *i. e.*, that of an immediate self-external multiplicity, devoid of unity, which relates to its ground as to its other, and at the same time constitutes its being-in-itself ; (2) it has repelled it into an internal, simple form, which is ground, but which relates to the self-identical immediate as to another, and determines the same as conditioning limit, *i. e.*, determines its being-in-itself as its own moment. These two sides presuppose the totality, therefore, as that which posits them. Conversely, since they presuppose the totality, the totality seems to be conditioned through them, and the “thing in itself” (*Sache*) seems to originate from its conditioning limit and from its ground. But since these two sides have shown themselves identical, the relation of conditioning limit and ground

has vanished, and these two categories are reduced to an appearance. The absolutely unconditioned, in its activity of positing and pre-positing, is only the activity in which this appearance annuls itself. It is the activity of the thing (*Sache*) which conditions itself, and places itself over against its conditions as their ground. Its relation as that of conditions and their ground is, however, a manifestation within it, and it stands in relation to them as its own self-identity (*Zusammengehen mit sich selbst*).

3. The Thing (*Sache*) Emerges into Existence.

The absolutely unconditioned is the absolute ground, identical with its conditioning limit; it is the immediate thing as the truly essential. As ground it relates negatively to itself, and reduces itself to posited-being; but this posited-being is the reflection which is completed in its two phases or sides, and in them it is self-identical form-relation, as has been ascertained in the foregoing investigation of its nature (*Begriff*). This posited-being, therefore, is, in the first place, annulled ground, or the thing as immediate and without any activity of reflection: this is the side of the conditioning limit. This is the totality of the determinations of the thing — the thing itself, but cast forth into the externality of being; it is the restored circle of being. In the conditioning limit, essence sets free the unity of its reflection into itself as an immediateness, which, however, has now the characteristic of being a presupposition which is a conditioning limit, and of constituting only one of its sides or phases. The conditioning limits are, therefore, the entire content of the thing, because they are the unconditioned in the form of the formless being (*Form des formlosen Seyns*). On account of this form, however, they have also still another aspect: that of the determinations of content as it is in the Thing as such. They manifest themselves as a multiplicity without unity, intermingled with non-essential and other circumstances, which do not belong to the sphere of particular being, in so far as it constitutes the conditioning limits of this particularized thing. The sphere of Being is itself the conditioning limit for the absolute unlimited thing. Ground, which returns into itself, posits it as the primary immediateness to which it relates as its unconditioned. This immediateness as the annulled reflection is reflection in the element of Being. This, therefore, as such completes itself to a totality. The form grows as determinateness of being, and manifests itself as a manifold content different from the determination of reflection, and indifferent towards it. The non-essential which appertains to the sphere of being, and which it, in so far as it is conditioning limit,

excludes, is the determinateness of immediateness into which the form-unity has sunk. This form-unity, as the relation of being, is first the category of Becoming, in this place—the transition of one determinateness of being into another. But the becoming of Being is its transition into Essence, and hence its return into Ground. Hence particular being, which constitutes the conditioning limits, is in truth not determined to be conditioning limit by another, and is not used as its material; but it, by its own activity, reduces itself to a moment of another. Its becoming is, moreover, not a beginning with itself, as if it were the true primordial and immediate, but its immediateness is only what is presupposed, and the activity of its becoming is the activity of reflection itself. The truth of particular being is, therefore, its realization as conditioning limit. Its immediateness is solely through the reflection of the ground-relation, which posits itself as annulled. The becoming, so far as it is immediateness, is only the appearance of the unconditioned, since the latter presupposes itself, and has in this presupposition its form, and the immediateness of being is therefore only a moment or phase of form.

The other side or aspect of this appearance of the unconditioned is the ground-relation, as such, which is determined as form in opposition to the immediateness of the conditioning limits and the content. It is the form, however, of the absolute Thing which possesses within itself the unity of its form and itself, or its content; and, since it determines its content to be a conditioning limit, it annuls in this very positing its diversity, and reduces it to a moment; conversely, as form devoid of essence in this self-identity, it takes on the form of immediateness as persistent reality. The reflection of ground annuls the immediateness of conditioning limits, and relates them to moments within the unity of the thing. The conditioning limits, on the other hand, are what is presupposed by the unconditioned thing itself; it annuls, therefore, its own positing; or, in other words, its positing reduces itself immediately to a becoming; the two are, therefore, one unity. The movement of the conditioning limits within themselves is a becoming, a return into the ground, and a positing of the ground. But the ground as posited—that is to say, as annulled—is the immediate. Ground relates to itself negatively, reduces itself to posited-being, and furnishes a ground for the conditioning limits. In the fact, however, that by this the immediate particular being is determined into a posited, the ground annuls it, and becomes ground in that act. This reflection, therefore, is the mediation of the unconditioned thing through its negation. Or, in other words, the reflection of the unconditioned is at first a presup-

posing; while, on the other hand, this annulment of itself is a positing of immediate determinations. In the second place, it is in this activity immediately the annulment of what is presupposed, and a determining which proceeds from itself; consequently, this determining is also the annulment of the positing, and is the becoming within itself. In this activity the mediation, as return to itself through negation, has vanished; it is simple reflection manifesting itself, and an absolute becoming devoid of ground. The activity of the thing through which it is posited, on the one hand by its conditioning limits, and on the other hand by its ground, is only the evanescence of the appearance of mediation. The activity of the thing by which it becomes posited is, therefore, a manifestation of itself as Existence—a simple exhibition of itself in the form of Existence; this is the pure movement of the thing within itself.

When all the conditioning limits of a thing are present, it comes into existence. The thing is before it exists. It is, first, essence or unconditioned; secondly, it is particular being, or is determined in a twofold manner: (1) in its conditions, (2) in its ground. In the first, it assumes the form of external, groundless being, for the reason that it is, as absolute reflection, negative self-relation, and thus its presupposition. This presupposed unconditioned is, therefore, the groundless immediate, whose being is nothing else than to exist without a ground. If, therefore, all the conditions of a thing are present—that is to say, if the totality of the thing is posited as groundless immediate—this scattered multiplicity is by this fact collected within the thing itself. The totality of the thing requires all its conditions; they all belong to its existence. For all together constitute the reflection. In other words, the particular being, since it is conditioning limit, is determined (particularized) by the form; and hence its determinations are, therefore, determinations of reflection, and are posited essentially through each other. The collection of the conditions in one unity is the destruction of the immediate being and the becoming of the ground. With this the ground is a posited, *i. e.*, it is annulled so far forth as it is ground, and thus it is immediate being. Therefore, when all the conditions of a thing are present, they are all annulled as immediate beings (mutually annulled), and as presupposition; and likewise the ground is annulled. Ground exhibits itself only as an appearance, which immediately vanishes; this is, consequently, the tantological movement within itself, and its mediation through the conditions and through the ground is the vanishing of both conditions and ground. The entrance

into existence is an immediate affair only through the fact that its mediation is a vanishing of mediation.

The thing proceeds from its ground. It is not grounded or posited through it in such a manner that the ground remains standing under it, but the act of positing is the outward movement of ground into itself, and the simple vanishing of itself as ground. It receives external immediateness through its union with the conditioning limits, and thus attains the phase of Being. But it receives external immediateness, not as an external somewhat, nor through an external relation. On the contrary, it reduces itself as ground to posited-being; its simple essentiality comes into self-identity in the posited-being; in this annulment of itself it is the vanishing of its difference from its posited-being, consequently it is simple, essential immediateness. The ground, therefore, does not remain behind as something different from that which is grounded; but the truth of that which is grounded lies in the fact that the ground unites itself with itself in this movement, and consequently its reflection into another becomes its reflection into itself. The thing, consequently, in so far as it is the unconditioned, is also without ground; and it issues forth from the ground only in so far as it proves itself perishable ("goes to the ground"), and is no ground; it issues forth from the groundless, *i. e.*, from its own essential negativity, or pure form.

This immediateness, which is mediated through ground and condition, and is self-identical through the annulment of mediation, is Existence.

SECOND SECTION.

Essence must manifest itself in a phenomenon (*erscheinen*).

Being is the absolute abstraction; as such its negativity is not anything external to it [but something intrinsic]; this negativity is being itself, and nothing else than being in this phase of absolute negativity. Hence being is only self-annulling being, and is essence. On the other hand Essence, in its phase of simple self-identity, is likewise Being. The science of Being contains the first proposition: Being is Essence. The second proposition: Essence is Being, constitutes the content of the first section of the science of Essence. This "Being" which essence is in one of its phases, is *essential* being,—[technically termed here] existence—a being that has arisen from negativity and internality. [Being is "absolute abstraction," because, in the thought of being we regard only its phase of self-relation and make abstraction from all other phases. "Relation to others" is not a category of being. In the sphere of being everything is thought of as independent, existing by itself without aid from anything else, and as having reality by itself considered—hence as existing outside of relation. If *relation* is spoken of in the science of being it does not belong to that stage of thinking which thinks being, or else it is a mere subjective relation just as this paper on which I write is externally related to my pen with which I write, but there is no essential relation between them, no dependence of one on the other, and each of them can be thought as existing without the other. This phase of being is called "absolute negativity," in view of the fact that the Science of Being has shown, as a result of investigation in the case of each and every category under Being, that every form of being is vanishing or transitory, each proving to be only an arc of a circle of process. The result is universally negative—the destruction of the particular forms of being—no phase of immediateness having any abiding. Being is therefore the self-annulling. But as entire circle of process it is Essence. Or, more accurately, Essence is the entire process in its aspect of relation or dependence—hence in its aspect of abiding. For the relation is the abiding or identity of a somewhat in its other, its continuation in its other. The proposition "Being is

Essence," of course does not mean that it is Essence, if Being is taken in its immediateness, or as mere transitory phase, but it means that Being when traced out so that we have found its truth, or the totality of its process, or the true nature of it, is Essence or the abiding being—that kind of being that abides through all change of particular form or phase. So, too, the second proposition, "Essence is Being," does not mean that Essence is Being *no matter how we think it*. It means that Essence as this negative self-relation produces and sustains itself in *immediateness*—as has been shown in this book in the chapter on "Ground." It may be truly said that if we think of Being as it truly is we must think it as a phase of self-relation; hence Being is only an aspect of Essence. Again, Essence is a process which has immediateness and self-relation as its result and as its constant product—hence Essence is Being, or in the form or phase of Being and is more than Being, for it abides, and is true Being, or existence. It must be remarked that Being always has the form of self-relation, or of independence—but not an *explicit* self-relation, or a relation which is in the form of "A relates to B which relates back to A, again" = A determines B and B determines A—so that A relates to itself through B, or so that A determines itself through B. This self-mediation through another is not perceived by the thinking which thinks mere Being. And yet this logical investigation finds this self-mediation through another to be the essential presupposition of any or all forms of Being. But the thinking which possesses this insight is the thinking which thinks Essence. The thinking which thinks Essence is able to understand that those categories which it thought as forms of Being, are such arcs of the process of self-relation as include the result of the "positing reflection." (See p. 14.) Essence as Being—here termed "Existence"—is the permanent manifestation of Essence through its own activity. Hence, "Phenomenon" means *complete manifestation*, or *essential appearance*. This complete manifestation has "emerged from negativity and internality;" that is to say, we have found that the negativity of the process called Essence does not result in zero, but in a reality which possesses immediateness through the annulment of mediation; the mere annulment of external mediation results in "internality," but the "Phenomenon" preserves *externality* or abiding objectivity].

Therefore, Essence manifests itself in a Phenomenon. Reflection is the appearing-to-itself of Essence. The determinations of Reflection are "posed" or annulled [*i.e.* dependent] when in the unity of reflection; in other words, Reflection is Essence as immediately self-identical in its posited-being [its dependence being converted

into self-dependence]. But since this activity [of reflection, which is self-identical in its posited-being] is Ground, it determines itself in the form of reality, through its self-annulling or self-returning reflection. Moreover, since this determination [of itself as real], or the other of the Ground-relation annuls itself in the reflection of Ground, and thus becomes existence [*i.e.* it takes up its conditions and includes them within itself], it follows that the Form-determinations obtain in this result an element of independent subsistence. Their appearance becomes complete in the Phenomenon.

The essentiality which has thus attained to immediateness, is, in its first phase, Existence; and as such composed of existing somethings or things; this phase is the indistinguishable unity of essence with its immediateness. “Thing” contains the movement of reflection, but in the immediateness of Thing the negativity of reflection is annulled; but for the reason that the ground of the thing is essentially this movement of reflection it annuls its immediateness; the thing is reduced to a posited-being. [Hegel’s style of writing about the investigation of the categories is dramatic; each category is treated as though self-active. Its definition is taken for its expressed will or intention, and then its behavior or its implication with others is compared with this its definition and the contradictions noted. This is the famous “dialectic;” each category is treated as though ultimate and final—as though it expressed independent, universal truth. An investigation of its contradictory behavior, when thus treated as universal, reveals to us the imperfection of the category, its dependence upon other categories with which it forms a whole, and the necessity is evident of a new definition which expresses this relation to others in a new unity. The definition of the new unity is a higher, more concrete statement of truth, inasmuch as it readjusts the previous statement and corrects its defects. Here, for example, “Existence” is found to involve existence under the form of particular “things.” Furthermore, “Thing” is found to involve the movement of reflection which annuls this immediateness of the “things;” hence “things” exist only in a state of transience. This result here stated is the brief announcement of what is to be shown in detail in the first chapter of this second division of Essence.]

Hence, secondly, essence is Phenomenon [not merely “existence” nor “thing;” their transitoriness is “phenomenon”]. The phenomenon is what the thing is in itself [in its nature], or it is the “truth of the thing.” Existence, as posited or reflected in the other-being [as a “thing”] is, however, the transcendence of itself,

the progress *ad infinitum*, away from itself ; the world of phenomena places itself in opposition to the reflected world, the world of being-in-itself [*i.e.* to the internal nature of “things”]. [This is a brief announcement of the contents of the second chapter of this second division of Essence].

But the essential being and the being which is a manifestation or phenomenon, stand in immediate relation to each other [they are mere counterparts or counter movements of one activity]. Hence, thirdly, “Existence” [with which we have to do in this second division of Essence] is Reciprocity or essential relation [or *state of relation*, or that which exists only in relation] ; the manifestation in a phenomenon (*Erscheinende*) exhibits the essential, and Essence is [or is completely included] in its phenomenon : — Essential relation [*Verhältniss*] is the as-yet-imperfect union of reflection in the other-being, [or in externality] and of reflection into itself ; the perfect interpenetration of the two is Actuality. [In this announcement of the contents of the third chapter of this second division of Essence we arrive at the idea of Actuality as the complete realization of the internal nature or essence in outer manifestation. We now proceed to take up the subject in detail.]

FIRST CHAPTER.

Existence.

Since the Proposition or principle of the “Ground” expresses : Everything that is, has a ground or is a posited *i.e.*, a mediated ; the principle of Existence would have to be expressed as follows : Everything that is, *exists*. The truth of Being is not found in a first immediate, but rather in the immediateness which has emerged from Essence [this immediateness of “Existence”].

If, however, the assertion is made that whatever exists has a ground and is conditioned [through that ground] *there would* need an additional statement [to correct the one-sidedness of the former] : it has no ground and is unconditioned. For Existence is the immediateness which has resulted from the annulment of mediation as found in the relation of ground and condition — an immediateness which in its production cancels the means that produced it. [An immediateness which results from the cancelling of mediation belongs to the higher order of immediateness. All self-mediation is of this order. Everything pertaining to the realm of Mind furnishes an illustration. I study Euclid ; I avail myself of his aid, using his

demonstration to comprehend the nature of a triangle, but obtaining insight into the subject I see the truth immediately, and without his aid. At first there was dependence on Euclid, mediation through his labors, but a use of his insight as mediation gives me immediate insight, makes me independent of his labors, and therefore annuls the mediation: The history of Mind everywhere furnishes the example of the person who "climbs a ladder and draws the ladder up after him."¹]

If the "Proof of the existence of God" is referred to at this point, it must be remembered that beside immediate Being and Existence [the "Being" of Essence] there is a third form of Being resulting from the Idea ["Begriff"] which is called "Objectivity." [The three parts of the Logic treat respectively, Being, Essence and Idea; in the first, we have immediate Being, utterly without mediation and hence without persistence and truth; in the second there is Essence whose immediateness is Existence, persistent and abiding, but imperfect, because its externality is opposed to internality: in the third, the Idea, or self-determination as completed in thought and will, or conscious personality we have again immediateness, this time as "objectivity." — subject-objectivity, or consciousness, the knowing of self, the becoming-completely-objective is REVELATION. Hence if the thought of mere being gives us the appearance of the Absolute, the thought of Essence gives us the self-manifestation and the thought of Idea gives us the self-revelation of the Absolute.¹

The process of proving something is, of course, a mediated knowing. The various kinds of Being demand or contain their own kinds of mediation; and so it happens that the nature of the process of proof varies with each kind of mediation. The ontological proof of the being of God sets out from ideas, it lays down as postulate the idea of the totality of all reality and then subsumes existence under the reality [it argues for the necessity of the existence of the totality] — it is therefore the mediation of the syllogism and is not in place for us to consider here. We have already mentioned in another place what Kant has urged against this form of proof, and have called attention to the fact that Kant understands by the term, "Existence," only *particular being*, and by the category of particular being every thing in the total content of our experience is thought as standing in relation to some other thing and as being itself another to something else; in other words, it falls

¹ See Brockmeyer's "Letters on Faust" (*Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. 1, page 181) for distinctions between self-manifestation, self-revelation and self-definition. — *Translator.*

under the category of “other-being.” For example, “somewhat” is as an existing thing mediated through “another,” and existence itself is the side of mediation for all things. Now in what Kant calls the Idea [*Begriff*=Idea or “Notion”¹] namely, in the somewhat in so far as it is taken simply, as related to itself merely, or as an “idea in the mind,” its mediation has been omitted; in its abstract identity, its antithetic relation to other things is left out. The ontological proof, according to this view would have to show that the absolute Idea, viz. the idea of God comes to particular Being, *i. e.* to mediation; in other words, as the simple essence proceeds to self-mediation. This takes place through the mentioned subsumption of existence under a more general term, namely, reality, which is assumed as the middle term between God in his Idea, on the one hand, and existence, on the other. Of this mediation so far as it has the form of the syllogism (inference) as remarked before, this is not the place to speak. But with the mediation of Essence with existence—its mode and manner—the present exposition deals. The nature of the process of demonstration is to be considered in the chapter that treats of the science of cognition [third part of this logic]. Here we are to treat only what concerns the nature of mediation in general.

The proof of the existence of God assigns a ground for his existence. This ground, it is understood, cannot be an objective [external] ground of the existence of God; for God exists in and for himself [and without grounds]. Hence this proof assigns merely a ground for the cognition of God’s existence. This species of ground [*i.e.* for knowledge, or subjective convictions] is of such a kind that it vanishes in the object, which is grounded through it [or the ground of proof is a somewhat whose being involves the object proved, and the perception of the object proved as thus involved in the ground of the proof, realizes the demonstration; but the ground of the proof is rather an object which is grounded in and through the object proved; hence “ground” and “grounded” are used in opposite

¹ English and Scotch writers generally translate the German word *Begriff* by “Notion.” In America the word “notion” is used for *vague idea* or *one-sided apprehension* and seldom for the logical concept, or *Begriff*. The use of the word *Begriff* by Hegel is different from that of Kant and others, and misleads Germans as to the tendency of his system. The use of the word “notion” in English makes the matter still worse; for *Begriff* like *concept* may possess an objective meaning without doing violence to the word. “Idea” since Plato’s time has possessed an objective as well as subjective meaning, and has signified *archetype* or *pattern* as well as subjective “notion.” — *Translator.*

senses according to their application — subjective or objective. The Neo-Platonists contended that we cannot prove the existence of God, because proving is grounding, and that which is grounded through another could not be divine in its nature. Here was a confusion between subjective ground of knowledge or conviction and objective ground of existence]. Now the ground of proof which is based on the contingency of the world contains [or involves] the return of the world into the absolute essence [the contingency of the world exhibits its dependence — no thing in nature abiding but each passing over into another; this transitoriness of things is a process of evolving and annulling determinations; the evolution of the determinations is the creation of particular beings over against the essence; their annulment is the return into the indeterminate essence;] for the contingent is the in-itself-groundless and self-annulling. The absolute essence, consequently, according to this, proceeds from the groundless; the ground annuls itself; and then the appearance of relativity vanishes; and in the proof vanishes also this appearance of relativity on the part of God as a being that was grounded through another. This mediation [of the absolute through the return into it of the groundless] is consequently the true one, but that stage of thinking to which the “proving reflection” belongs, does not understand the nature of this mediation; it takes this mediation as a merely subjective affair, and therefore carefully removes it from God himself, but on this account it does not perceive the mediating activity involved in essence itself. The relation of dependence [*i.e.*, of the “grounded” upon the “ground”] which the proof involves or contains, consists in this that they are both in one [*i.e.* “ground” and “grounded” are one being] — a mediation which is a self-externality which is self-annulling in its nature [*i.e.*, the transitory which is posited by the essence is a self-externalizing of the essence, but the transitory is self-annulling]. In the mentioned exposition “existence” receives an erroneous construction; it is conceived in the dependent relation of mediated or posited [through the proof — the ground being taken as objective instead of subjective].

On the other hand Existence may be regarded as something not merely immediate. Taken in the phase of immediateness, the cognition of the existence of God has been expressed as an act of Faith, a knowing which does not rest on proof — a knowing by the immediate consciousness. The knowing is said to come to this result, that it knows nothing; that is to say, that it gives up its mediating activity and the cognitions which it has arrived at through such activity. This result we have seen in what precedes; but it must be added that

reflection when it ends with the annulment of itself does not on this account have *zero* for a result; so that after this annulment the positive knowing of essence may take place as an immediate relation to the same and entirely separated from the act of reflection—and as though the act of reflection had not been—as though the immediate knowing were an original act beginning from itself. But this annulment of reflection, this “going-to-the-ground” of mediation is itself the “ground” from which the immediate proceeds, or originates. Language [*i.e.* the German language] unites as above remarked the two meanings of *destruction* and *ground* [for “goes to destruction” the German says, “goes to the ground”]. It is said also that the essence of God is the abyss [*Abgrund*] for the finite reason; it is this through the fact that the finite reason gives up its finitude and loses its mediating activity in the being of God; but this abyss, the negative ground, is at the same time the positive ground of the origination of existence, of the essence which is in itself immediate and of which mediation is an essential phase. Mediation through the ground annuls itself, but does not leave the ground lying at the basis so that what originates from it is a “posited,” or still depends on that ground, and as though it had its essence elsewhere, *viz.* in the ground; but this ground is as “abyss” the *vanished mediation*, and, conversely, it is only the vanished [self-annulled] mediation which is the ground; and only through this negation there arises the identical and the immediate.

Thus “existence” is not to be taken here in the sense of predicate or of determination of essence, so that a proposition or principle could be made of it. “Essence exists” or “essence has existence”; but essence has become here existence. Essence has become existence in so far forth as essence no longer distinguishes itself into “ground” and “grounded”; the ground has annulled itself. But this negation (the annulment of the ground-relation) is likewise essentially its positing affirmation or absolutely positive continuity with itself; existence is the reflection of ground into itself [this means: something is ground, *i.e.* it utters itself by positing something else which manifests the ground or is its appearance; in its transitorness its determinations are annulled, and thus it returns to the ground; ground is a reflection into itself—through its process of grounding something, and again annulling what is grounded by it; existence includes this whole process of the reflection of ground into itself]. Its identity with itself which results from its negation [relating to itself] is therefore the mediation which

has posited itself as self-identical and through this has come into immediateness.

Since existence is this self-identical mediation, the determinations of mediation belong to it. But these determinations as found in existence are reflected into themselves and have essential and immediate self-subsistence. As immediateness which posits itself through annulment, existence is negative unity and being-in-itself. Therefore it determines itself immediately as an existing somewhat and as *Thing*. [This is the general statement of the contents of this first chapter. It goes over the entire discussion, mentioning only the most important aspects. The closing sentence of this paragraph is perhaps a specimen of Hegel's most peculiar insight. It involves the passage from the generic to the individual, from the universal to the singular. The first example given in this logic of this insight is found in the treatment of Being, in Volume I., under the head of Quality (pages 113 and 114 c, "*Etwas*"). He remarks, after the statement that Somewhat (*Etwas*) is the first negation of negation, as simple existing relation to itself, "Being [*Daseyn*], Life, Thinking, &c., determine themselves essentially in the form of *beings*, *living beings*, *thinking beings* [*egos*], &c. This determination is of the highest importance in order to escape from the mere universal terms, Being, Life, Thought, &c.; and so to be able to descend from the general idea 'deity' to that of a [concrete, personal] God." Not the abstract universal any more than the abstract particular, is the reality. Hegel here agrees with Aristotle; only the individual has true reality. But the "individual" must not be understood as mere particular being or phase, but as the self-determining process which we call ego or person. All else is mere "posited being," and has its explanation only through the self-determining totality to which it belongs. Thus in this place Hegel makes existence to be "negative unity"—*i.e.* a process which annuls its particular stages of development, and "returns into itself," and thus becomes being-in-itself; but each and every phase of the process is reflected into itself; and hence the "return-into-itself" is not by the reduction to zero of the particular stages of development but by the elevation of each particular stage to a totality within itself by adding to it what it lacks of the totality. A, b and c are three moments of a totality, each needs the other two to make its existence possible, the total is the annulment of each, but if the annulment through the total takes the form of "negative unity" it destroys the individuality of the moments, a, b and c (think of the annulment of acid and alkali in a salt); but if the annulment of a, b and

e takes place by the addition to each of its complement then each comes to true individuality by the possession of the form of totality. Thus a, b, c, the primary, undeveloped unity, the first *entelechy*, becomes abc, bea, cab: each moment annuls itself and becomes its own totality. This is the form of preservation of the individual in the universal and is the especial insight of Hegel, on which he lays most stress. The idea of "reflection-into-itself" is the basis of this preservation of individuality and escape from pantheism or the abstract universal as a first principle in the universe. Aristotle, too, seems to have held this concrete principle of reflection-into-itself as the basis of true being and true reality. It was his commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, who interpreted the Master's thought as a thought of "external reflection," and hence as setting up the abstract universal instead of the concrete universal. This interpretation was adopted by the Arabians; hence Scholasticism arose as the Christian reaction, which in Aquinas finds the concrete universal again. Aristotle's thought of first and second "entelechies" and of "energy" and of "active reason" is founded on this insight. Existence is not an abstraction, but, as Hegel remarks, *existences* or *things*.]

A.

Thing and its Properties.

Existence as existing somewhat is posited in the form of negative unity, which it essentially is [a negative unity annuls all of its manifold of determinations, leaving them only a "posed being," just as acid and alkali have a "posed-being" only when they exist in the negative unity of a salt]. But this negative unity is in the first place only *immediate* determining, and hence it is the oneness of any "somewhat." The existing somewhat is to be distinguished from "somewhat" as a category of Being; the former is essentially such an immediateness as has originated through the reflection of mediation into itself ["reflection-into-itself" means here a return *from* mediation, through mediation, back to immediateness; the mediation is used and then dispensed with; the ladder has been ascended and now it is drawn up from the ground; this insight into the use of mediation and its annulment is the key to this whole book of Essence]. Hence the existing somewhat is a Thing ["Thing" is the category which expresses a somewhat which is mediated through others, and yet which is re-posed by the others — pre-supposed by them — and thus established in the form of independence; the de-

pendence of the thing upon others, implied by its relation to them, is annulled by the reciprocal dependence of the others upon it, and its immediateness and independence is thereby restored].

A "thing" is to be distinguished from its "existence" just as the "somewhat" can be distinguished from its "Being" [in the treatment of Being the category of somewhat is thus distinguished; a being is a somewhat, and so here an existence is a thing]. The "thing" and the existing somewhat are immediately one and the same. But since existing is not the first immediateness of being [in which case it would belong to the sphere of Being and not to that of Essence], but it possesses the phase or "moment" of mediation within it, and hence its determination as Thing and the distinction between the two [between Existence and Thing] is not a transition, but properly an analysis; and Existence as such contains this very act of distinguishing [between its generality as existence and its specializing negative unity as Thing] in the phases, or "moments" of its mediation. This distinction within the moments of its mediation is that between *thing-in-itself* and *external* existence. [This characterization is still a summary like the preceding ones in this chapter. But its scope includes only the three sub-sections immediately following].

a. Thing-in-itself.

1. The thing-in-itself is the existing somewhat, as extant through the annulment of the mediation [*i.e.* taken as it is after the mediation]; it is the essentially immediate. Through this fact mediation is likewise essential to the thing-in-itself; but this distinction [between the thing-in-itself and its mediation] in this first or immediate existence, falls asunder into two determinations indifferent towards each other. The one side, namely, the mediation of the thing, is its non-reflected immediateness; hence its being in general, which for the reason that it is determined, at the same time, as mediation, is its own other, a being that is manifold and external in its nature [this phase of the thing is the phase of Being, recognized in the first apprehension; what the first apprehension seizes upon will always be found to be a phase of a complex mediation, and all mediation is invisible to first Apprehension]. It is, however, not merely a being, but it is in relation to the annulled mediation, which is essential immediateness; it is, therefore [as related to essential immediateness], unessential being or posited-being. (If the Thing is distinguished from its existence, it is then a *possible* thing, a thing of the mind, an imagined thing,

which, as such, is not considered as existing. The category of possibility [or potentiality], and of the antithesis of the thing, and its existence belongs later in this Logic.) But the thing-in-itself and its mediated Being are both contained within existence, and both are existences themselves; the thing-in-itself exists and is the essential, while the mediated being is the unessential existence of the Thing.

The Thing-in-itself as the simple reflected being of existence [the phase of existence as reflected-into-itself, or as annulled mediation] is not the ground of the unessential being; it is the unmoved, undetermined unity, for it is only annulled mediation, and therefore it is the basis of the unessential being [*Grundlage* = basis; *Grund* = ground or reason; ground arises from the self-annulment of contradiction; contradiction is self-relation in its aspect of self-negation; this self-negation is self-determination, the positing of determinations within the undetermined subject of the process; or likewise the presupposing activity which determines a presupposed immediate; all this activity is mediating or grounding — the laying-of-a-foundation for another; thing-in-itself is not a foundation or ground for unessential existence, because all existence is such through the annulment of mediation; and the annulment of mediation is the annulment of the very distinction which the process of ground creates.] For that reason, Reflection, as a being mediating itself through another, falls outside of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself is defined as having no particularized manifold within it; and on this account it receives this manifoldness only when brought into connection with it through the activity of reflection, but even then the thing-in-itself remains indifferent to the manifoldness. For example, the thing-in-itself has color on being brought to the eye, smell to the nose, &c. Its diversity of properties according to this view is due to the "respects," "points of view," taken by some external observer, particular relations which the outside observer assumes towards the thing-in-itself, and which do not belong to the thing-in-itself as its own determinations.

2. On the other hand, the second phase distinguished within existence is the one containing the activity of reflection, that defined as external, and which is in the first place, self-external and particularized manifoldness. In the second place it is external to the essentially existing and relates to it as to its absolute presupposition. These two phases or "moments" of external reflection, however, their own manifoldness and their relation to the thing-in-itself opposed to them as their other, are one and the same. [Note carefully

the following demonstration of this point.] For this existence is “external” only in so far as it relates to the essential identity as to another. The manifoldness has therefore no independent self-subsistence of its own over against the thing-in-itself, but it is only an appearance or manifestation as opposed to the thing-in-itself; it is only in its necessary relation to the thing in itself and as a reflection bending back to it again. The diversity therefore arises as the relation of another to the thing-in-itself, but this other is nothing that subsists for and by itself; but only in relation to the thing-in-itself; but it is at the same time only the repulsion of the thing-in-itself, therefore it is a restless self-opposed activity.

This essenceless reflection, now, does not belong to the thing-in-itself, for the latter is the essential identity of existence; but it returns into itself externally to the thing-in-itself [*i.e.*, it has *thingness* or independence]. It goes down [“goes to the ground”], and becomes through this essential identity or thing-in-itself. This process can also be considered in another way: the unessential phase of existence possesses in the “thing-in-itself” its own reflection into itself; and at the same time it relates to it as to its own other; but as the other to that which is in itself [*i.e.*, opposed to its own nature] it is only the annulment of itself and its becoming of [transition into] its being in itself. The thing-in-itself is consequently identical with external existence.

This [the identity of the thing-in-itself and external existence] is exhibited in the thing-in-itself in this manner. The thing-in-itself is the self-relating, essential existence; it is self-identity only in so far as it contains in itself the negativity of reflection [for how could it be self-identity or self-relating without being negative self-return or reflection?]; and that which appeared as existence external to it is therefore, a phase or moment within it [for its negativity of reflection being admitted the multiplicity of externality is also given]. For this reason it is also a self-repelling thing-in-itself — a thing-in-itself which stands in relation to itself, therefore, as to another. Consequently, there are now before us several things-in-themselves, which stand in the relation of external reflection to each other. This unessential existence is their relation to each other as mutual others; but this unessential existence is moreover essential to them — or since it is a return into itself it is (for them) the thing-in-itself; but it is another as the mentioned first; for the mentioned first is immediate essentiality, but this has originated out of unessential existence [the “mentioned first” is the thing-in-itself discussed above as the first phase of existence and to which was opposed a manifold of un-

essential existence; but a consideration of the latter has discovered within it the movement of reflection and hence it is a thing-in-itself like the “mentioned first”]. But this second thing-in-itself is only other in general; for as self-identical thing it has no further antithetic relation to the first [it is only “other,” and has no essential relation, no dependence upon the first thing-in-itself]; it is the reflection into itself of the unessential existence just like the first thing-in-itself. The determinateness of the various things-in-themselves through which they are opposed to each other belongs therefore to external reflection [and not to things-in-themselves].

3. This external reflection is a process of relation of the things-in-themselves to each other — their reciprocal mediation as mutual others. The things-in-themselves are, therefore, extremes of a syllogism whose middle term constitutes their external existence — the existence through which they are mutually others to each other and different things. This difference of theirs is found only in their relation to each other. As far as they stand in relation they have superficial determinations distinguishing them from each other, but these determinations of difference do not appertain to the things-in-themselves except in this relation to each other. The latter, as regards these distinctions, are indifferent, reflected into themselves, and absolute [*i. e.* things in themselves are held to be independently existent for themselves and as having unessential relation to each other, through which relation the manifold of marks, properties, accidents, &c., which characterize concrete things arise]. — This process of relation constitutes the totality of “Existence;” the thing-in-itself stands in relation to an activity of reflection external to it, in which it possesses manifold determinations. In this external reflection it is the repulsion of itself from itself into another thing-in-itself. This repulsion is the counter impulse within itself inasmuch as each of these is another to itself only as reflecting itself from and out of another. It has its posited-being not in itself but in another, and it is determined only through the determinateness of the other, and this other is likewise determined only through the determinateness of the former. [N. B. The method by which reflection saves the thing-in-itself from dependence upon beings external to it and preserves its self-identity; the multiplicity of properties and other determinations belonging to the Thing which are well known to involve the interrelation of things and their interdependence, is made to be wholly a sphere by itself unessential and contingent as regards the things-in-themselves; by this device reflection saves the independence

and self-identity of things-in-themselves; the realm of dependence, *i. e.*, of posited-being, appertains only to this sphere of contingent relation — but this realm contains the entire sphere of determinateness of things; hence Hegel says that the posited-being and the determinateness do not belong to the thing-in-itself but to its other, and therefore the thing-in-itself is unaffected by the other, indifferent to it.] But the two things-in-themselves, since according to this view their difference does not appertain to themselves, but each one's difference is solely in the other, are not different from each other. The thing-in-itself, since it is defined as relating to the other extreme as to another thing-in-itself, stands in relation to that which is not different from it, and the external reflection which constitutes the mediating relation between the extremes is a process of relation solely of the thing-in-itself to itself; in other words, it is essentially its reflection into itself. Consequently it is in-itself-existent determinateness, or the determinateness of the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself, therefore has this determinateness not in relation to an external thing-in-itself, nor has the other thing-in-itself determinateness merely in relation to the former; the determinateness is not one whereby that appertains to the surface of the thing-in-itself [to its sphere of relation to others outside of it], but it is the essential mediation of itself with itself as its own other. — The two things-in-themselves which are here considered as constituting the extremes of the relation fall together into one thing-in-itself for the reason that they have essentially belonging to them no determinateness to distinguish them from each other [for this has been placed by the external reflection in their contingent relation and expressly denied of the things-in-themselves]. There is only one thing-in-itself which in the external reflection stands in a process of relation to itself; and it is this its own relation to itself in which it is its own other that constitutes its determinateness.

This determinateness of the thing-in-itself is the "Property" of the Thing.

b. The Properties of Things.

Quality is the immediate determinateness of a somewhat: the negative itself through which *Being* is *somewhat*. In like manner the Property of a Thing is the negativity of reflection, through which existence in general becomes a particular existence, and as simple identity with itself, is thing-in-itself. The negativity of reflection, the annulled mediation, is mediation still; and it is relation, though not relation to another as such, as quality is, quality being the

unreflected determinateness ; it is relation to *itself* as its own other ; in other words it is a mediation which is at the same time self-identical. The abstract thing-in-itself, too, is this process of relation which returns from another back into itself ; through this it is determined in itself. Its determinateness, however is its nature or constitution [*Beschaffenheit*] which as such is its own determining character [*Bestimmung*—determination, destination, vocation, qualitative character] and as process of relation to another does not pass over into other-being, nor is it subject to change.

A thing has properties ; and these are, in the first place, its particular relations to another. Properties have arisen only as modes of relation of the things to each other, they belong therefore to the activity of external reflection and to the sides of posited-being of the thing. But, in the second place, the thing has its being-in-itself in this posited-being ; it preserves itself [as self-identical] in this relation to others ; it is therefore, of course, only a surface of itself which Existence exposes to the vicissitudes of change and becoming ; the Property does not suffer dissolution through this. A thing has a property of influencing another thing in this or that respect ; and of uttering itself in a manner peculiar to itself in its effects upon or relations to another. It manifests this property (only under conditions that are adapted to it) in the other thing, but still the property is peculiarly its own and its self-identical basis ; — this *reflected* quality is accordingly called a *property* ; in this it passes over into an externality but the property still retains its identity in that externality. The thing through its properties becomes a cause and the cause is preserved in its effect. Yet in this place the thing is not yet determined as actual cause ; it is only the quiescent thing with a manifold of properties ; it is only as yet the in-itself existent reflection of its determinations and not its positing reflection.

The thing-in-itself is therefore, as we have seen, essentially not merely thing-in-itself in the sense that its properties are the posited-being of an external reflection, but they are its own determinations through which it stands in a definite relation to itself. The thing-in-itself is not a basis devoid of determinations existing beyond or behind its external existence ; but it is in its properties ; it is present as their ground, which means [*i.e.* “ground” means] self-identity in its posited-being ; but it is at the same time *conditioned* ground, and this means that its posited-being is likewise self-external reflection ; it is reflected into itself and self-identical in so far as it is external. Through existence the thing-in-itself enters into external relations. Existence consists in this externality : it is the immediateness of

Being, and in this the thing is exposed to change ; but it is also the reflected immediateness of Ground, and the thing is consequently by itself and self-identical in its change. This mention of the ground-relation must not be taken here in the sense that the thing as such is defined as ground of its properties : the thing-ness itself is as such the determination of Ground — the property is not distinct from its ground, nor does it constitute merely the posited-being, but it has passed over into its externality and therefore is really ground reflected into itself. The property itself is as such the ground — posited-being which exists by itself ; in other words, the ground constitutes the *form* of its self-identity : its determinateness is the self-external of the ground ; and the whole is, in its repulsion and determining, ground relating to itself in its external immediateness. The thing-in-itself exists therefore essentially and that it exists means, conversely, that existence is as external immediateness at the same time being-in-itself.

Remark.

We have already mentioned when considering the phases of particular being [page 120 of the original of Vol. I of this Logie, 2d ed.] (viz., under the phase of being-in-itself), the category of "Thing-in-itself," and in that place have observed that the thing-in-itself as such is nothing but the empty abstraction from all determinateness, and concerning which abstraction one of course can know nothing, for the precise reason that all determination [about which one could know anything] is abstracted. The thing-in-itself is presupposed to be void of determination, hence all determination falls outside of it in a reflection foreign to it, and toward which it is indifferent, this external reflection is the stage of consciousness which belongs to transcendental idealism. Since transcendental idealism attributes all determinateness of things both as to form and to content to the consciousness, it follows, according to that standpoint, that it is my subjective affair that I see the leaves of the trees not as black but as green ; that the sun appears round and not square ; that sugar tastes sweet and not bitter ; and that I fix the first and second strokes of the hour as in succession and not as simultaneous, nor the first as cause and the second as its effect. This brilliant exhibition of subjective idealism is in direct contradiction to the consciousness of freedom, according to which I know myself to be general and undetermined and distinguish from myself those manifold and necessary determinations and recognize them as external to myself and as be-

longing to the things alone. The ego is in this consciousness of its freedom that true identity reflected into itself which the thing-in-itself is defined to be. Elsewhere I have shown that this transcendental idealism never transcends the limitation of the ego through the object, in fact never gets beyond the finite world, but changes only the form of the limitation, which remains for it something absolute, inasmuch, namely, as it translates it out of the objective form into the subjective, and makes it into determinatenesses of the ego and thereby transfers what ordinary consciousness knows as change and manifoldness in external things into a wild hurlyburly going on in the ego like that which the ordinary consciousness has supposed to exist in external things. In the present consideration, the thing-in-itself and the reflection which is external to it in its first phase, stand opposed to each other. This phase of reflection has not yet determined itself as consciousness; nor has the thing-in-itself determined itself as ego. It has become evident from the exposition of the nature of the thing-in-itself and of external reflection, that this external reflection develops into the thing-in-itself, or, conversely, into a determination of the first mentioned thing-in-itself. The essential thing in regard to this insufficiency of the stand-point upon which the mentioned philosophy rests, consists in this, that it sets up the abstract thing-in-itself as an ultimate principle and opposes to this the activity of reflection or the determinateness and manifoldness of properties, while in point of fact the thing-in-itself essentially contains that external reflection in itself and develops into a thing with its own determinations — a thing endowed with properties — and by this means, we find that the abstraction of the thing, viz. the pure thing-in-itself shows itself to be an untrue determination.

e. Interaction between things.

The thing-in-itself *exists* essentially. External immediateness and determinateness belong to its being-in-itself [to its nature] or to its reflection into itself [*i.e.*, to it without reference to its dependence on others]. The thing-in-itself is therefore a thing with properties; and therefore there is a multiplicity of things; and these things are not distinguished from each other through a point of view external to them as [assumed by the stand-point treated in the previous section, wherein the multiplicity that pertains to the manifold properties of a thing was explained by referring it to the manifoldness of the subject, *i.e.*, to the five senses or to external things which were brought into relation to it] but they are distinguished from each other through the

manifold determinateness peculiar to each. These manifold [several] different things interact upon each other through their different properties; in fact, the property is this relation of interaction itself, and the thing is nothing else; the mutual act of determination, the middle term between things-in-themselves which as extremes are assumed as indifferent towards this, their relation — this middle term is itself, the self-identical reflection and the very thing-in-itself which those extremes are supposed to be. The thingness is consequently reduced to the form of undetermined self-identity which has its essentiality only in its property. If, therefore, a thing or things in general are spoken of as having no definite properties it is all the same whether one or many are spoken of — their difference is only a quantitative one, not a difference in kind. That which is regarded as one thing can likewise be made into many things or regarded as many things; the discrimination into many things, or the union of many things in one, is thus made to be an external affair [thing is a relative synthesis: *i.e.*, the comprehension, the inclusion in the thing is a matter of degree; a profound mind habitually thinks together a greater assemblage of properties and relations in his conception of a thing than does the shallow mind; he thinks its relations to other things, and sees in it the results of interaction, the marks which it has received from the activity of other things; and moreover he sees in its essential activity the potentiality of a reciprocating influence emanating from it and modifying other things; the mere sensuous consciousness cannot perceive properties, as properties, at all; hence it cannot be said to perceive things properly speaking; what a brute perceives where we perceive things, it is not easy to realize if we are not versed in psychology, our habit is so firmly established of thinking with the category of *thing*; the same habit, moreover, occasions an even greater difficulty to the ordinary mind when it is called upon to think speculative results, because the speculative thinking repudiates the category of *thing*]. A book is a "thing" and each of its leaves is also a "thing"; and so too is each and every piece of a leaf howsoever fine, and so *ad infinitum*. The determinateness whereby a thing is defined as "this particular thing," lies only in its properties. A thing is distinguished from other things through its properties; this is so because the property is the negative reflection and the activity of distinguishing; therefore the thing has its distinction from others only in its properties, and hence possesses this distinction within itself. It is distinction reflected into itself, and through this the thing is indifferent towards others and towards its relation to others, even in its posited-being, *i.e.*, in its relation to others. Consequently a thing without its prop-

erties is nothing but the abstract being in itself, an external aggregate and a non-essential inclusion [*i.e.*, a collection of materials not essentially related to each other]. The true being-in-itself is the being-in-itself in its posited-being and this is the property. Hence thing-ness has become for us “property.”

The thing, according to this, is defined as an in-itself-existent extreme standing in relation to the property; and the property is a middle term between the things which stand thus in relation. But this relation [between the things, and constituting the property or the “middle term”] just mentioned is that in which the things meet as the self-repelling reflection and in which they are distinguished from and related to each other. This distinction and relation of the things is one reflection and one continuity of the same. The things themselves in this aspect of the process are included wholly within the continuity of the property, and they vanish as independent extremes which possess existence outside of this property.

The property which is defined as constituting the relation between the independent extremes is therefore itself what is independent [and not the things, as was supposed]. The things as opposed to this [property as independent] are the non-essential. Things are essential only so far as they have a phase of self-relating reflection which is self-distinguishing [self-repelling]: but this phase is the “property” [thus the only phase of essentiality belonging to things is their properties]. The property is therefore not an “annulled” phase of the thing, or, in other words, it is not a mere “moment” of the thing; but the thing is in truth only an including surface—the non-essential aggregate [“*Umfang*”—*i.e.*, the *including unity*, containing the properties within it as the only realities; the thing has thus become a husk, shell, cover, containing the property as its kernel]; although the thing is negative unity, it is only the oneness of a “somewhat,” namely, an immediate one [*i.e.*, the “one” of the category of Being]. Although the thing has been defined as non-essential inclusion in a former connection, when it was deprived of its properties by an external act of abstraction, yet here this abstraction has taken place through the passing over of the thing-in-itself into property. But with contrary results; for in the former act of abstraction it was the thing, the abstract thing without its properties that was thought to be essential, while the property was thought to be merely an external determination; now it is the thing as such that is defined to be a mere indifferent, external and [non-essential] form for the properties. The properties are consequently now freed from the indefinite and powerless bond which the unity of

the thing constitutes. It is the properties that constitute the existence of the thing. Each property is an independent matter or material. Since the property is a simple self-continuity, its form takes on at first the aspect of variety [diversity or difference]. Therefore there are manifold independent matters [or properties — each property being a matter], and the thing consists of these.

B.

The Thing consists of Matters.

The transition of "property" into a "matter," or into an independent material [*Stoff*, *i.e.* stuff, or material] is the well-known transition which the science of chemistry has brought about as regards the matter which is perceptible by our senses. It essays to explain the properties of color, of smell, of taste, &c., as light-corpuscles, coloring matter, odor-corpuscles, acid particles and bitter particles, &c., or it assumes a caloric matter, or an electrical or magnetic *aura* and with these it is convinced that it has the properties in their tangible reality. Thus the expression is current that things consist of different materials or kinds of matter. They shrink from calling these materials or kinds of matter "things," although they would concede that a pigment, for example, is a thing. I do not know whether they would call the matters of light, heat, and electricity, "things." They distinguish things from their constituent parts without accurately stating whether these constituent parts are also things, or whether they are only half things. But at least these parts possess existence.

The necessity of passing over from the stand-point of "properties" to that of independent matters, in other words, the fact that properties are in truth matters, has been shown. They are what is essential, and consequently what is truly independent in the Thing. At the same time however the reflection of the property into itself [the phase of its independence or self-subsistence] constitutes only one side of the entire activity of reflection. It constitutes the annulment of the distinction and the self-continuity of the property which should be defined as an existence for another. The thingness in its phase of *negative* reflection into itself in which it is a distinguishing of itself from others and a repulsion of others, is [by this one-sided view of the property as mere continuity] reduced to a non-essential moment. But at the same time it has defined itself still further in a different aspect. This negative moment (1) has been preserved:

for the property has become self-continuous and an independent matter in so far as it has annulled the distinction between things; the continuity of the property over into the domain of other things [other-being] contains therefore itself the moment of negativity, and its independence is at the same time as this negative unity the restored "somewhat" of "thingness" [i.e., since the property includes different things in its continuity, the property itself, becomes thingness or an including unity of an included multiplicity]; it is the negative independence opposed to the positive phase which is called "stuff" or matter. Through this (2) the thing passes out of its former indeterminateness into perfect determinateness [definiteness, particularity]. As thing-in-itself, it is the abstract identity, the simple, negative existence, or it is defined as the undetermined. Secondly, it is determined through its properties through which it is distinguished from others. But since through the property it is in continuity with others instead of separated from them, this imperfect distinction is annulled. The thing through this has therefore gone back into itself, and is now defined as perfectly determinate or particular in itself, it is a "this thing."

(3) But this return into itself is the self-relation of the determination; notwithstanding this, it is non-essential; the continuity with itself constitutes the independent matter in which the difference between the things *i.e.* their determinateness existing in and for itself, is annulled and a mere external affair. The thing as a "this" is therefore perfected determinateness but in the element of non-essentiality.

Looked at from the side of the activity of the "property" the property is not merely external determination but Existence-by-itself. This unity of externality and essentiality repels itself from itself for the reason that it contains within itself the reflection into itself and the reflection into others and thus it is on the one hand determination as simple, self-identical, self-relating and independent, in which the negative unity, *i.e.* the one of the thing, is annulled; on the other hand this determination exists in opposition to others but as reflected into itself, a one determined in itself: in the first respect, it is the free matters and in the second it is the "this thing." These are the two moments or phases of the self-identical externality or of the "property" reflected into itself. The property was understood to be that by which the things were distinguished. Since it has freed itself from this its negative side through which it inheres in another, by this means, the thing has at the same time got rid of its side of determinateness through other things, and has returned into itself out

of its relation to others; but at the same time it is only the thing in itself become other to itself; since the manifold properties are independent of each other their negative relation has become annulled in the unity of the thing; it is therefore the self-identical negation only as opposed to the positive continuity of the matter.

The *This* constitutes therefore the perfected determinateness of the thing in that it is at the same time external. The thing is composed of independent matters which are indifferent as regards their relation within the thing. This relation is therefore only a non-essential collection of these matters and the distinction of one thing from another rests on the number of particular matters that are found in the things respectively. They transcend this particular thing and continue into other things and the fact that they belong to this particular thing is no restraint or limitation. Quite as little moreover are they limiting conditions or restraints for each other because their negative relation is only the powerless “*This*.¹” Therefore they do not annul each other, although confined within the thing; being independent they are impenetrable as regards each other; in their determinateness they relate solely to themselves and constitute a manifold of existences indifferent to [independent of] each other; they can have only a quantitative limit. The thing as a “*This*” is therefore merely a quantitative relation of the free matters, a mere collection — (the mere conjunction “*and*”) of the properties. The thing is composed of a given quantity of one matter *and* of a given quantity of another, *and* so on; this connection or aggregate of matters is no essential connection, but the thing is just this unity of matters not essentially united. [The ordinary consciousness arbitrarily selects from the manifold of sense-perception an aggregate which it calls “*thing*.²” Each thing may be divided at will into several things or may be concreted with other things into a larger thing; a thing is therefore an arbitrary synthesis of materials. This stage of thinking also isolates properties of a thing analytically; it supposes that the properties within the thing arise, severally, from the materials that compose the thing. Its motto is: “The ingredients taken together will have no attributes that they do not have, taken separately.” This phase of consciousness will be shown in this chapter to be a psychological incompetency. That whole realm of scientific thinking whose activity explains nature by means of the category of “*things*,³” as for example — the so-called simple chemical element — is therefore utterly inadequate to present a true theory of the world of nature.]

C.

The Dissolution of the Thing.

The “This Thing,” as above defined, viz., as the merely quantitative aggregate of free matters, is absolutely changeable. Its change consists in this that one or more of its matters may be withdrawn from its aggregate, or that others may be added to this aggregate, or they may be changed in their quantitative relation [relative amount of each] to each other. The origination and dissolution of a “this thing” is a mere external destruction of such external combination or it is the re-combination of elements for which it is indifferent whether they are combined or not. The matters circulate out of and into “this thing” without restraint; the thing itself is the absolute porosity without any principle of measure belonging to it that should limit the kind and amount of the matters — it is no form-principle.

Hence the thing in its absolute particularity of determinateness through which it is a “this thing” is perpetually exposed to dissolution. This dissolution is the effect of external influences just as in fact the being itself of the thing is such an effect. [But its dissolution and the externality of its being are both essential to its nature.] It is only a conjunction “and” [connecting the properties thus, white *and* acid, &c.] ; it consists only of this externality. But it is also composed of its matters, and is not merely an abstract “this” as such — the entire “this thing” is self-dissolution. The thing, namely, is defined as an external collection of independent matters ; these matters are not things, they do not possess the negative independence which belongs to the thing ; but they are the independent properties — determinatenesses reflected into themselves. The matters are therefore, simple and self-related ; but their content is a determinateness ; the reflection into itself is only the form of this content which is not as such reflected into itself, but which relates to others as regards its determinateness — the relation of the matters as indifferent to each other, but it is likewise their negative relation ; by reason of their determinateness [particularity] the matters are themselves this negative reflection, and this constitutes the punctateness [tendency to isolated singleness, brittleness that breaks up into independent points, disintegration, individual repulsion] of the thing. Each of the matters is not what the others are and according to the particularity of the content it is opposed to them, and the one is not in so far as the other is — according to their phase of independence.

The thing is, therefore, the relation to each other of the matters of

which it consists, in such a manner that each one exists coördinately with the other, but at the same time each one does not exist in so far as the other exists. In so far, therefore, as the one matter is in the thing the others are annulled by it; but at the same time the thing is the conjunction “and” [White *and* sour *and* round *and* heavy *and* hard *and* smooth *and* fragrant, etc.], or the independence of the one matter *and* of the others. In the existence of the one matter, the others, therefore, do *not* exist, and yet likewise the other matters *do* exist in the former; and so reciprocally of all these different matters — each one excludes all the others, and at the same time participates in them. Since, therefore, in the same respect in which the one exists the others also exist and this is the one existence of the matters — the punctateness, or the negative unity of the thing — they interpenetrate each other without hindrance; and since the thing is at the same time only their “*and*” and the matters are reflected into their determinateness and consequently are indifferent towards each other and do not come in contact with each other even in their mutual interpenetration. The matters are therefore essentially porous so that each one exists in the pores of the other, *i.e.* in the non-existence of the other [because the pores are the vacuities of the matters wherein their existence ceases]; and this existence of the others is likewise their annulment and the existence of the first [*i.e.*, in the pores of the others]. The thing is therefore the self-contradictory mediation of independent existence through its opposite, *viz.*, through its negation, or the self-contradictory mediation of one independent matter through the existence and non-existence of another. The category of existence has attained its perfection in the category of “this thing,” *viz.*: it is the unity of independent being or being-in-itself, and of non-essential existence; the truth of existence is therefore its being-by-itself [*i.e.*, independent self-subsistence], in the realm of non-essentiality, or in other words it is the possession of its self-subsistence in another, and even in the absolute other — it is the having its own nugatoriness for its foundation. It is therefore PHENOMENON.

Remark.

It is one of the current notions of common consciousness that a “thing” is composed of many independent matters. On the one hand the thing is regarded as having properties whose combination is the thing; on the other hand, however, the various determinations are taken as matters whose self-subsistence is not that of the thing, but

contrariwise: the thing consists of them and takes its self-subsistence from them—the thing being only their external combination and quantitative limit. Both of these points of view, that of the properties as well as that of the free matters, have the same content, the difference being that in one case they regard the moments as having their negative unity in the Thingness, *i. e.*, in the basis different from and other to themselves, and in the other case they regard the moments as different from and independent of each other, each one reflected into itself in its own unity and not in the unity of the Thingness. These matters now are further defined as independent existence, but they are also together in one thing. The “this thing” possesses the two phases: first it is a this [punctate, repelling, atomic, individual] and secondly it is the “and” [the including or aggregating unity]. The “and” is that which occurs in external sense-perception as space-extension; the “this,” on the other hand, is the negative unity, the punctateness [excluding individuality] of the thing. The matters are together within the punctateness and their “and” or the extension is everywhere this punctateness; for the “and” as thingness is essentially a negative unity. Where, therefore, the one of these matters is, there in one and the same point is the other. The thing does not have its properties, the one in one place and another in another—for example, its color here, its scent there, its heat in a third place, &c., but in the point in which it is warm, it is also colored, acid, electric, &c. Because now these materials are not external to each other, but are in one “this,” they are assumed as pores and as though one existed in the interstices or intervening spaces of the other. Each one which exists in the interstices of the other is however porous itself, and in its pores, therefore, the others exist [and it again within their pores, while within its pores], and this again and again for the third time, or the tenth [and so *ad infinitum*]. All are porous and in the interstices of each are found all of the others, just as each one is in the pores of every other. They are therefore a multiplicity of matters that interpenetrate each other reciprocally, and are interpenetrated, so that each one interpenetrates in turn itself again. Each is posited as its own negation, and this negation is the self-subsistence of another; but this self-subsistence is likewise the negation of this other and the self-subsistence is the first.

The subterfuge through which the scientific imagination prevents the contradiction from resulting through the unity of several independent matters in a thing, or preserves their indifference towards each other in their interpenetration is, as is well known, the theory of small particles or atoms and of pores or interstices. Where self-dis-

inction, contradiction, and negation of negation enter, and in general where anything is to be comprehended [grasped together in thought] the scientific imagination descends to the use of external, quantitative distinctions. In order to explain origination and evanescence it has recourse to the conceptions of "gradualness" and "by degrees," and in explaining being it has recourse to the conception of smallness or minuteness [molecules or atomic constituents, etc.], in these conceptions the varnishing is reduced simply to an imperceptible gradation and the contradiction is reduced to a confused appearance, and the true relation is obscured by conversion into an indefinite product of the imagination, whose indistinctness conceals the process of self-annulment.

Now, if we examine this indistinctness [and bring it to a focus] we find it to be nothing at all but the contradiction itself, partly the subjective contradiction of the activity of the imagination, partly the objective activity of the thing perceived.

The activity of mental representation [“scientific imagination”] itself contains all of the elements of this contradiction. The very first aspect of its activity is the contradiction involved in the fact that it proposes to itself to hold fast to simple perception, and to allow only things that actually exist to come into its presence; and yet, on the other hand, it hastens to identify as sensuous beings the products of its own reflection, thoughts which cannot be verified by an appeal to sense-perception. The small particles or atoms and the pores have, according to it, a sensuous existence, and the same kind of reality is predicated of their posited being [*i. e.*, dependent qualities] that is affirmed of color, heat, etc. Moreover if this mental picture or representation [scientific imagination] of the objective indistinctness in which the pores and atoms are conceived is examined attentively, not only a matter and also its negation are recognized, so arranged that the matter and the pore, which is its negation, are arranged side by side and alternately, first the matter and then the pore; but in this particular thing the independent matter and its negation, or porosity and the other independent matter, are found in one and the same point, so that this porosity and the independent existence of matters in each other as in one constitute a mutual negation and interpenetration of interpenetration. The modern expositions of physics in their explanation of the expansion of steam in the atmospheric air, and of the mixing together of the different kinds of gases, furnish a more definite example of the phases of thought here presented. They show that, for example, a certain volume of air will take up a certain quan-

ity of steam, and that an equal amount of space empty of air would not contain any more; and that the different kinds of gases are vacua to each other, or at least have no chemical combination with each other, each being self-continuous when it pervades the other and each being indifferent to the other, but in the idea of the thing each matter is found just where the other is; they interpenetrate the same point, the independence of the one is the independence of the other. This is contradictory; the thing, however, is nothing else than this contradiction, and therefore it is properly called *phenomenon*.

A similar application is made of this notion of matters in explaining the operations of the mind through the conception of psychic forces or "faculties." The mind is in a much deeper sense [than the thing] a "this particular" somewhat, a negative unity in which its determinations interpenetrate each other. But by this image-thinking it is commonly conceived as a "Thing." Man is commonly said to consist of soul and body, each one passing for something independent of the other; in the same manner the soul is made to consist of psychic forces each one of which possesses independent existence and has an activity that works according to its own nature without reference to the others. For example, they imagine that the understanding acts in this place, the imagination in that; and that the understanding may be set in activity without the memory, &c.; or that one faculty may be active while the others lie dormant, &c. Since they are all contained in the psychical thing, the soul, which is a simple material and which as simple is immaterial, these faculties are not represented as particular matters; but they are represented as powers and as such they have the same character of indifference towards each other that is ascribed to the matters in a thing. But the mind is not that contradiction which a thing is; it does not annul itself and thereby become phenomenal; but it is already in itself the contradiction which has returned into its absolute unity, the Idea, in which distinctions are to be thought, not as independent existences, but only as particular moments, or phases, in the thinking subject.

SECOND CHAPTER.

Phenomenon.

Existence is the immediateness of being to which essence has again restored itself. This immediateness is potentially [in its nature] the reflection of essence into itself: essence has as existence proceeded from its ground; ground has become existence. Exist-

ence is this reflected immediateness in so far as it is the absolute negativity in itself. It is now also posited as this reflection of negativity, since it is now defined as phenomenon.

Phenomenon is therefore, in the first place, essence in its existence; essence is immediately present in it. The fact that it is not immediate but reflected existence is its phase of essence; but existence as essential existence is phenomenon.

Somewhat is a *mere* phenomenon in the sense that existence as such is only a posited existence—not in and for itself. Its essentiality consists in having within it the negativity of reflection, the nature of essence. This is not a foreign, external reflection, which belongs to essence, and in contrast to which existence might seem to be only phenomenon. But, as has been shown, it is the essentiality of existence to be phenomenon; phenomenon is the truth of existence. The activity of reflection by which existence becomes phenomenon belongs to existence itself.

Where it is said that somewhat is only a phenomenon, meaning that it is in contrast to the true existence, the fact is overlooked that the phenomenon is rather the higher truth, for it is existence as essential opposed to existence which is unessential—essential existence being phenomenon and non-essential existence being the immediate existence [existence non-essential is existence without relations: existence in its relations is the phenomenon; the present doctrine of "relativity" belongs to the doctrine of the phenomenon. Since the non-essential existence is only one of the phases of phenomenon, viz., its phase of immediate existence, while the negative reflection is the other phase, it is seen that phenomenon is a totality more essential than existence]. If phenomenon is called non-essential this is done from the supposition that the immediate is something positive and true as opposed to the phase of negativity contained in the phenomenon; but this immediate does not yet contain essential truth [*i.e.*, it does not yet contain relativity within its definition]. Existence ceases to be non-essential when it becomes phenomenon.

Essence appears to itself, first in its simple identity: in this phase it is the abstract reflection, it is the pure movement from nothing through nothing back to itself. Essence manifests itself, and in this phase it becomes real appearance, since the phases of appearance have existence in Manifestation or phenomenon. The manifestation or phenomenon is, as has been shown, the thing in its negative self-mediation; the distinctions which it contains are independent matters. And these independent matters form a contradiction, namely they have an immediate existence of their own, and at the same time have

their existence only in others independent of them, and consequently they exist in the negation of their existence; and consequently, again they constitute the negation of those other independent ones, or, what is the same thing, the negation of their own negation. Appearance is the same mediation, but its restless phases assume in the mediation of the phenomenon the form of immediate independence. On the other hand, the immediate independence which belongs to existence is reduced to a phase of the former. Phenomenon is therefore the union of appearance and existence.

Phenomenon defined more accurately is essential existence; its essentiality is separated from existence as non-essential and these two sides enter into relation to each other. It is therefore in the first place simple self-identity, which at the same time contains multiplicity; and this as well as its relation remains self-identical within the change that belongs to the phenomenon. This is the *law* of the phenomenon.

Secondly, the law which is simple amidst the diversity [of its application] passes into the antithesis which forms the self-opposition of the essential phase of the phenomenon — viz., that of a phenomenal world over against a *noumenal* world.

Thirdly, this antithesis returns into its ground: the noumenal is found in the phenomenal and the phenomenal is taken up into the noumenal, and so the phenomenal becomes essential relation [*Verhältniss*=necessary connection].

A.

The Law of the Phenomenon.

1. The phenomenon is the existing mediated through its negation which constitutes its independence or self-subsistence. This its negation is however another independent somewhat; but it is likewise essentially annulled.

The existing somewhat is therefore the return into itself through its negation and through the negation of its negation; it has therefore essential independence; and at the same time it is a mere posited being [dependent] which has a ground and has its existence in another. In the first place, therefore, the phenomenon is the existence together with its essentiality — the posited-being with its ground; but this ground is the negation; and the other independent, the ground of the first, is likewise only a posited-being. In other words the existing somewhat is, as phenomenal, reflected into another,

which is its ground, but this ground is in turn itself reflected into another. The essential independence which appertains to it, for the reason that it is a return into itself, is on account of the negativity of its moments the return of nought through nought back to itself; the independence of the existing somewhats is therefore only essential appearance. The connection of the existing somewhats which ground each other reciprocally, consists therefore in this mutual negation that the independence of one is not the independence of the other, but its posited-being or dependence; and this relation of the posited-being, or dependence, alone constitutes independence. The ground is now present as it is in its truth, viz., it is a primary somewhat which is only a presupposed.

Now this constitutes the negative side of the phenomenon. But in this negative mediation there is contained in an immediate form the positive identity of the existing somewhats. For it is not posited-being [dependent] as opposed to an essential ground—in other words, it is not an appearance belonging to an independent being, but it is posited-being [dependence] which relates to posited-being,—in other words it is an appearance only within an appearance. Within this its negation or its other, which itself has been annulled, it [the phenomenon] relates only to itself and is consequently self-identical or positive essentiality. This identity is not the immediateness which appertains to existence as such, and which is only unessential, and has its subsistence in another; but it is the essential content of the phenomenon, which has two sides: first, in the form of posited-being or of external immediateness; secondly, the posited-being as self-identical. According to the first side, it is a particular being, a contingent unessential somewhat exposed to change, origination and evanescence by reason of its immediateness. According to the second side it is the simple content which abides under the mentioned origination and evanescence.

This content, besides being the simple which underlies the phase of change, is also a definite, particular content, containing variety within itself. It is the reflection [return-into-itself] of the phenomenon [*i. e.*, the totality of the phenomenon which presents the complete cycle of the activity of change, and hence its abiding image or form, because the continued activity of the process does nothing but repeat over and over again the cycle of phases which constitute the phenomenon; *e. g.*, the year contains a totality of seasons, and a longer period of time than a year does but repeat the cycle already contained, as a totality, within the year; the type of the variety of seasons within the year is a permanent under a variable — it is, as here called

by Hegel, the "law of the phenomenon"). In this reflection or return into itself the particular existences are negative [*i. e.*, perishable; but they form a series which returns into itself]; this reflection consequently contains essentially the determinateness [*i. e.*, the series of transitory particular existences which form the total cycle or the phenomenon, give definite particularity to the cycle or phenomenon, so that one phenomenon is distinguished from another by the series of evanescent existences within it]. The phenomenon however is the manifold variety, existent within it, which runs its course and passes through its succession of phases; its reflected content on the other hand is its manifoldness reduced to simplicity. The definite particular content which is essential is therefore not merely a single one of the particular phases of the phenomenon, but, being the essential particularity of the phenomenon, it includes the entire particularity or determinateness within the phenomenon, the particularity of each and every one. In the phenomenon therefore each phase of its succession of phases possesses its self-subsistence in the other phases [*i. e.*, there may be mutual interdependence among these phases] in such a manner that each phase is only in its non-subsistence [*i. e.*, its truth or totality is realized only by the transitoriness of each phase]. This contradiction annuls itself; and its reflection-into-itself is the identity of its twofold self subsistence, namely, that the posited-being or dependence of the one is also the posited being or dependence of the other. [One phase of transitoriness has its subsistence in another phase of transitoriness; the second phase being transitory and having its phase in another, the first phase has its non-subsistence as well as its subsistence in the second phase; this is the contradiction spoken of in the text.] They [the two dependent phases] constitute one subsistence, although constituting variety or diversity within the one subsistence.

In the essential side of the phenomenon, consequently, the negativity of the unessential content through which it annuls itself, has consequently returned into identity; it is an indifferent subsistence [*i. e.*, a non-related, neither repelling nor attracting distinction, each one independent of the other] which is not the annulled particularity, [not the identity of the particularities within the phenomenon with their differences omitted,] but rather the self-subsistence [the positive inclusion of all the differences within the identity] of the other.

This unity is the Law of the Phenomenon.

2. The law is therefore what is positive in the mediation which constitutes the phenomenon. The phenomenon is in its first phase,

existence as negative self-mediation, so that the existing thing is mediated through its own non-subsistence — through another thing — and again through the non-subsistence of this other thing — this process constituting its self-mediation [the second part of its mediation, namely, the non-subsistence of the other into which the first phase passes is as important as the non-subsistence of the first phase ; in finding out the totality of a succession of appearances with intent to find the law or the ideal type which Hegel here calls “*Phenomenon*” we must trace one phase into another and another again, until the first phase reappears, then we have the totality of phases, the total particularity involved and hence the permanent or the *law* of the phenomenon]. In this is contained, first, the mere appearance and disappearance of the several phases, and this is the unessential side of the phenomenon ; secondly, it contains also the abiding or the law [that is to say, the necessary recurrence, or repetition of the appearance and disappearance] ; for each of that series of phases in the phenomenon exists through the annulment of the other phases [their annulment posits it] ; and their posited-being [dependence] as their negativity is at the same time the self-identical, positive phase of their dependence [the dependence of each makes the independence of the others].

This abiding subsistence which belongs to the phenomenon and is here called its law is, therefore, as has been shown, at first opposed to the immediateness of being which appertains to existence. This immediateness, it is true, is potentially a reflected immediateness viz., that which is returned into itself as ground ; but in the phenomenon this simple immediateness is different from the reflected immediateness which showed itself formerly in the category of Thing. The existing thing in its dissolution became this antithesis: what there was positive in its dissolution is the self-identity of the process of the phenomenon as posited-being self-identical in its other posited-being. In the second place, this reflected immediateness has been shown to be opposed as posited-being to the immediateness of existence. This posited-being is now the essential and truly positive. The German expression *Gesetz* [*Gesetz* is the German word for “*law*,” from the verb *setzen*, to posit] contains this thought [*i. e.*, in German, law means the posited ; — as understood by Hegel, here, the law states the particularity of a series of particular, transitory beings passing over into each other and thus constituting a complete cycle, so that the mutual dependence — or posited-being — makes the abiding or the law]. In this posited-being is found the

essential relation of the two sides of distinction [that of the one phase to the others] which the law contains; they constitute a diversity of immediate content [elements independent of each other] and constitute this as the reflecting activity of the vanishing content of the phenomenon. As essential diversity or variety the phases of the phenomenon are simple self-relating elements. But likewise each element is essentially dependent and not immediately for itself—in other words it is only in so far as the other is.

Thirdly, phenomenon and law have one and the same content. Law is the phenomenon's reflection into self-identity; hence the phenomenon stands opposed to that which is reflected into itself as the nugatory immediate, and in this shape they [the law and the phenomenon] are contrasted. But the reflection of the phenomenon which causes this contrast is also the essential identity of the phenomenon itself and of its reflection, and constitutes the nature of reflection. This reflection is self-identical in the posited being, and indifferent towards that contrast which constitutes the form or posited being; therefore it is a content which continues beyond the phenomenon and into the law, and is the content both of the law and the phenomenon.

This content constitutes therefore the basis of the phenomenon; the law is this basis itself; the phenomenon is the same content, but it contains something additional, namely, the non-essential content of its immediate being. Moreover the form-determination through which the phenomenon as such differs from the law, is namely a content and likewise a different content from that of the law. For existence is as immediateness, on the whole, a self-identical somewhat in respect to matter and form, and therefore a content, and indifferent towards its form-determinations; it is the "thingness" possessing properties and free matters. But it is the content whose independent immediateness is at the same time without substantial existence. The self-identity of the same in this its non-subsistence [or lack of "substantial existence"] is, however, the other essential content. This identity, the basis of the phenomenon and which constitutes the law, is its own moment [or the essential element of the phenomenon]; it is the positive side of essentiality through which existence becomes and is phenomenon.

The law is therefore not something beyond the phenomenon or outside of it or above it, but immediately present in it; the realm of laws is the quiet image or archetype of the existing or phenomenal world. The two, however, constitute one totality, and the existing

world is itself the realm of laws, which is the simple self-identical as well as the self-identical in the posited-being, or in the self-annulling independence which belongs to existence. Existence goes back into the law as into its ground [this means that existence is annulled in its process, and loses its immediateness, but by the continuance of the process returns into itself, or its immediateness reappears, just as summer's heat and winter's cold recur in the process of the year; the law is the general type of the entire movement, and is therefore always in self-identity, although its existences change — hence the law is here spoken of as the ground of existence, — *i. e.*, the annulment of existence is the realization of the ground as law]. The phenomenon contains both the simple ground and the annulling activity of the phenomenal universe of which it is the essentiality [*i. e.*, the law as ground and the negativity which makes real one of its phases after the other].

3. The Law is therefore the essential phenomenon; it is its reflection in its posited-being [dependence], the identical content of itself and of the non-essential existence. In the first place, now this identity of the law with its existence is only immediate, simple identity, and the law is indifferent in respect to its existence; the phenomenon has still another content opposed to the content of the law. That content, however, is the non-essential and the return into the content of the law; but for the law that non-essential is something that already exists for itself and is not caused by it, and hence it is an external content in some way attached to the law. The phenomenon is a collection of determinations in close connection, which belong to "this," or the concrete somewhat, and are not contained in the law, but are derived from some other source.

In the second place, that which the phenomenon contains besides the law is defined as a positive or as another content; but it is essentially a negative somewhat; it is the form, and its activity as such, which appertains to the phenomenon. The realm of laws is the quiescent content of the phenomenon; the phenomenon is the same content but exhibiting itself in the restless change and as reflection into another. The phenomenon is the law as the negative self-changing existence, the activity of the transition of contraries into each other, and of their self-annulment and return into one unity. This side of restless form or of negativity does not contain the law; the phenomenon, therefore, is rather the totality as opposed to the law, for it contains the law and also something additional, namely, the phase of the self-active form.

This lack or defect, in the third place, is to be found in the law, viz., that its content is something diverse from it, external to it, and indifferent to it; therefore the identity of its sides with each other is only an immediate and internal one, but not yet a necessary identity. In the law there are two determinations of content connected together as essential — for example, in the law of falling bodies, the extent of the space and the time of descent are essentially connected: the space varies as the square of the time. The law states only the connection as an existing fact — a mere immediate relation — without showing the necessity for the same. This relation is therefore likewise a mere posited or dependent something, just as in the phenomenon the phase of immediateness has been found to have this meaning of dependence. The essential unity of the two sides of the law would be their negativity. In that negativity, namely, the one would be found to contain in itself the other; but this essential unity we have not yet found in the law. For example, in the idea of the space passed through by a falling body, we do not find its necessary correspondence to the square of the time occupied in falling. Since the fall of the body is a sensuous movement, it involves a relation of time and space; but at first it does not appear that the nature of time involves a relation to space, and *vice versa*; one would say that time could be thought without space, and space without time; the one stands therefore in external relation to the other, being united with it in movement.

In the second place, the quantitative relation of space and time to each other is quite indifferent. The law which states this quantitative relation is derived from experience, and in so far it is only immediate and demands farther proof of its necessity — a mediation for the scientific cognition that it is not a mere accident, something that happens, but that it is necessary. The law as such does not contain this proof of its objective necessity. The law is therefore only the positive essentiality of the phenomenon, and not its negative essentiality according to which the determinations of content are "moments," or phases of form, and as such pass over into others and show themselves to be potentially something else than they are immediately. In the law is therefore its posited-being, on the one side, the same as its posited-being on the other side; but its content is indifferent to this relation, its content does not contain within it this posited-being. The law is therefore the essential form, but not yet the real form as reflected content in its side or phases of activity.

B.

The Phenomenal World and the World that exists in itself.

1. The existing world [*i. e.*, the totality of existences understood as defined in the foregoing] becomes a quiet realm of laws; the nugatory content of its manifold particulars has its subsistence in another [*i. e.*, each particular being is dependent on another] its subsistence therefore is its dissolution [*i. e.*, its being in another is annulment of its being in itself]. But the phenomenal arrives at self-identity in this other; hence the phenomenon in its change is an abiding and its posited-being is law [as the change of seasons finds its abiding form in the year]. The law is this simple self-identity of the phenomenon; hence its basis and not its ground or substrate; for the law is not the negative unity of the phenomenon, but, as its simple identity it is the immediate unity as abstract, and, co-ordinate to it, is found also its other content. The content is "this" particular, and coheres within itself, in other words has its negative reflection within itself. It is reflected into another; and this other is itself an existence of the phenomenon; the phenomenal things have their grounds [or substrates] and conditions in other phenomenal things.

In fact however the law is also the other of the phenomenon as such and its negative reflection is into its other. The content of the phenomenon, which is different from the content of the law, is the existing somewhat which has its negativity for its substrate or in other words is reflected into its non-being. But this other which is also an existing somewhat is likewise such an existence reflected into its non-being; it is therefore the same, and the phenomenal in being reflected into it is not in fact reflected into another but reflected into itself; and this very reflection into itself of the posited-being [dependence] is the law. But as phenomenal it is essentially reflected into its non-being, or its identity is likewise essentially its negativity and its other. The reflection into itself of the phenomenon, *i. e.*, the law, is therefore not only its identical basis but it has in it its anti-thesis, and the law is its negative unity.

Therefore the definition of the law in the phenomenon has changed; at first it was only a varied content and the formal reflection of posited-being into itself [*i. e.*, self-dependence] so that the posited-being of one of its sides is the posited-being of the other. But since it is also the negative reflection into itself, its sides stand in relation to each other not as mere indifferent and independent ones but as related to each other negatively. In other words when the

law is considered merely by itself the sides of its content are indifferent towards each other; but they are likewise annulled through their identity; the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the other; therefore the subsistence of each one is also its own non-subsistence. This posited-being or dependence of the one within the other is their negative unity, and each is not only its own posited-being but also that of the other, or each is itself this negative unity.

The positive identity which they have in the law as such is their internal unity, now found for the first time, which needs proof and mediation for the reason that this negative unity is not yet posited on them. But since the different sides of the law are now defined as retaining their difference in their negative unity through the fact that each one contains its other within itself and at the same time as independent repels its otherness from itself, it follows that the identity of the law is now a posited and real one.

Hence therefore the law has received the element of the negative form of its sides which it heretofore lacked; the element which heretofore still belonged to the phenomenon. Consequently existence has now completely returned into itself, and has reflected itself into its absolute other-being which exists in and for itself. That which was law in the previous consideration is therefore no longer merely one side of the totality whose other was the phenomenon as such, but it is itself the totality. It is the essential totality of the phenomenon, so that it now contains also the element of non-essentiality which had hitherto belonged only to the phenomenon and not to the law. But it contains this element of non-essentiality as reflected, as in itself existent, *i. e.*, as essential negativity. The law is as an immediate content particularized, contradistinguished from the other laws, of which there are an indefinite number. But since it now has the essential negativity belonging to it, it contains no longer a merely indifferent contingent content; but its content is all determinateness standing in essential relation and thus constituting a totality. Therefore the phenomenon reflected into itself is now a world which reveals itself as in-and-for-itself existent above the phenomenal world.

The realm of laws contains nothing but the simple, changeless, but still varied content of the existing world; but now since it is the total reflection of this existing world, it contains also its non-essential manifoldness. This phase of mutability and change as reflected into itself and essential [*i. e.*, closing together into cycles of change] is the absolute negativity or the form, whose elements have the reality of independent but reflected existence in the world that exists in and

for itself. And, conversely, this reflected independence possesses the form within itself, and through this its content is not a mere manifold but essentially connected and interdependent.

This world which exists in and for itself is called the "supersensible world"; in so far as the existing world is defined as sensuous, viz., as existing for sense-perception, as the direct object of consciousness. The supersensible world likewise has immediateness or existence, but it is reflected, essential existence. Essence as yet does not possess particularized being, but it *is* in a deeper sense than mere being; the thing is the beginning of reflected existence; it is an immediateness which is not yet posited as essential or reflected. But the thing is not in truth an existent immediate.

It is only when the things are posited as things of another, of a supersensible world, that they become true existences and possess truth in contrast to mere beings. It is then recognized that there is another being distinguished from immediate being and that this other being is the true existence. On the one hand in this category of true existence the sensuous conception is laid aside as inadequate, for it ascribes existence only to the immediate being of feeling and sense-perception; and on the other hand also unconscious reflection is transcended, for though it possesses the idea of things, forces, the internal, &c., yet it does not know that such ideas are not sensuous and do not correspond to immediate beings but are reflected existences.

2. The world which exists in and for itself is the totality of existence; there is nothing else outside of it. But since it is in itself the absolute negativity or form, its reflection into itself is negative relation to itself. Therefore it contains within itself the antithesis, on the one hand being an essential world which repels, on the other hand, from itself the world of other-being or the world of phenomenon. Therefore since it is the totality and also one side of the antithesis which it contains, it constitutes an independent world opposed to the world of phenomenon. The phenomenal world has in the essential world its negative unity in which it is annulled and in which it finds its substrate. Moreover, the essential world is the positing substrate or ground of the phenomenal world; and in the next place since it contains the absolute form in its essentiality it annuls its self-identity, and becomes posited-being and as this posited-immediateness is the phenomenal world.

Moreover it is not merely the general ground or substrate of the phenomenal world, but its particular ground. As a realm of laws, it already possesses a manifold content and although it is the essential

of the phenomenal world and a substrate replete with content, it is the particular substrate of others, but only as regards this content; for the phenomenal world had still a variety of other content than that realm of laws, because the negative element still properly belonged to it. But now since the realm of laws likewise possesses this moment of negativity it becomes the totality of the content of the phenomenal world and the substrate of all its manifoldness. But it is at the same time the negative of it, and therefore a world in opposition to it. Namely, in the identity of the two worlds and while the one is defined according to form as the essential and the other as non-essential the category of ground of substrate has again made its appearance; but at the same time it is the ground-relation of the phenomenon, namely, as relation not of an identical content nor of a merely disparate content such as the law is, but as total relation or as negative identity and essential relation of the content as an antithesis.

The realm of laws is not merely a realm in which the posited-being of a content is the posited-being of another—but this identity is essentially negative unity, too, as has been seen; each of the two-sides of the law is in the negative unity potentially its other content. The other is therefore not indefinitely another in general, but it is its other or it contains likewise the content of the former; therefore the two sides are opposed. Since the realm of laws contains this negative moment and the antithesis within it, and consequently, as the totality repels from itself a phenomenal world as opposed to a world existent in and for itself, the identity of the two is the essential relation of the antithesis.

The ground-relation as such is the antithesis which has been annulled in its contradiction, and existence is the ground which has gone into self-identity. But existence becomes phenomenon, and ground is annulled in existence; it restores itself and reappears as the return of the phenomenon into itself, but it does this at the same time in the form of annulled ground, viz., as the ground of opposite determinations; the identity of such however is essentially becoming and transition, and not the ground-relation in its proper form.

The world that exists in and for itself is therefore itself a world which is distinguished within itself into the totality of manifold content; it is identical with the phenomenal or posited, in so far as it is its ground; but this connection of identity is at the same time determined as antithesis, because the form of the phenomenal world is the form of reflection into its other being; hence it has returned into the world which exists in and for itself, and thus has returned truly

into itself, as the latter is its opposite [*i. e.*, it is self-opposed]. The relation is therefore defined as this, that the in-and-for-itself existent world is the inverted, phenomenal world.

C.

Dissolution of the Phenomenon.

The world which exists in and for itself is the definite, determined ground of the phenomenal world, and is this only in so far as it is in itself the negative moment and therefore the totality of the determinations of content and of their changes — the totality of determinations of content corresponds to the phenomenal world but at the same time constitutes a side in opposition to it. The two worlds therefore stand in this relation to each other: that whatsoever is positive in the phenomenal world is negative in the for-itself-existent world; and conversely, whatever is negative in the former is positive in the latter. The north pole in the phenomenal world is the south pole when considered in-and-for-itself and, conversely; positive electricity is in-itself negative electricity, &c. Whatever is evil in phenomenal existence or misfortune, &c., is in-and-for-itself good and a happy fortune.

In fact the difference between these two worlds has vanished in this form of antithetic relation, so that the world which is defined as existing in and for itself is the same as the phenomenal world and the latter is identical with the essential world which exists in itself [it is evident that if the counterpart or opposite of each phase in the one world exists in the other world, that each world will contain all the phases of the other world in an inverted order — provided that either world is a totality and contains all phases of existence]. The phenomenal world is first defined as reflection in the form of other-being so that its determinations and existences are regarded as having their ground and subsistence in another; but since this other is likewise such a being reflected into another they are related in such a way that they become self-relation inasmuch as the other to which they relate is a self-annulling other; the phenomenal world is hence a self-identical law in itself.

Conversely, the world that exists in-and-for-itself is at first self-identical — a content which is elevated above change and otherness; but the latter as perfect reflection of the phenomenal world into itself or for the reason that its difference is reflected into itself and there-

fore absolute distinction [*i. e.*, self-distinction] it therefore contains the negative phase and the relation to itself as to its own other; through this it becomes a self-opposed, a self-inverted, a content devoid of essence. Moreover, this content [*i. e.*, of the self-existent world] has received also the form of immediate existence. For it is, first, the ground of the phenomenal; but since it contains its opposite within itself it is likewise annulled ground and immediate existence.

The phenomenal and the essential worlds are consequently totalities — each within itself the totality of the reflection which is identical with itself and of the reflection into another, or in other words, the totality containing the being-in-and-for-itself and the phenomenon. They thus constitute two independent totalities of existence. The one is defined as merely reflected existence and the other as mere immediate existence, but in fact each continues into its other, and is the identity of itself and the other. What we have therefore before us is this one totality which repels itself into two totalities, the one the reflected totality and the other the immediate totality. Each of these is at first independent but independent only as a totality; and each is a totality only in so far as it contains essentially the other within itself as a moment [N. B. independence implies totality, and totality implies the inclusion of its other within itself. All development and becoming consist in the process of unfolding from itself its other-being or of developing its counterpart within itself. At first there is a series of mutually limiting elements; then growth and development of each element results in each element becoming a totality, so that each is identical with the whole and a reflection of it]. The distinct independence of each — the one defined as immediate, distinguished from the other defined as reflected — is now posited in such a manner that it is essential relation to its other, and hence this independence is formed only in this unity of the two.

It should have proceeded from the law of the phenomenon; the latter is the identity of a diversified content with another content — so that the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the other. In the law this distinction still exists that the identity of its sides is only an inner identity, and these sides do not possess this identity as yet in themselves; therefore on the one hand that identity is not yet realized; the content of the law is not an identical content but an indifferent manifold. On the other hand it is defined as a mere potentiality that the posited-being of the one is the posited-being of the other; this is not yet present in it. Now however the law is realized; its inner identity is at the same time externally real; conversely, the content of the law is elevated into ideality; for it is annulled in it-

self — reflected into itself, since each side has within it its other and is consequently identical with it and with itself in very truth.

The law has therefore become essential relation or “necessary connection.” The truth of the non-essential world is in the first place a world which exists for its other as an in-and-for-itself-existent, but hence this is the totality, because it is itself and also that former world; both are immediate existences and consequently reflections in their other-being and therefore true reflections into themselves. The word “world” expresses in general the formless totality of multiplicity, of manifold indifferent objects. This world of indifferent multiplicity whether essential or phenomenal has gone to the ground; its multiplicity has ceased to be a multiplicity of mere indifferent, unrelated beings; it is now a totality or universum — *an essential relation*. There are two totalities of content in the phenomenon; at first they are defined as mutually indifferent and independent, and they have form each within itself but not as opposed to each other, but this form has shown itself to be their relation and the essential relation is the perfection of their form-unity.

THIRD CHAPTER.

Essential Relation.

The truth of the phenomenon is the *essential relation* [reciprocal relation or necessary connection]. Its content has immediate independence, both existing immediateness and reflecting immediateness, or reflection that is identical with itself; at the same time in this independence it is a relative — merely reflected into its other or a unity with its other through relation. In this unity the independent content is a posited and annulled; but this very unity constitutes its essentiality and independence; this reflection into another is reflection into itself. The relation has sides, since it is reflection into another; it has self-distinction within it; and the sides have independent existence, since in their indifference towards each other they are bent back into themselves and disconnected from each other so that the existence of each has its significance only in its relation to the other, or in the negative unity.

The essential relation is not yet the true *tertium quid* of Essence and Existence, but it contains already their definite union. Essence is realized in it in such a manner that it has independent existing elements for its reality; and these have returned from their indifference into their essential unity so that they have this essential unity

for their reality. The determinations of reflection — the positive and negative — are likewise reflected into themselves when they are reflected into their opposites. But they have no other determination than this their negative unity. The essential relation, on the contrary, has for its sides two independent totalities. It is the same antithesis as that of positive and negative, but it is at the same time an inverted world. Each side of the essential relation is a totality which, however, as essentially and opposite, has a “beyond” to itself; it is only phenomenon, its existence is not its own, but rather the existence belonging to its other. It is therefore disconnected or broken within itself. But this self-annulment is, at the same time, the unity of itself and its other, and therefore it is a totality, and on this account it has independent existence, and is essential reflection into itself.

This is the definition of the “Essential Relation.” But in the first place, the identity which it contains is not yet perfect; the totality which each relative term is in itself is at first only an internal one. Each side of the essential relation is in the first place posited in one determination only of the negative unity, the proper independence of each of the two sides is that which constitutes the form of the essential relation. Its identity, therefore, is only a relation to which their independence is external, namely, in the two sides; the reflected unity of that identity and of the independent existences has not yet been attained — substance has not yet been reached. The definition of essential relation as given requires the unity of the reflected and immediate independence. But the first realization of this definition is immediate and its moments are opposed to each other, and their unity is only an essential reference to each other, which becomes afterwards a unity corresponding to the idea or definition, when it is realized, *i. e.*, when those moments have posited the mentioned unity through their activity.

The essential relation is therefore at first the relation of the *whole and the parts*, *i. e.*, the relation of the reflected and the immediate independence in which they mutually condition and presuppose each other.

In this form of essential relation neither of the sides is posited as moment of the other; their identity is therefore itself one side; in other words their identity is not their negative unity. The second phase of this essential relation is that in which the one side is a moment of the other, and is contained in it as in its ground — the true independence of both. This is the relation of *force* and its *manifestation*.

Thirdly, this inequality or non-identity that still remains within the relation annuls itself, and the final form of essential relation appears—that of *Internal* and *External*. In this form of essential relation which has become entirely formal the essential relation goes to the ground, and there arises true *activity* or Substance as the absolute unity of immediate and reflected existence.

A

The Relation of the Whole and the Parts.

The essential relation contains in the first place the reflected-into-itself independence of existence; hence it is the simple form whose determinations are existences but at the same time are posited—held as moments in the unity. This independence which is reflected into itself is at the same time reflection into its opposite, namely, immediate independence; and its existence is essentially this identity with its opposite, just as much as it is its own independence. For this reason the other side also is immediately posited; the immediate independence which is determined as the other and is a diversified manifold within itself but in such a manner that this manifoldness is also essentially a relation to the other side is that to which the reflected independence belongs. The former side, the whole or totality is the independence which constitutes the in-and-for-itself-existing world. The other side, the parts, is the immediate existence, which was called the “phenomenal world.” In the relation of whole and parts the two sides are these independent worlds—each of which, however, reflects the other within itself, and is at the same time only this identity of both. Now since the essential relation is in its first phase only the immediate, it follows that the negative unity and the positive independence is predicated of it as an additional circumstance; the two sides are posited as moments and yet likewise as existing independently. That the two are posited as moments means that first the whole, the reflected independence, is an existence which contains the other, the immediate independence as a moment or element of it; in this the whole constitutes the unity of the two sides, their substrate, and the immediate existence takes the form of posited-being. Conversely, on the other hand the parts are the immediate—the side which contains within itself a manifold existence, an independent substrate; the reflected unity, on the contrary, the whole, is only an external relation.

2. This essential relation [of the whole and the parts] contains

therefore the independence of the sides, and likewise their annulment, and it contains both absolutely in one relation. The whole is the independent, and the parts are only moments or elements of this unity ; but likewise the parts are also independent, and their reflected unity [the whole] is only a moment or element ; and each is in its independence merely a relative of the other. This essential relation is, therefore, an immediate self-contradiction and annuls itself.

A closer examination shows that the whole is a reflected unity which has independent existence for itself ; but this its independence is likewise repelled from it ; the whole is a negative unity in negative relation to itself ; consequently it is self-externalized ; it has its existence in its opposite, in the manifold immediateness — the parts. The whole, therefore, consists of the parts, has its existence in them, and is nothing without them. It is, therefore, the entire essential relation and the independent totality ; and on precisely this ground it is only a relative somewhat, for that which makes it a totality is its other, the parts ; and it has its being not in itself but in its other.

So also are the parts likewise the entirety of this essential relation. They are the immediate independence opposed to the reflected independence, and have their being not in the whole, but for themselves. They have, moreover, the whole as an element which belongs to them : it constitutes their relation [to each other] ; without the whole there are no parts. Since they are independent, this relation or necessary connection is only an external phase towards which they are in-and-for-themselves indifferent. At the same time, however, the parts as manifold existence consolidate into one, for manifold existence is being without reflection ; the parts have their independence only in the reflected unity, which is this unity as well as also the existing manifoldness ; that is to say, they have independence only in the whole, which is at the same time, however, an independence different from the parts.

The whole and the parts, therefore, condition each other reciprocally ; but the essential relation in the form considered here stands higher than the relation of condition and conditioned, as considered above [as the result of the ground-relation]. This relation is now *realized* : namely, it is posited that the condition is the essential independence of the conditioned, and is presupposed by it. The condition as such is only the immediate and only an implicit presupposition. The whole, however, is the condition of the parts, and yet it contains the immediate implication that it is only in so far as it presupposes the parts. Since, therefore, the two sides of the essential relation are posited as mutually conditioning, to each there belongs

immediate independence, but an independence which is mediated or posited for each through the other. The entire essential relation through this reciprocity becomes a return of the conditioning activity into itself, and hence the not relative, the unconditioned.

Since the sides of the essential relation possess their independence only through each other, we have only one identity for the two, and in this identity they are only moments or complemental elements; but since each is independent within itself, there are two independent existences, mutually indifferent.

In the first respect [of the contradiction just stated] the essential identity of these sides is the whole equal to the parts and the parts equal to the whole: There is nothing in the whole which is not in the parts, and nothing in the parts which is not in the whole. The whole is not abstract unity, but the unity as a diversified multiplicity [of different, independent ones]; but this unity, within which the manifold ones relate to each other, is the determinateness through which each one is a "part." The essential relation has, therefore, an inseparable identity and only one independence.

Moreover the whole is equal to the parts, but it is not the same as the parts; the whole is the reflected unity, but the parts constitute the particularity or the otherness of the unity, and are the many different ones. The whole is not equal to them when they are regarded as these independent ones, but is equal to them only when taken together. This "together" is nothing else than their unity, the whole as such. The whole is, therefore, in the parts only self-identical, and the identity of the whole and the parts expresses only the tautology that the whole, as whole, is not identical with the parts but with the whole of the parts.

Conversely, the parts are equal to the whole, but since they possess the phase of otherness they are not equal to the whole as unity, but only in so far as one of its manifold determinations belongs to each part or the parts are equal to the whole regarded as manifold; in other words, they are equal to it as a divided whole, that is to say, as divided into parts. Hence we have the same tautology as before; that the parts, as parts, are not identical with the whole as such, but with the whole considered as the whole of the parts.

The whole and the parts regarded in this manner are external and indifferent to each other; each side relates only to itself. And thus held asunder they are destroyed. The whole which is indifferent towards the parts is only the abstract identity, without distinction within itself; it is not a whole except as containing distinctions within itself, and distinctions within itself such as are reflected into

themselves as manifold determinations, and have immediate independence. And the identity of reflection has been shown to have this reflection into its other as its truth. Likewise the parts as indifferent towards the unity of the whole are only a multiplicity of ones unrelated towards the other, and are therefore in themselves others, which therefore are self-annulling. This relation to itself of each of the two sides is its independence, but this independence which each possesses is rather its self-negation. Each has therefore its independence not within itself but within the other; this other which possesses its being is its presupposed immediate which promises to be its first and its beginning.

The truth of the essential relation consists therefore in the mediation; its essence is negative unity in which both the reflected and the existent immediateness is annulled. The essential relation is the contradiction which goes back into its ground, into the unity which as returning is the reflected unity; but since the reflected unity has also been annulled it relates negatively to itself, annuls itself, and reduces itself to existent immediateness. But this is negative relation in so far as it is a first and immediate or is mediated through another, and on this account a posited. This other existent immediateness is likewise only as annulled; its independence is a first somewhat [an immediate] but only to vanish; and it has a being that is posited and mediated.

In this determination the essential relation remains no longer whole and parts; the immediateness which its sides possessed has passed over into posited-being and mediation; each is posited in so far as it is immediate as self-annulling and as transition into the other; and in so far as itself is negative relation it is conditioned through the other as through its positive; and its immediate transition is likewise an immediate, that is to say an annulment, which is posited through the other. Hence the relation of the Whole and the Parts has gone over into the relation of *Force* and *Manifestation*.

Remark.

The antinomy of the infinite divisibility of matter has been already discussed in connection with the idea of quantity. Quantity is the unity of continuity and discreteness; it contains in the independent one its continuity into another and in this identity continued without break it has likewise the negation of that identity. The immediate relation of these moments of quantity are expressed as the essential relation of the Whole and the Parts, the One of Quantity being regarded

as part, and the continuity of quantity being taken as the Whole which is composed of parts. The antinomy then consists in the contradiction which has been solved in the essential relation of the whole and the parts. Whole and parts are, namely, essentially related to each other and constitute one identity, and they are likewise indifferent to each other and possess independence. The essential relation is therefore this antinomy: when one of the moments frees itself from its other the other at once reappears within it.

When the existing somewhat is defined as whole it has parts, and the parts constitute its reality; the unity of the whole is only a posited relation—an external juxtaposition which does not concern the independently existing somewhats. In so far as the somewhats are parts they are not the whole, not combined, and are accordingly simple. And since the relation to a whole is an external affair it does not concern it; the independent somewhat is accordingly not a part, for a part is such only in relation to a whole. But since in this view it is not a part, it is a whole itself already; for there is only this essential relation of whole and parts, and the independent somewhat is either one or the other of the two. But since it is the whole it follows that it is composed of parts, and its parts as independent wholes are again composed of parts, and so *ad infinitum*. This infinitude consists only in the perennial alternation of the two determinations of the essential relation in which each gives rise immediately to the other, so that the posited-being of each is its own vanishing. Matter defined as whole therefore consists of parts and in these parts the whole becomes a non-essential relation and vanishes. The part thus for-and-by-itself is not a part but the whole. The antinomy of this syllogism, considered carefully, proves really to be this: since the whole is not the independent, the part is the independent; but since the part is independent only when not in relation to the whole it is the independent not as part but rather as the whole. The infinitude of the progress which arises, is the incapacity of uniting the two thoughts which contain this mediation so that on this account each of the two determinations becomes dependent and passes over into the other just because of its independence and separation.

B.

The Essential Relation of Force and its Manifestation.

Force is the negative unity in which the contradiction of the whole and parts has resolved itself, as the truth of essential relation.

The whole and parts is the essential relation as it appears when seized in a thoughtless manner, or by mind in its representative thinking or thinking in images, or, considered objectively, it is the dead mechanical aggregate which has form-determinations through which the manifoldness of its independent matters is brought into relation in a unity, but a unity which is after all only external to it. The essential relation [or necessary connection between force and its manifestation] of force is however a higher form of return-into-itself in which the unity of the whole which constituted the relation of the independent others (parts) has ceased to be external and indifferent to this multiplicity.

As this essential relation has now been defined, the immediate and the reflected forms of independence are posited in one unity as annulled or as moments, while in the preceding form of the essential relation (whole and parts) they were real sides or extremes existing for themselves. In this result, first, we see that the reflected unity and its immediate being, in so far as the two are first and immediate, are by nature self-annulling phases and forms of reciprocal transition. The former, the force, passes into its manifestation, and the manifestation vanishes and goes back into the force as into its ground and only exists when it is posited by the force and sustained by it. In the second place, this transition is not merely a becoming and a vanishing, but it is a negative self-relation; in other words, that which changes its determination is while doing so reflected into itself and preserves itself. The movement of force is not so much a transition as a translation or transference of itself which remains self-identical in this transference of itself through its own posited change. In the third place, this reflected unity which relates to itself is also annulled and a moment [or complementary element]; it is mediated through its other, and conditioned through it; its negative relation to itself which is first and begins the movement of transition from itself has likewise a presupposition by which it is solicited to activity, and another from which it begins.

a. The Conditioning of Force.

Considered in its special determinations force has, in the first place, the phase of existent immediateness belonging to it; opposed to this, it itself is a negative unity. But the latter as a determination of immediate being is an existing somewhat. This somewhat, for the reason that it is the negative unity as an immediate, appears to be a first [presupposed as already existing] a somewhat opposed to the

force since the force is a reflected existence, a posited-being, and hence it seems to belong to an existing thing or to a matter. This is not understood as though the force were the form of this thing, and the thing were determined through it; but the thing is conceived to be an immediate and to be a separate existence and indifferent to the force. And according to this view there is no ground or reason in the thing why it should possess a force; it is the force, on the other hand, as the side of posited being which essentially presupposes the thing. Therefore if the question is asked, how it happens that the thing or matter is endowed with a force, the explanation is given that the force is impressed on it by a foreign power, and that it is only something external to the thing or matter.

Regarded as this immediate reality, force is a quiescent determinateness of the thing; not as a self-uttering or manifesting, but as an immediate externality. Hence the force is designated as a matter and instead of being called a magnetic force, an electric force, &c., there is assumed a magnetic matter, an electric matter, &c.; or instead of the well-known attractive force there is conceived a subtle ether which holds all things together. There are matters into which the powerless, inactive negative unity of the thing dissolves, and these have been already considered [in Book II., section 2, B and C].

But force contains immediate existence as phase or moment, as such a somewhat as while it is condition, passes into transition and annuls itself; therefore immediate existence as a phase of force is not an existing thing [has not the form of "thing"]. It is moreover not negation as determinateness, but negative unity which is reflected into itself. The thing to which the force belongs has consequently here no further significance; it is rather the positing of externality which manifests itself as existence. Therefore it is also not merely a determined matter [a special form of it]; such independence [as particular matter] has long ago passed over into posited-being and phenomenon.

Secondly, force is the unity of the reflected reality and of immediate reality — or of the form-unity and of external independence. It is both in one; it is the contact of such somewhats that the one is in so far as the other is not; the self-identical positive and the negated reflection. Force is therefore the self-repelling contradiction. It is active; in other words it is self-related negative unity, in which reflected immediateness or essential being-in-itself is posited as being only annulled or a phase; consequently in so far as it distinguishes itself from immediate existence, it passes over into it.

Force therefore is posited as the determination of the reflected unity of the whole as the becoming of existing, external multiplicity.

But, thirdly, force is at first only potential and immediate activity; it is reflected unity and likewise essentially the negation of essential unity; and since it is different from these, and only the identity of itself and its negation, it is related to them essentially as an immediateness external to them, and they are consequently its presupposition and condition.

This presupposition now is not a thing already existing in contrast with it; such indifferent independence is annulled in the force; as its condition the presupposition is an independent other to the force. But since it is not a thing, and since the independent immediateness has here determined itself to be a self-relating negative unity, this presupposition is itself force. The activity of force is therefore conditioned through itself as a self-other, *i. e.*, it is conditioned through a force.

Force is, according to this, an essential relation in which each side is the same as the other. Forces stand in essential relation to each other [and not forces and things]. In the first place, they are regarded as indifferent to each other. The unity of their essential relation is at first only an internal, potential unity. The conditioning of one force through another is, therefore, regarded as the product of the force's own activity; in other words, is looked upon at first as a preposing activity, an act of negative self-relation. This other force which conditions the first force lies beyond its positing activity, *viz.*, the reflection which returns into itself immediately in its activity of returning.

b. The Soliciting Force.

Force is conditioned because the phase of immediate existence which it contains is a mere posited, but, for the reason that it is at the same time immediate it is a presupposed, in which the force itself is negated. Therefore the externality which force encounters is its own presupposing activity itself, which is posited directly as another force.

This presupposition is moreover mutual. Each of the two forces contains the unity-reflected-into-itself as annulled, and is therefore presupposing. It posits itself as external; this externality is its own externality; but since it is likewise unity reflected-into-itself, it posits this externality not within itself, but as another force.

But the external, as such, is the self-annulling; moreover the self-reflecting activity is essentially related to that external as its other,

but likewise as to something nugatory in itself and in identity with it. Since the presupposing activity is likewise reflection into itself, it is the annulment of its mentioned negation, and posits the same as its own external. Therefore the force as conditioning is reciprocally the occasion which excites the activity of the other force against which it is active. It does not stand in the relation of a passivity, a being determined by another force which came into it, but it is an occasion which solicits the other. It is within itself a negativity of itself and the repulsion of itself from itself is its own positing. Its activity therefore consists in this, that it annuls its occasion as an external occasion; it reduces it to a mere occasion, and posits it as its own repulsion from itself — it makes it into its own manifestation [*i. e.*, the force makes the occasion of its activity the utterance of the force itself; it annuls the determination which it finds in the object upon which it, the force, acts, and replaces those determinations with its own determinations].

The self-externalizing force is therefore the same that was previously defined as the presupposing activity, *i. e.*, that which made itself external. But the force as self-externalizing is at the same time a negating of externality and a positing of it as its own activity. In so far now as we begin with this view of force as a negative unity of itself, and consequently a presupposing reflection, it is all the same as if we began with the view of the soliciting occasion in the process of manifestation of a force. The force is therefore defined as a self-annulling identity according to its ideal, but as a reality it becomes one of two forces soliciting or solicited. But the ideal of the force is in general the identity of the positing and presupposing reflection — in other words, of the reflected and immediate unity — and each of these determinations is only a phase or moment, in one unity, and consequently is mediated through the other. But likewise there is no way of characterizing which of the two forces that stand in mutual relation is the soliciting or which the solicited; each of the two form-determinations belongs to the one as much as to the other. But this identity is not merely an external one of comparison, but it is also their essential unity.

The one force, for instance, is defined as the soliciting and the other as the solicited; these form-determinations appear thus as immediate, as belonging essentially to the forces. But they are essentially mediated. The one force is solicited, the soliciting occasion is a determination posited within it from without. But force is itself the presupposing; it is essentially reflection into itself, and it annuls the externality of the soliciting occasion and makes it its own solici-

tation. The soliciting is therefore its own deed; in other words, it determines the fact that the other force shall be another and a soliciting force. The soliciting relates to its other, negatively, so that it annuls its externality, and is thus so far a positing force; but it is this only through the presupposition of having another opposed to it. *i. e.*, it is soliciting only so far as it has an externality to it, consequently only so far as it is solicited. In other words it is soliciting only in so far as it is solicited to be soliciting. Conversely, also, the former solicits only in so far as the other solicits it to solicit. Each of the two therefore receives its occasion or impulse from the other; but the occasion which it gives as active consists in this, that it receives from the other an occasion or impulse. The occasion or impulse which it receives is solicited by itself. The two, the given and the received occasion, or the active externalization and the passive externality are therefore not immediate but mediated, and each of the two forces is consequently itself the determinateness which the other has presented to it — is mediated through the other, and the mediating other is likewise its own determining positing.

Therefore this fact that an occasion for the activity of a force is presented through another force to which it is in so far passive, but, on account of the occasion, goes over from its passivity into activity — all this is only the return of force into itself. It externalizes itself, or manifests itself. The externalization is reaction in the sense that it posits the externality as its own phase or moment, and consequently annuls the solicitation of itself through another force. The two are therefore one. The externalizing of the force, whereby it gives itself extantness for others through its negative activity upon itself, and the infinite return in this externality to itself, so that this externality is only its own self-relation. The presupposing reflection to which belongs the conditioning activity and the "occasion," is therefore only the reflection returning into itself, and the activity is essentially reactive against itself. The positing of the occasion, or of the external as itself the annulment of the same, and conversely, the annulment of the occasion, is the positing of externality [*i. e.*, of the force itself].

c. The Infinitude of Force.

Force is finite in so far as its moments have still the form of immediateness; their presupposing and their self-relating reflections are distinct in this determination. The presupposing reflection manifests itself as an external force independently existing, and the self-relating reflection manifests itself in relation to it as passive. Force is there-

fore conditioned as regards form, and likewise limited as regards its content; for a determinateness as regards form contains a limitation as regards content. But the activity of force consists in self-utterance. This means, as has been shown, the annulment of externality and the determining of it to be that in which force is identical with itself. Therefore what the force really manifests is this, that its relation to another is its relation to itself, that its passivity consists in its activity. The occasion through which it is solicited to activity is its own soliciting; and the externality which comes to it [to solicit it] is no immediate somewhat, but mediated through it; and likewise its own essential identity with itself is not immediate, but mediated through its negation. In other words, the force manifests this, or expresses this, that its externality is identical with its internality.

C.

Relation of External and Internal.

1. The essential relation of the whole and the parts is the immediate phase of essential relation; the reflected immediateness and the existent immediateness have therefore within it, each an independence of its own; but since they stand in essential relation their independence is only their negative unity. This is now posited in the utterance or manifestation of force. The reflected unity is essentially the becoming-other as transference of itself into externality, but externality has likewise immediately gone back into the reflected unity. The distinction between the independent forces annuls itself; the manifestation of force is only a mediation of the reflected unity with itself. It is only an empty transparent distinction — a mere appearance; but this appearance is the mediation which constitutes the independent reality itself. Besides the contrary or opposite determinations which mutually annul each other, and besides their activity of transition the immediateness from which the movement into the other is begun is itself only a posited being; and through this each of the determinations is in its immediateness already the unity with its other and therefore the transition is likewise the self-positing return into itself.

The Internal is defined as the form of the reflected immediateness, or of Essence, as opposed to the External which is the form of Being; they however, form only one identity. This identity is, in the first place, the solid unity of the two as substrate replete with content — in other words as the absolute Thing [*Sache*] or substrate in which

the two determinations named are indifferent, external moments. In so far as it is content and totality which constitutes the Internal and which becomes likewise External, but in this becoming does not change or pass over out of itself, but remains self-identical. The External in this respect is not only identical with the Internal as regards its content, but the two constitute only one thing [*Sache*].

But this thing [*Sache*] as simple identity with itself is different from its form-determinations — in other words, the latter are external to it; in this respect it is itself an internal which is different from its externality. This externality, however, consists in the two determinations, viz., the internal and external, which constitute it. But the thing [*Sache*] is itself nothing but the unity of the two. Consequently the two sides are again identical as regards the content. But in the thing [*Sache*] they form a self-penetrating identity as a substrate replete with content. But in the external, as forms of the thing [*Sache*] the two sides are opposed to the former identity and are consequently mutually indifferent.

2. They have thus become different form-determinations which possess an identical substrate not in themselves, but in another; they are determinations of reflection; the internal as the form of reflection-into-itself is essentiality, the external in the form of immediateness reflected into something else is non-essentiality. But the nature of the essential relation has exhibited these determinations as constituting merely one identity. Force is in its utterance a presupposing activity which is identical with the determining activity as returning into itself. Therefore in so far as internal and external are regarded as form-determinations, they are first only the simple form itself; secondly, since they are defined within it as opposites their unity is the pure, abstract mediation in which the one is immediately because the other is, and the latter immediately because the former is; thus the internal is immediately the external and it has the form of externality because it is the internal; conversely, the external is only an internal because it is only an external.

Since this form-unity contains the two determinations as opposed, their identity is only this transition, and it is an identity which differs from them, rather than their identity with fulness of content. In other words this firm retention of the form is the side of particularity. And what is posited in this regard is not the real totality of the whole, but the totality or the thing [*Sache*] itself merely in the determinateness of form. Since this is merely a composite or aggregate unity of the two opposite determinations, it follows that each is essentially in the other determinateness and only in the other, and it

follows also as first remarked that they are only in the former determinateness, it being indifferent which determinateness we take first — whether that of substrate or of thing [*Sache*]. [It is evident that if the external is outside of the internal the internal is also outside of the external — *i. e.*, separate from it, beyond its limits. This shows the emptiness of the distinction of external and internal as affording any real explanation.]

It follows that anything that is only an internal is likewise for that reason only an external; and conversely, whatever is only external is likewise only internal. In other words, since the internal is defined as Essence, while the external is defined as Being, it follows that a thing [*Sache*] in so far as it is only in its essence is for that reason only an immediate being [*i. e.*, without mediation or essential relation which it ought to have if it is Essence]; or on the other hand a thing [*Sache*] which only is, or has being alone, is for that reason still in its essence [*i. e.*, has not unfolded its nature — manifested its essence, and hence is no true being]. The external and internal are sides of determination in which determinateness is posited in such a manner that each of the two determinations not only presupposes the other and passes over into it as into its truth, but, besides this, remains posited as determinateness in so far as it is the truth of the other, and indicates the totality of the two. The internal is therefore the completion of Essence as regards form. Essence, *viz.*, defined as internal, as such, must necessarily be defective, and a mere relation to its other, the external; and the external is likewise not mere being or existence even, but a somewhat relating to essence or to the internal. But it is not merely the relation of each to the other that we have here, but the absolute form in its completeness, *viz.*, that each is immediately its opposite, and the common relation of these opposites to their third or their unity. Their mediation lacks however as yet this identical substrate containing them both; their relation is on this account an immediate inversion of the one into the other, and this negative unity which combines them is a simple point, without any content.

Remark.

The activity of Essence is in general the becoming [or production of, or genesis of] the Idea [*Begriff* or “concrete Idea,” as the being which is both subjective and objective, *i. e.*, self-determined as its own object — conscious being]. In the essential relation of the internal and external the essential feature of the Idea makes its appear-

ance, viz., the existence of such a negative unity that each of its moments is not only its other, but is also the totality of the whole [human nature manifests itself as such a negative unity of individual human beings, each one of which not only depends upon the others and avails itself of their strength, but through this relation realizes within itself its own negative unity, *i. e.*, elevates itself to a total by this means]. But this totality is in the Idea as such the universal [*i. e.*, the category of the universal corresponds to the totality in the category of External and Internal]; the totality however is a substrate which has not yet appeared at the stage of the process where we have internal and external. In the negative identity of internal and external, which is the immediate inversion of each of these determinations into the other, there is also lacking that substrate which has been called thing [*Sache*].

The unmediated identity of form as it is here posited as yet without the activity filled with content belonging to the thing [*Sache*] itself ought to be noted very carefully. It makes its appearance in the thing [*Sache*] as it is in its beginning. Similarly pure being is immediately nothing. So too everything real in its beginning is such an immediate identity only; for in its beginning it has not yet developed its moments, and contrasted them, nor withdrawn itself back out of its externality, and on the other hand it has not yet through its own activity proceeded forth from its internality and externalized itself. In such case it is therefore only the internal as determinateness in contrast with the external, and only the external as a contrast with the internal. Hence it is in one respect only an immediate being; in another respect, in so far as it is likewise the negativity which is destined to become the activity of development, it is as such essentially only an internal.

In all natural scientific and spiritual evolution, in general, this phase presents itself and it is important to recognize it: that the first phase of any thing is that of its internality, in other words its existence in its idea [an ideal not yet realized, *e. g.*, an acorn not yet become an oak, a child or a savage not yet become a developed, civilized man] and is for this reason only its immediate passive being. And the most convenient example of this is the essential relation just above considered which has passed through mediation — the essential relation of force, — and has realized the essential relation within itself, — its ideal, or first internality. On this account, because it is first internal only, it is only the external immediate essential relation, — the essential relation of the “whole and the parts” in which the sides have an indifferent reality, outside of relation to each other.

Their identity does not yet essentially exist for them ; it is only internal as yet, and on this account they fall asunder, and have only an immediate external existence. So too the sphere of Being in general is nothing but an internality, and what is the same thing the sphere of existent immediateness or of externality.

Essence is at first only the internal ; and consequently as such it is taken for a mere unsystematized common interest and quite external. In German one has the words, *Schulwesen* = school-essence [where the English say school-system], *Zeitungswesen* = newspaper-essence [where the English say journalism] and understand under these expressions a common interest formed by external combination of existing objects, without essential connection or organization. Among concrete objects the seed of a plant is an internal plant [internally a plant] and a child is an internal man [a man not yet realized]. But on this account the plant or the man as a germ is only an immediate somewhat, an external being, which has not yet attained the negative relation to itself, and is therefore a passive being exposed to external influences ; so also God defined in his immediate idea would not be spirit ; spirit is not the immediate, the opposite of mediation, but rather the essence which externally posits immediateness, and eternally returns from that immediateness into itself. Regarded as immediate therefore God would be only nature. In other words Nature is only the internality of spirit, not the actuality of spirit, and is therefore not the true God. In other words God in the first [or lowest form of] thinking is only pure being, or mere essence, that is to say, the abstract absolute, and not God as absolute spirit [self-conscious] which alone is the true nature of God.

3. The first of the considered identities of the internal and external is the identity opposed to the distinction of these determinations as an indifferent substrate opposed to a form external to it, or an identity as content. The second of the identities considered is the unmediated identity of the distinction of the external and internal, viz., the immediate inversion of each into its opposite — this is the pure form. But these two identities are only the sides of one totality ; in other words the totality itself is only their conversion of each into the other. The totality as substrate and content is their immediateness reflected into itself by means of the presupposing reflection of form which annuls its distinction and posits itself as indifferent identity, as reflected unity opposed to it. In other words the identity is the form itself in so far as it is defined as variety, or indifferent multiplicity, and in so far as it reduces itself to one of its

sides as externality, and to the other of its sides as immediateness reflected into itself, or internality.

Hence, on the other hand, the distinctions of form — the internal and the external, are by this means posited each as the totality of itself and its other ; the internal as simple identity reflected into itself is therefore the immediate and consequently being and externality, as well as essence. The external, on the other hand as manifold, particular being, mere externality, is posited as unessential, and returned into its ground, and consequently as internal [that which is posited as unessential is thereby posited as dependent and as belonging to something else whose manifestation it is ; and as a manifestation or appearance it is only the internality of something else, which has thus been externalized as appearance]. This transition of each into the other forms their immediate identity as substrate, but it is also their mediated identity, viz., each is through its other what it is within itself, *i. e.*, the totality of the essential relation. Or conversely, the determinateness of each side is meditated with the other determinateness, through the fact that it is potentially the totality ; the totality mediates itself therefore through the form, or through the determinateness, and the determinateness mediates itself through its simple identity.

Any somewhat is what it is therefore wholly in its externality ; its externality is its totality ; it is likewise its unity reflected into itself. Its manifestation or phenomenal existence is not merely reflection into something else, but reflection into itself, and its externality is therefore the externality of that which it is in itself ; and since in this way its content and its form are absolutely identical there is nothing in and for itself but this, to utter itself or manifest itself. It is the revelation of its own essence, so that this essence consists merely in self-revelation.

The essential relation has thus defined itself as identity of its phenomenal manifestation with its internality, and therefore now defines essence as Actuality.

THIRD SECTION.

ACTUALITY.

Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence. In it the formless essence and the fleeting phenomenon have their truth—in other words, persistence devoid of determination and multiplicity devoid of persistence find here their truth. Although existence is immediateness which has resulted from a ground it has not the form posited within it and as belonging to it. When it determines itself and forms itself it is the phenomenon [*i. e.*, totality of appearance]. And since it develops persistence as reflection-into-another until it becomes reflection into itself, there originate two worlds, two totalities of content, the one of which is defined as reflected into itself and the other as reflected into another. The essential relation, however, exhibits its form-relation which arrives at its full development in the essential relation of Internal and External as one identical substrate for the content of both, and thus only one identity of form. Through the fact that this identity of the form has arisen, the category of form has lost its multiplicity of distinctions [and is hence annulled] and one absolute totality has resulted.

This unity of the Internal and External is the absolute actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). This actuality is in its first phase of consideration the absolute as such; and in so far as it is posited as unity in which the form is annulled, it has become the empty or external distinction of External and Internal. The activity of reflection is regarded as an external affair in its relation to this absolute, and not as the activity of the absolute itself, but since this reflection essentially belongs to it, it is [*i. e.*, will be found to be] the negative return of the absolute into itself. [Such is the first phase of Actuality.]

In the second place [*i. e.*, in the second phase of its consideration] this unity of the Internal and External is the Actuality properly so-called. Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity constitute the formal moments [elements or phases] of the absolute, *i. e.*, its reflection.

In the third place [the third phase of its consideration] the unity of the absolute and of its activity of reflection is the absolute essential relation—in other words it is the absolute as essential relation to itself; this is called SUBSTANCE.

[In the preceding paragraphs, Hegel gives the substance or outline of this third section of Essence.]

FIRST CHAPTER.

The Absolute.

The simple, pure identity of the absolute is indeterminate [without particularization]. In other words within it all determinateness, whether of essence and existence or of being, have been annulled; and so has the activity of reflection. In so far as this is the case the definition of that which the absolute is, is merely negative; and the absolute itself appears only as the negation of all predicates and as entirely empty and void; but in as much as the absolute must at the same time be pronounced as the affirmation of all predicates, it is manifestly the most formal contradiction. In so far as this negating and affirming belong to external reflection it is a formal, non-systematic dialectic, which, with little trouble, seizes upon determinations of different kinds here and there, and with just as little trouble shows up their finitude and mere relativity, while, on the other hand, the totality hovers before it, and it pronounces this absolute to possess all determinations inherent within it. It has not the ability to bring this affirming and negating to a true unity. There is a necessity, however, to show what this absolute is, but this exposition must not be a determining or a defining of it, nor an external reflection, because by them *determinations* of the absolute would appear; there is admissible only an *analysis* or *exposition* — the exposition on the part of the absolute itself — which only shows what it is.

A.

The Display or Exposition of the Absolute.

The Absolute is not merely Being, nor is it merely Essence. Being is the first non-reflected immediateness; Essence is the reflected immediateness. Each of the two is a totality within itself, but a definite, particular totality. In the sphere of Essence the category of Being reappears as Existence; and the relation of being to essence has developed into the essential relation of Internal and External. The Internal is the Essence as totality, which is related to being and is immediate being. The External is being, but it is related to the activity of reflection and it is immediate identity with essence. The absolute itself is the absolute unity of the two. It is

that which constitutes the ground of the essential relation, which as essential relation has not gone back into this identity, and its ground is not yet posited.

Hence it is evident that the definition of the absolute makes it to be absolute form, but at the same time not as an identity whose moments or phases are mere simple determinatenesses; it is rather the identity whose moments or phases are both totalities, and as such are indifferent to the form, and hence constitute the perfect content of the whole. Conversely, the absolute is the absolute content in such a manner that the content which as such is an indifferent [*i. e.*, a non-related] multiplicity and possesses the negative form-relation within it, and through this its multiplicity forms one solid [*i. e.*, homogeneous or continuous] identity.

The identity of the absolute is consequently the absolute through this fact, that each of its parts is the whole, in other words, that each determinateness is the totality. This makes each determinateness to be a transparent appearance, a distinction that has vanished in its posited-being. Essence, existence, in-itself-existent world, whole, part, force, — these reflected determinations appear to the imaging [representing] form of thought as if they were something valid in and for themselves — as possessing true being; but the absolute is their ground and they have vanished into it. Since in the absolute the form is only simple self-identity, the absolute does not determine itself [or particularize itself]; for determination is a form-distinction [a distinction within form.] But since the absolute contains all distinction and form-determination — in other words since it is absolute form and activity of reflection, it must have difference or diversity in its content. But the absolute itself is absolute identity. This is its definition since all multiplicity of the self-existent world and of the phenomenal world, or of the internal and external totalities have vanished. In itself there is no becoming, for it is not a form of Being nor is it the self-reflecting form of determination; it is not essence, which determines itself only within itself; it is moreover not a self-manifestation, for it is the identity of the internal and external.

But the activity of reflection stands in opposition to its absolute identity. The activity of reflection is annulled in its absolute identity. Hence it is only the internality of it and therefore external to it [*i. e.*, separate from it]. The activity of reflection consists in this — the annulment of its activity in the absolute. It is “the beyond” of the manifold distinctions and determinations and of their activity which the absolute holds in abeyance. It is therefore their assump-

tion [adoption] but at the same time their destruction. It is thus the negative exposition of the absolute already mentioned. In their true presentation this exposition forms the whole of the logical activity which has preceded in this investigation, including the spheres of Being and Essence, whose content is not gathered together from without as something accidentally found, nor has it gone down into the abyss of the absolute through external reflection, but it is determined within it through its own inner necessity: a becoming, inherent in being, and an activity of reflection belonging to essence has returned into the absolute as its ground.

This Display or exposition has however a positive side, namely, in so far as the finite within it — that which perishes — shows by perishing that it is related to the absolute, or that the absolute is contained in it [or manifested upon it]. But this side is not so much the positive exhibition of the absolute itself as it is the exhibition of the determinations which it has through the fact that the absolute is its foundation and also its ground — in other words, that which gives it, as appearance, a reality, is the absolute itself. The appearance is not a mere nothing, but it is reflection, *i. e.*, relation to the absolute; in other words, it is appearance, in so far as the absolute appears in it. This positive exposition or display, therefore, prevents the finite from disappearing and regards it as an expression and image of the absolute. But the transparency of the finite which permits only the absolute to appear through it, results in its entire disappearance, for there is nothing in the finite which can give it an independent individuality as against the absolute; it is only a medium which is lost in the manifestation of that which shines through it.

This positive analysis or display of the absolute is therefore only an appearance; for the true positive which contains it and the content which is exhibited, is the absolute itself. As regards the further determinations, the form in which the absolute appears is something nugatory which the exhibition assumes as an external affair, and makes its beginning with it. Such a determination has not its beginning in the absolute, but only its end. This exhibition is therefore an absolute deed through its relation to the absolute into which it returns; but it is not this in its point of departure, for that is only an external determination to the absolute.

In fact, however, the display or exposition of the absolute is its own act, and it begins with itself as well as arrives at itself. The absolute is determined solely as absolute identity; through the activity of reflection it is posited as identical in contrast with antithesis and multiplicity; in other words it is only the negative of reflection

and of determination in general. Not only that exhibition of the absolute is something incomplete, but so also is this absolute itself at which it has arrived. In other words, that absolute which exists only as absolute identity is such an absolute merely as belongs to external reflection. It is therefore not what is absolute in an absolute sense, but it is the absolute in the form of determinateness or particularity—it is what is called “Attribute.”

The absolute however is not attribute merely because it is the object of external reflection and is particularized through that. In other words reflection is not external to it solely; but it is also immediate, and therefore because it is external it is also internal. The absolute is the absolute only because it is not abstract identity, but the identity of being and essence—*i. e.*, the identity of the internal and external. It is therefore the absolute form which causes its manifestation within itself and determines it to be an attribute.

B.

The Absolute Attribute.

The expression which has been used—the absolute absolute [the absolute taken absolutely]—denotes the absolute as returned into itself in its own form, or that whose form is identical with its content. The attribute is only the relative absolute—an expression which means only that the absolute is in a form-determination. The form is namely at first, before its complete analysis or exposition, only internal, or, what is the same thing, only external—particularized form or negation. But since it is the form of the absolute, the attribute is the entire content of the absolute; it is the totality—such a totality as we formerly named a “world” [the “phenomenal world” and the “in-itself-existent world”] or as one of the sides of the essential relation—each of those sides being at the same time the entire relation. But those two “worlds”—the phenomenal and in-itself-existent worlds—were defined as antithetic to each other in their nature. One side of the essential relation was identical with the other; the whole identical with the parts; the manifestation of the force possessed the same content as the force itself, and the “external” was the same as the “internal.” At the same time however each of these sides possessed an immediate reality of its own; one side possessed an existent immediateness and the other a reflected immediateness. In the absolute on the contrary these distinctions of immediateness are reduced to a mere appearance [or seeming] and the totality

which is the attribute is posited as its true and only proper reality ; but the determination in which it appears is posited as non-essential.

The absolute is therefore attribute for the reason that it is simple, absolute identity in the determination of identity. There may be other determinations joined to this determination — so that there are several attributes. But since the absolute identity has only this meaning, not only that all determinations are annulled, but that it is also the activity of reflection which has annulled itself, it consequently happens that all determinations belonging to it are posited as annulled. In other words, the totality is posited as the absolute ; or the attribute has for its reality and content the absolute. Its form-determination through which it is attribute is therefore also posited immediately as mere appearance, and thus the negative is posited as negative. The positive appearance, which the exhibition or exposition reaches through the attribute, — since it takes the finite in its limitation as something lacking self-existence, and annuls its independent existence in the absolute and reduces it to an attribute, — again annuls it as attribute ; it causes it to perish in the simple absolute, and thus it recalls the act which distinguished or displayed it as attribute.

Since, however, the reflection thus returns from its act of distinguishing back to the identity of the absolute, it has not emerged from its externality and arrived at the true absolute. It has reached only the indefinite, abstract identity ; *i. e.*, that form of it which has the determinateness of identity. In other words, the reflection, since it is determined as attribute, — as the internal form of the absolute, — is in this determining, different from the externality ; the internal determination does not interpenetrate the absolute — its manifestation is a vanishing, as a mere posited on the absolute.

The form therefore taken as external, or as internal, whereby the absolute becomes an attribute, is therefore posited as a self-nugatory, a mere appearance, a mere mode and manner of existence.

C.

The Modus of the Absolute.

The attribute is in the first phase the absolute as simple self-identity. In the second phase it is negation, and as such negation it is the formal activity of reflection into itself. These two sides constitute the two extremes of the attribute while it itself is the middle term, since it is itself both the absolute and the determinateness.

The second of these two extremes is the negative as negative, the activity of reflection external to the absolute. In other words, in so far as it is taken as the internal of the absolute, and it is defined as the activity of positing itself as modus, it is the externality of the absolute, its lapse into the realm of change and contingency, of immediate being—its transition into the opposite without return into itself; the multiplicity of form and content determinations, without totality.

The modus as the externality of the absolute is moreover the externality posited as externality, a mere “mode and manner;” consequently the appearance as appearance, or the reflection into itself of form; consequently the self-identity which is the absolute. In fact therefore the absolute is posited as absolute identity first in the modus; it is only what it is, *i. e.*, self-identity as self-relating negativity, as appearance which is posited as appearance.

Therefore in so far as the analysis or exposition of the absolute begins with its absolute identity and passes over to the attribute and thence to the modus it has in these moments completed its course. But, in the first place, it is not a merely negative activity in its attitude towards these determinations, but it is the reflecting activity itself, the very activity by which the absolute is true absolute identity. In the second place it does not have to do merely with externality, and the modus is not the extreme of externality, but since it is appearance as appearance, it is the return into itself, the self-annulling reflection as which the absolute is absolute being.

In the third place the exhibiting reflection appears to commence with its own determinations, and with the external—the modus or the determinations of the attribute—taking them up as though they were already existent outside of the absolute, and the activity of the existing reflection seems to consist in this—that it reduces these determinations to independent identities. But in fact the exhibiting reflection finds the determinateness with which it begins in the absolute. For the absolute as first indifferent identity is only the determined absolute, called the attribute because it is the inactive absolute devoid of reflection. This determinateness, since it is determinateness, belongs to the reflecting activity; only through it is it determined as the first identical and only through it does it possess the absolute form, and is not merely in identity but a positing of itself in identity.

The true meaning of the modus is therefore that it is the reflecting activity belonging to the absolute; an activity of determination whereby it does not become another, but only becomes what it is

already; it is thus a transparent externality, which shows what it is in itself; a movement away from itself whose externality is at the same time its internality; and hence it is a positing which is not a mere positing, but absolute being.

If therefore the question is asked regarding the content of the exposition of the absolute, what it is that the absolute exhibits? it must be remembered that the distinction between form and content in the absolute has utterly vanished. Or that the content of the absolute is self-manifestation. The absolute is absolute form, which as the diremption or dualization of the absolute is wholly self-identical — the negative as negative; or it comes into identity with itself which is likewise indifferent towards its distinctions and is thus absolute content; the content is therefore only this very exposition (or exhibition of itself).

The absolute as this self-sustaining activity of exposition as mode and manner, which is its absolute self-identity, is manifestation not of an internal, nor a manifestation made to something else, but it is only a manifesting of itself for itself absolutely; it is therefore Actuality [*Wirklichkeit*].

Remark.

The idea of the “substance” of Spinoza corresponds to this idea of the absolute, and to the essential (reciprocal) relations of reflection belonging to it, as we have explained above. Spinozism is deficient as a philosophy through the fact that the activity of reflection and its manifold determining is an external form of thinking. His “substance” is one substance, one indivisible totality; there is no determinateness or particularity that is not contained in or annulled by this absolute; and it is important enough that all which appears to the naive representation, or the defining understanding as something independent, is reduced utterly to a mere posited-being [dependence] within that necessary thought [of the absolute or substance]. “*Determinateness is negation*,” is the absolute principle of Spinozistic philosophy; this true and simple insight establishes the absolute unity of substance. But Spinoza remains at the standpoint of negation as determinateness or quality; he does not reach the idea of absolute negation, *i. e.*, self-negating negation; hence his “substance” does not contain absolute form [self-determined form] and the science of it is no immanent scientific process [*i. e.*, a necessary procedure]. His “substance” is absolute unity of thought and being or extension; therefore it contains the thinking activity,

but only in its unity with extension. This implies that the thinking does not separate itself from extension, and consequently is not an activity of determining and form-giving, nor a return into itself, nor a beginning with itself. The "substance" therefore lacks the principle of personality, a defect which has been urged against the Spinozistic system most frequently. Moreover its form of knowing is external reflection, which takes up the determinateness of attribute and mode as a finite phenomenon without deducing it from the idea of "substance," and it makes reflections upon the same in an external manner, and, assuming those determinations as given, refers them to the absolute, without commencing its procedure in the absolute.

The definitions which Spinoza gives of "substance" are those of self-cause — *causa sui* — defined as a somewhat, "whose essence includes within itself its existence;" and he says that "The idea of the absolute does not need the idea of anything else for its conception." These definitions, deep and true as they are, are nevertheless assumed without proof in his system. Mathematics and other subordinate sciences are obliged to begin with presuppositions; they are under the necessity of assuming their elements or matter with which they have to deal. But the absolute cannot be a direct immediate something; it is essentially its own result.

After the definition of the absolute, Spinoza gives next his definition of attribute, namely, as "That which the intellect comprehends as the nature or essence of the absolute." Not to dwell upon the fact that the intellect is assumed as something subsequent to the attribute according to its nature — for Spinoza defines the intellect as a *modus* — it must be observed that the attribute which is a determination of the absolute is made by Spinoza dependent upon something else, namely, the intellect which regards "substance" from an external and independent point of view.

Spinoza defines the attribute further as infinite; and infinite also in the sense of infinite multiplicity. There appear however only two attributes — thought and extension and it is not shown how infinite multiplicity is reduced to this antithesis of thought and extension. These two attributes are therefore taken from experience. Thought and being are the absolute conceived in a determination. The absolute itself is their absolute unity, and within it they are only non-essential forms; the arrangement of things is the same as that of mental images or thoughts, and the one absolute is perceived only by the external reflection, by a *modus*, as existing in those two determinations [thought and extension] — on the one hand, as the totality of mental images, and on the other, as a totality of things

and events. As it is this external reflection that makes that distinction, so it is the same reflection that carries it back into the absolute identity, and annuls it. This entire activity however goes on outside of the absolute. Although the absolute is also the activity of thought, and hence thinking occurs only in the absolute, yet, as already remarked, thought, in the absolute, is only in unity with extension, consequently not as the activity which is essentially opposed to extension. Spinoza makes the sublime demand upon thought that it shall consider things under the form of eternity, *sub specie aeterni*, *i. e.*, as they are in the absolute. But in that absolute which is only the inactive identity, the attribute, as well as the modus, exist only as vanishing, not as beginning, so that even that vanishing has its positive origin only from without.

The third, the modus, is understood by Spinoza as an affection of substance, particular determinateness, that which is in another and is apprehended through that other. The attributes really have for their determination only indefinite multiplicity. Each of the attributes should express the totality of substance and be understood through itself, but, in so far as the absolute exists as determined or particular, it involves other-being and cannot be understood through itself. In the modus therefore the definition of attribute is first posited in its true form. This third remains moreover mere modus; on the one hand it is an immediately given somewhat, and on the other hand its nugatoriness is not recognized as reflection into itself. The Spinozistic exposition of the absolute is therefore complete only in so far as it begins with the absolute, proceeds to the attribute, and concludes with the modus. These three, however, are merely mentioned one after the other without showing any inner necessity of development; the third is not negation defined as negation—the negation relating to itself negatively, through which it would be a return into itself within the first identity, and thus the true identity. Therefore it lacks the necessity of procedure from the absolute to the non-essential, as well as their dissolution again into the identity. In other words it lacks the becoming of the identity as well as of its determinations.

In like manner the oriental idea of emanation conceives the absolute as the self-kindling light. But the light not only originates within itself, it streams forth away from itself. Its rays are departures from its undimmed clearness; the remote results are more imperfect than the preceding ones from whence they came. The raying forth of the light is taken only as an event, and the process only as a continuous loss of energy. Hence the being continually

grows dimmer and the end of the line is night — the negative, which does not turn back to the source of light.

The defect of reflection, which Spinoza's exposition of the absolute contains as an emanation theory, does not exist in the idea of the monad as set forth by Leibnitz. The one-sidedness of the philosophical principle usually draws out its opposite principle in another system so that the whole, the totality, exists in its completeness although sundered into different systems. The monad is merely one, a negative reflected into itself; it is the totality of the content of the world. The variety and multiplicity within it has not vanished altogether but is preserved in a negative manner. Spinoza's "substance" is the unity of all contents. But this manifold content of the world does not exist as such within the "substance" but only in the activity of reflection external to it. The monad is essentially a representing activity. And although it is finite it possesses no passivity; but the changes and determinations within it are manifestations in itself. It is an "Entelechy;" the revelation is its own activity. By this the monad is particularized and distinguished from others; the determinateness of particularity consists in the special content and in the mode and manner of the manifestation. The monad is therefore potentially — as regards its substance — the totality, but not in its manifestation. This limitation of the monad does not appertain to it as self-positing or self-representing, but, to its nature, its potentiality; in other words it is an absolute limit, a predestination imposed upon it through another being. Moreover the limited ones are in relation to each other while the monads are self-contained absolutes. Hence the harmony of these limitations, namely, the relation of the monads to each other, is external to the monads and proceeds from another being, or is a "pre-established harmony."

It is clear that through the principle of reflection-into-itself, which constitutes the fundamental principle of the monad, that otherness and the influence of the external is removed, and the changes which happen to the monad are through its own activity. But on the other hand, the passivity is converted into an absolute limitation, a limitation of nature or constitution [a limitation impressed upon it from without]. Leibnitz ascribes to the monads a certain kind of completeness within themselves, a kind of independence. They are created beings. Upon a closer examination of the nature of this limitation it appears that the self-manifestation which belongs to the monad is the totality of form. It is an extremely important idea that the changes in the monad are conceived as self-manifestations, as actions devoid of

passivity, and the principle of reflection-into-itself, or of individualization, is made prominent as essential. Moreover it is necessary that the finitude or particularity is allowed to exist within the monad — that the content or the substance is distinguished from the form, and moreover that the content is limited while the form is infinite. But in the idea of the absolute monad we ought to find not only the mentioned unity of form and content, but also the nature of reflection as self-related negativity which repels itself from itself and is thereby a positing and creating activity. In the system of Leibnitz we find further the doctrine that God is the source of the existence and of the essence of the monads: which means that the mentioned absolute limitations in the nature of the monads are not existent in and for themselves but that they vanish in the absolute. But these notions are derived from current conceptions which are without philosophical development and not brought up to the speculative stand-point. Hence the principle of individualization does not receive its deeper meaning; the thoughts on the distinction between the different finite monads and upon their relation to the absolute, do not originate in this essence itself, *i. e.*, in an absolute manner. They belong only to discursive reasoning — to dogmatic reflection, and they therefore attain no internal coherence.



SECOND CHAPTER.

Actuality.

The absolute is the unity of the internal and external as the first phase of unity existing in itself or potentially. The exhibition or exposition proved to be an external reflection, which possessed the immediate on its side as an already given somewhat; but it is an activity which relates the immediate to the absolute, and as such connects it to the latter, and determines it as a mere mode and manner. But this mode and manner is the activity of determination which belongs to the absolute itself; it is namely its first identity or its mere in-itself-existent unity. And although by means of this reflection, that former being-in-itself or nature is posited as a non-essential determination, yet through its negative relation to itself it becomes the *mode* ("modus") as described. This activity of reflection as annulling itself in its determinations and as activity that returns into itself, becomes true absolute identity, and is at the same time the determining [particularizing] of the absolute — in other words, its modality. The mode is, therefore, the externality of the

absolute, but only as its reflection into itself; in other words, it is its own manifestation, so that this externalization is the reflection into itself of the absolute, and, therefore, its being-in-and-for-itself.

Therefore as the manifestation which shows the absolute as having no other content than to be self-manifestation, the absolute becomes absolute form. The "actuality" is to be seized or conceived as this reflected absoluteness. The category of being does not express actuality; for it is only a first immediateness; its reflection is, therefore, only a becoming—a transition into something else; in other words its immediateness is not being-in-and-for-itself. The category of Actuality is moreover higher than that of Existence. Existence has an immediateness which has issued forth from Ground and Conditions—in other words from Essence and its reflection. It is therefore potentially what actuality is, real reflection, but it is as yet not the posited unity of reflection and immediateness. Existence accordingly passes over into "Phenomenon" when it develops the activity of reflection that it contains. It is the category of Ground that has become annulled ("gone to the ground"); its determination is its restoration, hence it becomes essential [or reciprocal] relation; and its final activity of reflection is the positing of its immediateness as reflection into itself, and conversely. This unity, which contains Existence or immediateness and being-in-itself as mere moments or subordinate elements, is now before us as the Actuality. The actual is therefore manifestation, it does not pass over into the sphere of change through its externality nor is it an appearance in something else, but it manifests itself. This means that it is itself in its externality, and is only in that externality; in other words, it is only the activity which distinguishes and determines.

In the actuality as this absolute form, the moments or elements are only as annulled—formal, not yet realized; their diversity [multiplicity] belongs, therefore, to external reflection, and is not defined as content.

Actuality as immediate unity of form of the internal and external is consequently in the determination of immediateness as opposed to the determination of reflection into itself; in other words it is an actuality opposed to a possibility. The relation of the two to each other constitutes therefore a third term: the actual defines itself as a being reflected into itself, and the latter is at the same time an immediately existing somewhat. This third term is Necessity.

But in the first place, since the actual and possible are formal distinctions, their relation too is only formal, and consists only in this

that the one as well as the other is a posited-being, hence mere Contingency.

Now, because the contingency contains the actual as well as the possible, as mere posited-being, they have received the determination within themselves; there arises therefore, secondly, the real actuality. And with this likewise there arises the real possibility and the relative necessity. The reflection of the relative necessity into itself gives, thirdly, absolute necessity, which is absolute possibility, or potentiality and actuality.

A.

Contingency or Formal Actuality, Possibility and Necessity.

1. Actuality is "formal" in so far as it is mere immediate unreflected actuality — the first phase of actuality — consequently merely in this form-determination, but not as totality of form. It is in this phase nothing more than a being or existence in general. But since it is not merely immediate existence but essentially the form-unity of the being-in-itself or of internality and externality it contains immediately being-in-itself or potentiality. Whatever is actual is possible.

2. This potentiality is actuality that is reflected into itself. But this first phase of reflected-being is also a formal phase and hence only the determination of identity with itself, or of being-in-itself in general.

Since, however, the determination here is the totality of form, this being-in-itself is determined as annulled or as essentially a mere relation to actuality; as the negative of actuality posited as negative. Potentiality contains therefore two phases; first, the positive phase, its reflection into itself; but since it is within the absolute form it is reduced to a mere phase, its reflection into itself is no longer valid as *essence*, but in the second place possesses the negative significance, viz., that the potentiality is something defective, something that refers to another, *i. e.*, to the actuality, and supplements its deficiencies with the same.

According to the first phase, the merely positive side, the potentiality is therefore the mere form-determination of self-identity, *i. e.*, the form of essentiality. In this phase it is devoid of relativity, an indefinite receptacle for everything in general. In the sense of formal potentiality everything is possible which does not contradict itself; the realm of potentiality is therefore the limitless multi-

plicity. But every individual of the multiplicity is particularized or determined within itself and in opposition to others, and has the negation inherent in it. Indifferent variety or diversity passes over into antithesis [*i. e.*, is found upon careful examination to imply antithesis as the basis of its distinction]; but antithesis is contradiction [*i. e.*, implies contradiction, which is the first phase of self-distinction; that is to say, all distinction or difference rests finally on self-distinction]. Therefore every particular thing is likewise a contradictory somewhat [as well as a possible one], and therefore everything is impossible.

This merely formal statement regarding anything — that it is possible — is therefore likewise shallow and empty, like the principle of contradiction, and every content that it may have, *e. g.*, “A is possible,” means only that A is A. In so far as one regards this without considering the development of the content it has the form of simplicity. Distinction arises within it only upon the annulment of the form of simplicity. When one holds fast to the simple form, the content remains a self-identical one and therefore a possible. There is nothing more expressed, however, by this term “possible” than with the formal principle of identity.

The possible contains however more than the mere principle of identity. The possible is the reflection-into-itself again reflected; in other words, the identical as phase of the totality is also determined or defined to be not in-itself, *i. e.*, potential. It has therefore the second determination — to be a mere possible something — and its ideal is the totality of the form. The potentiality without this ideal is the essentiality as such; but the absolute form contains the essence merely as moment, and has no truth except as being. Potentiality is this mere essentiality posited in such a manner as to be a mere phase and not commensurate with the absolute form. It is being-in-itself defined as mere posited; in other words as not possessing being-in-itself. The potentiality is therefore the contradiction or the impossibility.

In the first place, this states that the possibility whose posited form-determination is annulled, possesses a content. This as possible is a being-in-itself which is at the same time annulled or other-being [*i. e.*, a being for others or dependent]. Since it is for this reason only a possible being it follows that another being is possible, and even its opposite. A is A; likewise not-A is not-A. These two principles both express the possibility of its content. But these principles as identical are indifferent towards each other; when one of them is posited the other is not of necessity also posited. The

potentiality is the relation in which the two are brought into comparison. It contains in its determination as a reflection of the totality, the implication that the opposite is also possible. It is therefore the relating ground: that because A is A also not-A is not-A. In the possible A the possible not-A is contained, and it is this relation that determines both as possible.

As this relation however — that in one possible thing its other is also contained — it is the contradiction that annuls itself. Since now according to its definition it is reflected and the reflection is self-annulled, as has been shown, it is consequently also the immediate and with this it is actuality.

3. This actuality is not the first phase of actuality, but the reflected form of it — posited as unity of itself and potentiality. The actual as such is possible; it is in immediate positive identity with potentiality; but potentiality has defined itself as mere potentiality; consequently the actual is defined as merely a possible. And it follows immediately that because the potentiality is found in the actuality that it is annulled and mere potentiality. Conversely, actuality which is in unity with potentiality is only the annulled immediateness; in other words, because the formal actuality is a mere immediate, first phase, it is only an element, a mere annulled actuality.

Hence a more accurate definition is reached of the degree in which possibility is actuality. Possibility is, namely, not all actuality — of the real and absolute actuality we are not speaking here. This phase is only the first one, namely, the formal one which has been defined as mere possibility, therefore formal actuality, which is mere being or existence in general. Every possible therefore possesses being, or existence.

This unity of potentiality and actuality is contingency. The contingent is an actual which is at the same time defined as merely possible and whose other or opposite is likewise possible. This actuality is therefore mere being or existence posited in its truth as having the value of a posited-being or potentiality. Conversely, potentiality as reflection into itself or being-in-itself, is posited as posited-being. Whatever is possible is an actual in this sense of actuality; it has only as much value as the contingent actuality, and is itself contingent.

The contingent presents therefore two sides. First, in so far as it possesses potentiality immediately, or, what is the same thing, in so far as potentiality is annulled in it, it is not posited-being nor mediated but it is immediate actuality, it has no ground. Since this im-

mediate actuality belongs also to the possible, it is defined as the contingent and likewise as devoid of ground, just as the actual was.

The contingent is however, in the second place, the actual as a mere possible, in other words, as a posited-being; and so too the possible is as formal being-in-itself, mere posited-being. Consequently, the two are not in and for themselves but each has its true reflection into itself in another, in other words, it has a ground.

The contingent has therefore no ground, just for the reason that it is contingent; and likewise it has a ground because it is contingent.

It is the posited, unmediated vanishing of the external and internal into each other; in other words the vanishing of the reflection into itself — into being — and *vice versa*. It is posited through this that possibility and actuality each within itself possesses this determination and consequently that they are moments or elements of the absolute form. The actuality in its immediate unity with potentiality is mere existence and therefore defined as groundless, that is as a mere posited or mere potential. In other words, it is posited as reflected and determined in opposition to potentiality, and therefore it is sundered from the potentiality and from reflection into itself and consequently it is likewise immediate and only a possible. Likewise potentiality as simple being-in-itself is an immediate somewhat, merely an existent in general. In other words, opposed to actuality it is a being in itself devoid of actuality, merely a possible; and just on this account an existence in general which is not reflected into itself.

This absolute unrest of the becoming of these two determinations is contingency. But for the reason that each vanishes immediately in its opposite, it goes together with itself — [returns into itself — A vanishing in B, which vanishes again into A] and this identity of the same, of one in the other, is Necessity.

The necessary somewhat is an actual somewhat, hence it is devoid of ground, as it is an immediate; but it has likewise its actuality through another, or in its ground; but it is at the same time the posited-being of this ground and its reflection into itself; the potentiality of the necessity is annulled.

The contingent is therefore necessary because the actual is determined as possible, and hence its immediateness is annulled, and is repelled into ground, *i. e.*, being-in-itself, and grounded; and also since this its potentiality is the ground-relation, it is entirely annulled, and it is posited as being. That which is necessary is; and this existent is itself that which is necessary. At the same time it is in itself; this reflection into itself is something else than the immediateness of the sphere of being; and the necessity of the existent is something

else. The existent itself is therefore not that which is necessary; but this being-in-itself is mere posited-being — it is annulled and even immediate. Therefore actuality is in its distinctions, *i. e.*, its possibility, self-identical. As this identity it is Necessity.

B.

Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Possibility and Necessity.

1. Necessity as thus derived is formal, for the reason that its elements are formal; they are, *viz.*, simple determinations, which are totality only as immediate unity or as the immediate conversion of the one into the other, and consequently not as having the form of independence. In this formal necessity the unity is therefore only a simple one, and indifferent towards its distinctions. As immediate unity of form-determinations this necessity is actuality; but such an actuality as possesses a content for the reason that its unity is now defined as indifferent towards the distinction of its form-determinations, *viz.*, itself and possibility. This content contains an indifferent identity, also an indifferent form, *i. e.*, as a mere diversity of determinations, and it is a manifold content. This actuality is real actuality. Real actuality, as such, is in its first phase the thing with many properties, the existing world; but it is not the existence that loses itself in the phenomenon, but as actuality it is at the same time being-in-itself and reflection-into-itself; it preserves its individuality in the multiplicity of mere existence; its externality is only an internal activity of relation to itself. That which is actual can act; its actuality is manifested in what it produces. Its activity of relation to another is the manifestation of itself; not a transition as the existent somewhat relates to another, nor a phenomenal appearance like that of the thing which has mere relativity to another which is independent, but possesses its reflection-into-itself, its particular essentiality in some other independent being.

The real actuality has likewise the potentiality immediately within itself. It contains the element of being-in-itself; but as mere first phase the immediate unity is in one of the determinations of form, hence as the existent, which is different from the being-in-itself or the potentiality.

2. This potentiality as the being-in-itself of the real actuality is the real potentiality and as such a being-in-itself full of contents. Formal potentiality is the reflection into itself only as abstract identity, an identity in which a something is not self-contradictory. But in so far as one examines the determinations, circumstances, and con-

ditions of a somewhat with a view to learn its potentialities he deserts the formal point of view and comes to the consideration of its real potentiality.

This real potentiality is itself immediate existence, not however for the reason that the potentiality as such as a formal element is immediately its opposite — an actuality that is not reflected; but, because it is real possibility, this determination belongs to it itself. The real possibility of a thing is therefore the existing multiplicity of surrounding conditions which stand in relation to it.

This multiplicity of existence is potentiality as well as actuality, but its identity is only the content which is indifferent towards the determinations of form; they constitute therefore the form, determined [particularized] in respect to their identity. In other words, the immediate, real actuality, for the reason that it is immediate, is determined against [or defined and distinguished from] its potentiality; as this determinate [definite, special] and reflected it is the real potentiality. This is the posited totality of form, but the form in its determinateness [particularity], namely, the actuality as formal or immediate, and likewise the potentiality as the abstract being-in-itself. This actuality which constitutes the potentiality of a thing is therefore not its own potentiality but the being-in-itself of another actuality; it is itself the actuality which is to be annulled — the potentiality as mere potentiality. Hence the real potentiality constitutes the totality of conditions which is not an actuality reflected into itself but which is defined as something whose destiny is to go back into itself and to become another.

What is really potential is therefore as regards its being-in-itself something formally identical, that is, something which does not contradict itself as regards its simple contents; but it is necessary also that it should not contradict itself as regards the developed conditions and various surroundings with which it is connected — it must be self-identical even in these. Secondly, because it is manifold and stands in manifold connection with others, there is diversity within itself, and this diversity passes over into opposition [antithesis] and into self-contradiction. When one speaks of potentiality and undertakes to show its contradiction he has only to call attention to the multiplicity of its content, or of its conditioned existence; by this its contradiction is easily shown. But this is not a contradiction of external comparison. For the existence that contained multiplicity, on that account, essentially annuls itself and is destroyed; hence it is essentially a mere potentiality. If all the conditions of a thing are complete and present the thing becomes actual; the completeness of

the conditions is the totality of the content of a thing and the thing itself is this content determined as actual in the entire scope of its possibility. In the sphere of the conditioned ground the conditions have the form outside of them—that is to say: the ground or the reflection which exists for itself, is outside of them; and this relates to the moments of the thing and brings them into existence. Here, on the contrary, the immediate actuality is not defined to be conditioned through a presupposing reflection, but it is posited that it itself is the potentiality.

In the self-annulling, real potentiality, that which is annulled is twofold; for it is itself twofold—actuality and potentiality. (1.) The actuality is the formal, or an existence which has an immediate, independent manifestation, and through its annulment has become reflected and a moment of another being, and hence contains within it the being-in-itself. (2.) The mentioned existence was also determined as the potentiality or as being-in-itself, but it was the being-in-itself of another. Since it therefore annuls itself, the being-in-itself gets annulled, and passes over into actuality. This movement of the self-annulling, real potentiality produces therefore the same moments that were already extant, each arising from the other; in this negation it is therefore also not a transition but a return into itself. In the case of the formal potentiality, for the reason that the somewhat was potential, it was not itself but something else that was potential. The real potentiality has no longer such another over against it, for it is real in so far as itself is also the actuality. Since it annuls therefore the immediate existence of the same—*i. e.*, the circle of conditions—it becomes being-in-itself which it already is, namely, the being-in-itself of another. And since conversely it annuls at the same time its moment of being-in-itself, it becomes actuality; that is, it becomes the moment which it likewise is already. That which vanishes is therefore the definition of the actuality as the potentiality or being-in-itself of another; and, conversely, there vanishes the potentiality as an actuality which is not the actuality of its potentiality. (3.) The negation of the real potentiality is consequently its identity with itself; since it therefore is the opposite of this annulment in its annulment, it is the real necessity.

That which is necessary cannot be otherwise than it is; but that which is possible, is; for the potentiality is the being-in-itself, the mere posited-being, and therefore it is essentially other-being. The formal potentiality is this identity as transition into an absolute other; but the real, since it has the other moment, the actuality, belonging to it, is already itself necessity. What, therefore, is really

possible can never be anything else; under these conditions and circumstances, nothing else can happen. Real possibility and necessity are therefore only apparently distinct; their identity is not one that develops, but one that is presupposed and underlies them. The real necessity is therefore relation which is full of contents [*i. e.*, a totality of conditions]; for the content [which consists in these details] is the mentioned identity existing in itself, which is indifferent as regards the distinctions of form.

This necessity is however at the same time relative. That is to say: it has a presupposition as its origin—it has its beginning in what is contingent. The really actual as such is a completely defined actual, and possesses this completely defined character as its immediate being—as a multiplicity of existing circumstances; but this immediate being as definiteness is also the negative of it [*i. e.*, of the really actual]—it is its being-in-itself or potentiality; hence it is real possibility. As this unity of the two moments it is the totality of form, but the totality which is still external to itself; it is therefore unity of possibility and actuality in such a manner that (1) the multiplex existence is immediately or positively the potentiality—a potential that is self-identical, because it is actual. (2.) In so far as the potentiality of existence is posited, it is determined as mere potentiality and as immediate conversion of actuality into its opposite—or as contingency. Therefore this potentiality which has the immediate actuality attached to it as its condition, is only the being-in-itself as the potentiality of another. Through the fact that—as has been shown—this other-being annuls itself and this posited-being is itself posited, the real potentiality becomes necessity. But this necessity begins with that real potentiality as a unity of the potential and actual, which is not yet reflected into itself. This presupposition, and the self-returning movement are as yet separate. In other words, the necessity has not as yet determined itself into contingency.

The relativity of the real necessity presents itself in the content as an identity which is indifferent to the form, and which is, therefore, distinct from it and a definite content altogether. The really necessary is on this account a limited actuality which, on account of this limitation, may be regarded also as a contingent.

In fact the real necessity is in itself also contingency. This is evident in the fact that the really necessary as regards the form is limited as regards its content, and through this limitation possesses contingency. But also in the form of the real necessity there is found contingency; for, as has been shown, the real potentiality is only in

itself necessary, but it is posited as the other-being of actuality and potentiality opposed to each other. The real necessity contains therefore contingency; it is the return into self out of the mentioned restless other-being of actuality and potentiality opposed to each other, but it is not the return-*into* itself, *from* itself.

In itself therefore there is found here the unity of necessity and contingency; this unity is to be called the absolute actuality.

C.

ABSOLUTE NECESSITY.

The real necessity is definitely determined necessity; the formal has as yet no content nor determinateness belonging to it. The determinateness of necessity consists in the contingency or the negation which it possesses. This has been shown.

This definite determinateness in its first simplicity is actuality. The definitely determined necessity is therefore immediately actual necessity. This actuality which as such is itself necessary because it contains the necessity as its being-in-itself is the absolute actuality. It is actuality which can never be other than it is; for its being-in-itself is not potentiality but necessity itself. But this actuality, because it is posited, is absolute, that is to say, it is the unity of itself and with possibility—a mere empty determination; in other words it is contingency. The emptiness of its determination reduces it to a mere potentiality—to a determination which can be just as well something else and be determined as potential. This potentiality is however itself the absolute; for it is precisely the potentiality which will be determined as potentiality as well as actuality. Through the fact that it is this indifference to itself it is posited as an empty, contingent determination.

Thus the real necessity contains contingency not only in itself [*i. e.*, potentially], but this will also develop itself; this development however as externality is only its being-in-itself, because it is only an immediate determinateness. It is not only this but its *own* development or the presupposition that it has its own positing. For as real necessity it is the annulment of actuality in potentiality and conversely. Since it is the simple conversion of one of these moments into the other, it is also its simple positive unity, since each as shown goes together with itself [*i. e.*, comes into identity with itself in the other]. But it is thus actuality; such an actuality, however, as is only this simple going together of the form with itself. Its negative positing of those elements is therefore presupposition or the positing of itself as annulled or as immediateness.

In this, however, this actuality is defined as negative; it is a going-together-with-itself [arrival at self-identity] that proceeds from actuality which was real potentiality. Therefore this new actuality arises only from being-in-itself, from the negation of itself. Thus it is determined immediately as potentiality, as mediated through its negation. This potentiality, however, is nothing but this mediation in which the being-in-itself (namely, it itself and the immediateness) are both, in the same way, posited-being. Hence it is the necessity which is just as well the annulment of this posited-being or the positing of immediateness and the annulment of being-in-itself, as it is the determining of this annulment as posited-being. It is therefore itself which determines itself as contingency, and in its being repels itself from itself, and in this repulsion has only returned into itself—and in this return as into its being, has repelled itself from itself.

Hence the form in its realization has penetrated all of its distinctions and made itself transparent; and as absolute necessity is only this simple identity of being-with-itself, in its negation, or in the essence, the distinction of content and form even has likewise vanished. For that unity of potentiality and actuality and of actuality in potentiality is the form indifferent to itself in its determinateness or in the posited-being—a thing with its totality of conditions from which the form of necessity has been removed as far as it is external. But in this way it is this reflected identity of the two determinations as indifferent to it, and consequently the form-determination of the being-in-itself opposed to the posited-being, and this potentiality constitutes the limitation of content that the real necessity possessed. The dissolution of this difference, however, is the absolute necessity whose content is this self-penetrating difference within it.

The absolute necessity is therefore the truth, into which actuality and potentiality in general, as well as formal and real necessity, return. It is, as shown, the being which in its negation—in essence—relates to itself and is being. It is likewise simple immediateness, or pure being as simple reflection-into-itself or pure essence within it, these two are one and the same. The purely necessary *is*, only because it is; it has no other condition nor ground. It is likewise pure essence, its being is the simple reflection into itself; it is because it is. As reflection it has ground and condition, but it has only itself for ground and condition. It is being in itself, but its being-in-itself is its immediateness—its potentiality is its actuality. It is therefore because it is. As the going together with itself of being [*i. e.*,

the arrival at self-identity] it is essence; but for the reason that this simple somewhat is likewise immediate simplicity it is being.

Absolute necessity is therefore reflection, or the form of the absolute. It is the unity of being and essence — simple immediateness, which is absolute negativity. On the one hand, its distinctions are nothing but determinations of reflection, only however as existent multiplicity, actuality full of distinctions, and this has the shape of independent somewhats opposed to each other as others. On the other hand, their relation is the absolute identity; it is the absolute conversion of their actuality into their potentiality and of their potentiality into actuality. Absolute necessity is therefore blind. On the one hand, the distinctions of actuality and potentiality have the form of reflection-into-itself as being; they are therefore both as free actualities, neither of which appears in the other, nor exhibits a single trace of its relation to the other — each is grounded in itself and is necessary in itself. Necessity as essence is included within this being. The contact of these actualities with each other appears therefore as an empty externality. The actuality of the one in the other is the mere potentiality — contingency. For being is posited as absolutely necessary, as mediation with itself, which is absolute negation of mediation through another, or as being which is only identical with being. It is another which has actuality in being, and is therefore determined as merely potential, empty posited-being.

But this contingency is rather the absolute necessity. It is the essence of those free actualities necessary in themselves. This essence avoids light, because in these actualities there is no appearing, no reflex, for the reason that they are grounded only within themselves, and shaped for themselves, — self-manifestations — because they are mere being. But their essence will manifest itself in them and reveal what it is and what they are. The simplicity of its being, of its repose upon itself, is the absolute negativity: it is the freedom of their non-manifesting immediateness. This negative breaks forth in them, because being is the contradiction of itself through this, its essence. And this negation breaks forth in contrast to this being in the form of being, — hence as the negation of those actualities — which is absolutely different from their being, as well as from their non-being, — and hence comes forth as a free other-being opposed to it as its being. Yet it was not to be ignored in them. They are, in their self-dependent formation, indifferent to form, hence a content of different actualities — a definitely determined content. This is the seal which necessity impresses upon them, since it sets them free as absolute, actual things, possessing absolute return-

into-itself in their determination. Upon them it impresses itself, and its impressions are marks of its right over them, and they are seized by it and perish. This manifestation of that which is the determinateness in truth — negative relation to itself — is blind dissolution in other-being. The manifestation or reflection appears, in the phase of being, as becoming or transition of being into naught. But being is conversely also essence, and in the phase of essence “becoming” is *reflection* or *appearance*. Hence externality is their internality, their relation is absolute identity; and the transition of the actual into the possible, or of being into naught, is a going together with itself [arrival at self-identity]. Contingency is absolute necessity, it is itself the presupposition of the mentioned first absolute actuality.

This identity of being with itself in its negation is the category of *Substance*. It is this unity as in its negation, or as in contingency; hence it is Substance as essential relation to itself. The blind transition of necessity is rather the self-exposition of the absolute, the movement of the absolute within itself which in its externalization exhibits or manifests only itself.

THIRD CHAPTER.

The Absolute Essential-Relation or Reciprocal-Relation.

The absolute necessity is not *the* necessary — still less *a* necessary — but Necessity — being which is pure and simple reflection. It is essential relation [*Verhaeltniss*, reciprocity, relativity] because it is the activity of distinguishing, each of whose moments is the entire totality, and whose moments have independent existence in such a manner that the totality has only one simple existence [notwithstanding the multiplicity that it includes], and therefore the distinctions within it have only the appearance of independence, and this appearance is the absolute itself. The Essence as such is reflection or appearance; essence as absolute relativity [*Verhaeltniss*, reciprocal relation] is, however, appearance posited as appearance, and this as self-relation is the absolute actuality. The absolute, which has been unfolded and exhibited by external reflection, now unfolds itself, it being absolute form or necessity [it sunders itself into a form of relation or disrupts itself]. This self-unfolding [self-disruption] is its self-positing and it is only in this self-positing. As light in nature is not a something nor a thing, but exists only as appearance, so manifestation is absolute actuality in its self-identity.

The sides of absolute relativity are therefore not *attributes*. In an

attribute, the absolute appears only in one of its moments [phases] as a presupposed somewhat and taken up by the external reflection. The unfolding or display of the absolute [its self-sundering] is performed by the Absolute Necessity, however, which is self-identical as self-determining. Since it is the activity of appearing which is posited as appearance, the sides of this relativity are totalities, because they are appearance; because as appearance the distinctions are both themselves and their opposite, and thus the whole. Conversely, they are appearance, because they are totalities. This act of distinction, or activity of appearing, which pertains to the absolute, is therefore only the positing of itself as self-identity.

This essential relation [reciprocity] in its immediate form is the relation of Substance and Accidents, the immediate vanishing and becoming of absolute appearance in itself. Since substance determines itself as being for itself opposed to another, or the absolute reciprocity becomes real [in both its moments] it becomes the reciprocal relation found in Causality. Finally, when the latter [causality] passes over into self-relation in reciprocal action [interaction], then the absolute essential relation [interrelation] is posited in all the essential characteristics that it contains. This posited unity of itself in its determinations—which are posited as the whole and as determinations at the same time, is the category of the IDEA [*Begriff* = concrete idea].

A.

The Reciprocal Relation as Substantiality.

Absolute necessity is absolute essential-relation or reciprocity, because it is not being as such, but being which is because it is [being which expresses the ground of itself] being as the absolute mediation of itself through itself. This being is Substance; as the ultimate unity of Essence and Being; it is the being in all being. It is neither the unreflected immediate, nor an abstract something standing behind existence and phenomenon, but it is the immediate actuality itself as absolute reflection into itself as in-and-for-itself, independent, existence. Substance as this unity of being and reflection is essentially their appearance and posited-being. The activity of appearing is the self-relating appearing and hence it has the form of being [the “form of being” is that of *self-relation*]. This being is substance as such. Conversely, this being is only the self-identical, posited-being, hence it is the totality as appearance or it is Accidentalinity.

This activity of appearing is identity as form [the form is the determining activity which makes the distinctions which belong to the object]; — it is the unity of potentiality and actuality. First it is Becoming, — Contingency as the sphere of beginning and ceasing. For according to the determination of immediateness the relation of potentiality and actuality is an immediate transformation of each into its other. But since being is appearance its relation is also identical relation, in other words, the appearance of each in the other — hence it is reflection. The activity of accidentality, therefore, presents in each of its moments the appearance of the categories of being and of the reflection-determinations of essence — each appearing in the other. The immediate somewhat has a content: its immediateness is at the same time a reflected indifference as regards the form. This content is determined and since this is the determinateness of being the somewhat passes over into another. But quality is also a determinateness of reflection: hence it is indifferent variety [different things existing without relation to each other]. This annuls itself; but it is self-reflected being-in-itself; hence it is potentiality and this being-in-itself is in its transition, which is likewise reflection-into-itself — the necessarily actual.

This activity of accidentality is the effectiveness [*Actuosität* = external manifestation] of substance as a quiet outflow from itself. It is not an activity as directed against anything else, but active against itself as simple element offering no resistance. The annulment of what is presupposed is the vanishing of appearance. First in the activity which annuls the immediate originates the immediate itself. This is the activity of appearance. The beginning with itself as source or origin is the positing of this very self from which it starts [its presupposing is a positing].

Substance, as this identity of the activity of appearance, is the totality of the entire process, and includes accidentality within it, and accidentality is the entire substance itself. This distinction of substance into the simple identity of being, on the one hand, and the reciprocity of accidents, on the other hand, is a form of its activity of appearance. The former [identity] is the formless substance conceived by the imagination, to which appearance does not seem to be appearance. This image-thinking clings to an absolute which is an indeterminate identity that possesses no truth, but is only the determinateness of immediate actuality, or in other words, the being-in-itself, or potentiality. These are determinations of form which pertain to accidentality.

The other determination, that of the reciprocity of accidents, is

the absolute form-unity of accidentality—substance as absolute might or power. The ceasing of the accident is its return as actuality into itself, as into its being-in-itself or into its potentiality. But this its being-in-itself is only a posited-being. Hence it is also actuality, and because these form-determinations are likewise content-determinations this potential somewhat is, as regards content, another particular, actual somewhat. Substance manifests itself through the content of the actuality, into which it translates the potential, as creative might; and through the content of the potentiality, into which it transmutes the actual, it manifests itself as destructive might. But the two are identical. The creative activity is destructive, and the destructive activity is creative. For the negative and positive, potentiality and actuality are absolutely united in substantial necessity.

Accidents as such—and there are many of them, since multiplicity is one of the determinations of being—have no power over each other. They are existent somethings or existent for themselves—things existing with manifold properties—wholes consisting of parts, independent parts—forces which need to be solicited into activity by each other and which are conditioned through each other. In so far as such an accidental somewhat seems to exercise power over another, it is the power of the substance that is manifesting itself. This substance includes both within it, and as negativity it gives them unequal values—it posits the one as vanishing and the other as arising, or it determines the former as passing over into its potentiality and the latter as passing over into its actuality. Substance eternally dirempts itself into these distinctions of form and content and eternally purifies itself from this one-sidedness; but in this purifying it dirempts itself again into the distinctions, one accident replaces another only because its own subsistence is this totality of form and content in which it, as well as its other, vanishes.

On account of this immediate identity and presence of substance in its accidents, there is no real distinction remaining between them. In this first determination substance is not yet manifested according to its whole extent. If substance is distinguished as the self-identical being-in-and-for-itself from itself as totality of accidents, it is the mediating-power. This is necessity which retains positive persistence in the negativity of accidents, and in its persistence retains its mere posited-being. This mediating term is consequently the unity of substantiality and accidentality itself, and its extremes have no proper self-subsistence of their own. Substantiality is there-

fore only reciprocal relation as immediately vanishing; it relates to itself not as negative, and is immediate unity of power with itself in the form of identity alone, and not of its negative essence. This can also be explained in another way, as follows: Appearance or accidentality is in itself substance through power, but it is not so posited as this activity of appearance identical with itself. Therefore substance possesses accidentality in its form or posited-being, but not in itself; accidentality is not substance as substance. The substantiality-relation therefore reveals itself as a formal power whose distinctions are not substantial; substance is in fact only the internal of accidents, and the accidents are only *attached to* the substance. In other words, this reciprocal relation is only an appearing-totality as a becoming; but it is likewise reflection; accidentality which is in-itself substance is therefore posited as substance. Therefore it is defined as self-relating negativity opposed to itself,—determined as self-relating, simple identity with itself; and it is for-itself-existent mighty substance. The substantiality-relation, through this, passes over into the causality-relation.

B.

The Causality-Relation.

Substance is might, that is reflected into itself and not merely transition. But it is a might, which posits determinations, and distinguishes them from itself. In its determining it is self-relating and it is that which posits its determining as negative or as posited-being. This is consequently annulled substantiality, merely posited—it is Effect; the substance existing for itself however is the Cause.

This causality-relation is in the first place only this reciprocal relation of cause and effect; it is the formal causal-relation.

a. Formal Causality.

1. Cause is the source, in contrast with the effect; but the substance is the power of manifestation, or it possesses accidentality. But it is as power likewise reflection into itself in its appearance; therefore it unfolds its transition and this activity of appearing is determined as appearance—in other words, the accidents are posited as mere effect [or as merely posited.] The substance however in its determining does not start from accidentality as though the latter existed already in another, and now was to be posited as determinateness—but both substance and its accidentality are one activity. Substance as power determines itself; but this determining is imme-

diately the annulment of the determining and the return. It determines itself—it, the determining is therefore the immediate, and itself already the determined. Since it determines itself it posits this already determined as determined; it has therefore annulled the posited-being, and returned into itself. Conversely, this return, because it is the negative relation of substance to itself, is itself a determining or repelling from itself. Through this return the determined originates and from this it seemed to begin, and to posit it as an already existent determined somewhat. Therefore the absolute activity of manifestation [*Actuosität*] is Cause. The power of substance, in its truth as manifestation, which unfolds what was within itself, namely, the accidents, which is the posited-being immediately in the development of the same,—it sets up this as posited-being: the Effect. This is therefore, in the first place, the same as the偶然性 which occurs in the relation of substantiality, viz., substance as posited-being. But, secondly, the accidents as such are substantial only through their vanishing—as transitory. As effect, however, they are posited-being as self-identical. Cause is manifested in the effect as the whole substance, viz., as reflected into itself in the posited-being as such.

2. The substance as not-posed, original source stands over against this posited-being reflected into itself—the determined as determined. Since it as absolute might or power is return into itself, but as self-determining in this return, it is not any longer the mere in-itself of its accidents, but it is also posited as this being-in-itself. Substance has therefore actuality first in the category of Cause. But this actuality, viz., that its being-in-itself—its determinateness in the relation of substantiality is now posited as determinateness in the category of Effect. Substance, therefore, has its actuality which it possesses as cause, only in its effect. This is the necessity which the cause is. It is the actual substance, because the substance as power determines itself. But it is at the same time cause, because it unfolds this determinateness or posits it as posited-being. Therefore it posits its actuality as posited-being or as the effect. This is the other of the cause, the posited-being over against the origin or source and mediated through this. But the cause as necessity annuls also this its mediation, and is in the determining of itself as the original self-relating opposed to the mediated, the return into itself. For the posited-being is determined as posited-being, and is therefore self-identical. The cause is therefore first in the effect truly actual and self-identical. The effect is therefore necessary because it is the manifestation of the cause or it is this necessity which the cause is.

Only as this necessity is the cause self-acting, originating from itself, without being solicited by another—and the independent source of self-production. It must act; its originality consists in the fact that its reflection-into-itself is a determining-positing, and conversely, both are in one unity.

The effect contains therefore nothing that is not in the cause. Conversely, the cause contains nothing that is not in its effect. The cause is cause only in so far as it produces an effect. And the cause is nothing else than this determination which produces an effect, and the effect nothing else than the determination which has a cause. In the cause as such lies its effect; and in the effect its cause. In so far as the cause has not yet acted, or in so far as it has ceased to act, it is not cause. The effect in so far as its cause has vanished is no longer effect but only an indifferent actuality.

3. In this identity of cause and effect, has vanished the form through which they were distinguished as being-in-itself and posited-being. Cause is quenched in its effect; and with this the effect is likewise quenched because it is only the determinateness belonging to the cause. This causality that is exhausted [quenched] in its effect is consequently an immediateness that is indifferent towards the necessary connection between cause and effect, and is external to it.

b. The Specialized Causality-Relation in its Special Applications.

1. The identity of the cause in its effect is the annulment of its power and negativity, and therefore the unity indifferent towards distinctions of form—it is content. It is therefore related only in itself to the form which is here causality. They are therefore posited as differing, and the form opposed to the content is an actual only in an immediate sense—a contingent causality.

Moreover, the content as thus determined is a content diverse within itself; and the cause is determined as regards its content, and is therefore the effect. The content, since the reflected-being is here also immediate actuality, is, so far forth, actual but the finite substance.

This is the causality-relation in its reality and finitude. As formal it is the infinite, necessary connection within the absolute power whose content is pure manifestation or necessity. As finite causality, on the other hand, it has a given content and is an external distinction appertaining to this identical somewhat which is in its determinations one and the same substance.

Through this identity of content causality is an analytical proposi-

tion. The same content is taken in the first instance as cause and in the second instance as effect; there it is self-existent, and here only posited-being or a determination belonging to another. Since these determinations of form are external reflection, it follows that it is only a tautological activity of a subjective understanding which describes one phenomenon as effect, and traces it back to its cause for the purpose of comprehending and explaining it. It amounts only to a repetition of one and the same content. There is nothing in the cause different from what is in the effect. Rain, for example, is the cause of the moisture which is its effect. The rain makes moist—this is an analytical proposition; the same water which constitutes the rain constitutes the moisture. As rain this water exists in the form of an object *per se*; as moisture or wetness, on the other hand, it is an adjective, a posited which does not possess its own self-subsistence; and the one determination as well as the other is external to it. Thus again the cause of a color is said to be a coloring-matter, a pigment, which is one and the same actuality as the color itself; at one time being taken in the external form of an active—that is to say, externally-connected with an activity different from it [*i. e.*, as cause]; and in the second place in the likewise external determination of an effect. The cause of a deed is the internal resolution in an active subject which as an external being has received through an action the internal resolution and is the same content and value. If the activity of a body is regarded as an effect its cause is an impelling force. But it is the same quantum of activity before and after the impulse—the same existence which the impelling body contains and imparts to the impelled body. So much as it imparts, so much it itself loses.

The cause, *e. g.*, the painter or the impelling body, has, it is true, other content besides—the former as the colors and the form combining them into paintings; the latter as an activity of determined strength and direction. But this latter content is a contingent matter not concerning the cause. What the painter possesses in other qualities is to be abstracted in considering him as cause of this painting—they have nothing to do with this painting; only those qualities of his which exhibit themselves in this effect are its cause, the rest is not cause. Thus, in the case of the impelling body whether it is stone or wood, green or yellow, etc., does not concern this impulse—in those qualities it is not cause here.

It is to be noted of this tautology of the causality-relation that it does not seem to contain tautology when only the remote causes of an effect are adduced and not the proximate ones. The change of

form which the subject that forms the basis suffers in this passage through several members of a series conceals the identity which is preserved in it. It connects itself in this multiplication of causes which enter between it and the ultimate effect, with other things and circumstances in such a manner that it is not the first member of the series which is called cause that contains the perfect effect, but only this series of causes taken together. So, for example, if a man came into circumstances such that he developed his talents, through the fact that he had lost his father, killed by a bullet in a battle, it would be possible to regard this shot, or in an ascending series, the battle, or the war, or the causes of the war, etc., *ad infinitum*, as the cause of the development of this man's talents. But it is evident that, for example, the shot in question is not the cause of this *intrinsically*, but that it is only the condition of it through its connection with other active determinations. In other words, it is not the cause, but only a single phase of the circumstances which gave it possibility.

In the next place, it is to be especially noted how inadequate is the application of the causal relation to phenomena of physical-organic and spiritual life. Here it is shown that what is called the cause has quite a different content from the effect; and for this reason that that which acts upon the vital is determined as independent of this and is changed and transformed, since vitality does not allow a cause to produce its effect, that is to say annuls it as cause. Therefore it is not proper to say that nourishment is the cause of the blood, or that articles of food or coldness or moisture is the cause of fever etc. And it is improper to speak of the Ionic climate as the cause of the Homeric poems, or to allege Cæsar's ambition as the cause of the destruction of the republican constitution of Rome. In history spiritual masses and individuals are in reciprocal determination with each other. It is the nature of mind in a far higher sense than the character of organic life to take up into itself something that originates in another; it does not allow it to continue its causal activity when within it, but it transmutes and transforms it. But these reciprocal relations belong to the stage of the Idea and will receive consideration with it [*i. e.*, in the Third part of this Logic].

It may be further remarked here that in so far as the necessary connection of cause and effect is conceded although not in its proper sense, the effect cannot be greater than the cause, for the effect is nothing but the manifestation of the cause. It is a play of wit, much resorted to in history, to explain great effects through small causes, and for a deep and widely prevailing event to allege an anecdote as the first cause. Such a cause so-called is nothing but an

occasion, an external incitement of which the internal spirit of the event did not stand in need, or it might have used any one of an innumerable multitude of others for the occasion of its manifestation. Conversely, it is to be regarded that the small and contingent has been determined by the great event as its occasion. That arabesque-painting of history which builds up a great shape on a slender stalk is therefore though brilliant only a superficial treatment. In this development of the great out of the small, the true order of things is inverted and spirit is made to take its occasion from external circumstance. But for this very reason this external is not conceived as a real cause in it—in other words this inversion itself annuls the causal relation.

2. But this determinateness of the causal relation that content and form are diverse and indifferent to each other, extends further. The form-determination is also the content-determination; cause and effect, the two sides of the relation, are therefore also another content. In other words, the content because it is only the content of a form, has its distinction within itself and is essentially diverse or varied [possessing variety within itself]. But since its form is the causal relation which is a content identical in cause and effect, the varied content is connected externally with the cause and with the effect; consequently it does not enter into the activity of the causal relation.

This external content is therefore outside of the necessary connection between cause and effect—it is an immediate existence. In other words, because as content it is the in-itself existent identity of cause and effect it is also immediate, existent identity. This is therefore something or other which possesses manifold determinations in its being, and among these the determination that it is in one respect a cause or an effect. The form-determinations, cause and effect, have their substrate in it; that is to say, have their essential subsistence—and each side has a special subsistence—for their identity is their subsistence. At the same time, however, it is its immediate subsistence, and not its subsistence as form-unity or as essential connection.

But this thing is not merely substrate, but also substance, for it is the identical self-subsistence only in the form of essential connection. Moreover, it is finite substance, for it is determined as immediate in opposition to its causality. But it has likewise causality, because it is identical only as this causal relation. As cause this substrate is negative relation to itself. But itself to which it relates is first a posited-being, because it is determined as an immediate actual.

This posited-being as content is some one determination. Secondly, the causality is external to it; this, consequently, makes its posited-being. Since it is now causal substance, its causality consists in this: to relate to itself negatively and therefore to its posited-being and external causality. The activity of this substance begins therefore from without, and emancipates itself from this external determination, and its return-into-itself is the preservation of its immediate existence and the annulment of its posited existence, and consequently of its causality.

Thus, a moving stone is a cause; its movement is a determination which it possesses — one among many determinations, such as color, shape, etc., which do not belong to its causality. Because its immediate existence is separated from its form-relation, *i. e.*, its causality, this form-relation is something external. Its movement and the causality which pertains to it is only a posited-being within it. But the causality is also its own. This is involved in the fact that its substantial self-subsistence is its identical relation to itself, but this is now defined as posited-being. It is therefore at the same time negative relation to itself. Its causality which is directed upon itself as upon the posited-being or an external, consists therefore in this, that it annuls it and by its removal returns into itself; consequently it is not self-identical in its posited-being, but it restores only its abstract independence. In other words, the rain is the cause of the moisture which is the same water as before. This water is determined as rain and cause, through the fact that the determination is posited in it by another. Another force or something has elevated the water into the air by evaporation and brought it together into a mass whose weight has made it fall. Its removal from the earth is a determination alien to its original identity with itself — its weight. Its causality consists in removing the same and in restoring that identity, and therewith annulling its causality.

The now considered second determinateness of causality belongs to the form; this connection is causality as self-external as primary independence which is at the same time in-itself-posed-being or effect. This union of the opposite determination as in an existent substrate constitutes the infinite regress in the series of causes. Beginning is made with the effect; this has a cause; the cause again has a cause, and so on. Why has the cause again a cause? That is, why is it that the same side which, previously determined as cause, is now determined as effect, and a new cause now demanded for it? On the ground that the cause is a finite, a determined; it is determined as one element of the form opposed to the effect as the

other element; hence it has its determinateness or negation outside of it. Precisely for this reason it is itself finite, has its determinateness on it, and is consequently posited-being, or effect. This, its identity, is also posited, but it is a third—the immediate substrate. Causality is therefore self-external, because its originality is here an immediateness. The form-distinction is therefore first determinateness and not yet determinateness posited as determinateness—it is existent other-being. Finite reflection holds fast to this immediate, removes the form-unity from it and makes it a cause in one respect and an effect in another; and on the other hand it transposes the form-unity into the realm of infinitude, and by this perpetual progress or regress from cause to cause it expresses its incompetency to attain and hold it.

With the effect it is the same case—or rather the infinite progress from cause to cause. In the latter the cause develops into an effect which has again another cause. Conversely, the effect becomes cause which again has an effect. The considered particular cause begins in an externality, and returns into its effect not as cause, but it loses its causality in it. Conversely, the effect arrives at a substrate which is substance, an original, self-relating subsistence. In it therefore this posited-being, becomes posited-being—*i. e.*, this substance, since an effect is posited in it, takes on the form of cause. But the mentioned first effect, the posited-being which was external to it is a different one from the second which is produced by it; for this second is determined as its reflection-into-itself, but the first one was an externality to it. But since the causality is here, the self-external causality, it returns, in its effect, not into itself. In its effect it becomes external, its effect is again posited-being in a substrate—as another substance—which reduces it to a posited-being, or manifests itself as a cause, and repels its effect again from itself, and so on in the infinite progress.

3. It is now for us to see what has become through the movement of the determination or limited causal relation. The formal causality exhausts itself in the effect; through this the identity of the two moments has arisen; with this the unity of the cause and the effect is only in-itself, and the form-relation is external to it. This identity is also immediate according to the two determinations of immediateness—first as being-in-itself, a content, to which causality comes externally; secondly, as an existing substrate in which cause and effect inhere as different form-determinations. These are in themselves one, but each is on account of this-in-itself, or the externality of form, self, hence in its unity with the other, deter-

mined also as other in opposition to it. Therefore the cause has an effect and is at the same time an effect itself; and the effect has not only a cause but is also itself a cause. But the effect which the cause has, and the effect which it is—likewise the cause which the effect has and the cause which it is—are different.

Through the movement of the limited causal relation it has resulted that the cause is extinguished not only in the effect, and with it the effect also, as in formal causality, but the cause in its extinction reappears again in the effect, and that the effect vanishes in the cause, but reappears again, likewise. Each of these determinations annuls itself in its positing and posits itself in its annulment. It is not an external transition of causality from one substrate to another, but this becoming-other is its own positing. Causality therefore presupposes itself, or conditions itself. The identity pre-existing merely-in-itself, the substrate, is therefore now determined as presupposition, or it is posited in opposition to the active causality, and the reflection (formerly external to the identity) stands now in essential connection with the same.

c. Action and Reaction.

Causality is presupposing activity. The cause is conditioned, it is the negative relation to itself as presupposed, as external other, which however is in itself, but only in itself, causality. It is, as we have seen, the substantial identity into which formal causality passes over, that has now determined itself in opposition to it as its negative. In other words, it is the same as the substance of the causality-relation, but which stands in opposition to the power of accidentality as self-subsstantial activity. It is the passive substance. That which is passive is the immediate, or in-itself-existing which is not also for-itself: the pure being or the essence which is only in this determinateness of abstract self-identity. To the passive stands in opposition the active substance as negative self-relation. It is the cause, in so far as it has restored itself from the effect in the limited, specialized causality, through the negation of itself—and which is active as a positing in its other-being, *i. e.*, as immediate—and through its negation mediates itself through itself. On this account causality has no longer any substrate in which it inheres and is not form-determination opposed to this identity, but is itself the substance, or the ultimate and original is only causality. The substrate is the passive substance which has presupposed itself.

The cause now acts; for it is the negative power related to itself;

at the same time it is presupposed by it; hence it acts upon itself as though itself were another — upon itself as upon passive substance. Consequently, in the first place it annuls its other-being and returns within it into itself. Secondly, it determines the same, and posits this annulment of its other-being, or the return-into-itself as a determinateness. This posited-being, for the reason that it is at the same time its return into itself, is, in the first place, its effect. But, conversely, because it determines itself as its other, presupposing it, it posits the effect in the other, the passive substance. In other words, because the passive substance is itself the duplicated, namely, an independent other, and at the same time is a presupposed, and in itself already identical with the active cause, the activity of this passive substance is also double. Both phases of activity are in one, the annulment of its being-determined, namely, its condition, or the annulment of the independence of the passive substance; and besides this, that it annuls its identity with the same, and consequently presupposes itself or posits itself as other. Through the last moment the passive substance is preserved; the first annulment of it manifests itself in relation to it, in such a manner that only a few of the determinations are annulled in it, and their identity with the first in the effect becomes external to it.

In so far it suffers external compulsion. The external compulsion is the manifestation of the power, or the power as external. But the power is external only in so far as the causal substance is presupposing in its activity at the same time that it is positing — *i. e.*, it posits itself as annulled. Conversely, therefore, the act of external compulsion is an act of the power. It is only another, presupposed by itself, that the external-compulsory cause acts upon — its effect on it is negative relation to itself, or it is the manifestation of itself. The passive is the independent, which is only a posited — something broken in itself — an actuality which is conditioned, and the condition now in its truth, namely, an actuality which is only a possibility, or, conversely, a being-in-itself which is only the determinateness of the being-in-itself, only passive. Hence that upon which the external compulsion is exerted not only may be subject to violence but must be. That which exerts compulsion upon the other does it because it is the power of the same which manifests itself and the other in it. The passive substance is posited only through the external compulsion as that which it is in truth, namely, because it is the simple positive or immediate substance, and for this reason is only a posited. The presupposition which is its condition is the appearance of immediateness, which appearance the active causality removes from it.

The passive substance is therefore given its dues only through the influence of another constraining force. What it loses is the mentioned immediateness—the substantiality foreign to it. What it receives as a foreign, namely, the being-determined as a posited-being is its own determination, but since it is now posited in its posited-being or in its own determination it is not annulled through this, but it goes into identity with itself, and is therefore, in this activity of becoming, determined, primitive independence. The passive substance is therefore, on the one hand, preserved or posited through the active, namely, in so far as the latter makes itself merely an annulled activity—but on the other hand it is the doing of the passive itself, to go into identity with itself and consequently to make itself primitive independence and cause. The being-positing through another and its own becoming is the same thing.

Through the fact that the passive substance has inverted itself into a cause; the effect is annulled within it. This constitutes its reaction in general. It is in itself the posited-being as passive substance; also the posited-being is posited within it through the other substance in so far, namely, as it received on it the effect. Its reaction contains therefore two phases: (1) That it is posited as what it is in itself, and (2) that it exhibits itself in its being-in-itself as that which it is posited. It is in-itself posited-being, and therefore it receives an effect upon it through the other. But this posited-being is, conversely, its own being-in-itself, hence this is its effect and it exhibits itself as cause.

Secondly, the reaction is opposed to the first-acting cause. The effect which the previously passive substance annuls within itself is, namely, that effect of the first-acting cause. The cause has however its substantial actuality only in its effect. And since this is annulled its causal substantiality is also annulled. This takes place first in itself and through itself when it becomes effect; in this identity its negative determination vanishes, and it becomes passive. Secondly, this happens through that which was formerly passive, but is now the reacting substance which annuls its effect. In the limited causality, the substance upon which it acts becomes also again the cause, it acts therefore against the activity which has posited it as an effect. But it does not react against that cause, but it posits its effect again in another substance, and thus the progress of effects *ad infinitum* presents itself. For the reason that the cause here in its effect is first self-identical only in-itself, and, therefore, on the one hand, it vanishes into an immediate identity in its inactivity; on the other hand, it arouses its activity, again, in another substance.

In the limited causality, on the other hand, the cause relates to itself in the effect, because it is its other as condition, as presupposed, and its action is therefore just as much a becoming of its other as it is a positing and annulling of the other.

Moreover it stands in this relation as passive substance. But, as we saw, it originates through the effect that has been produced upon it as primitive substance. The mentioned first cause which acts, and receives its effect as reaction upon itself, appears again therefore as a cause; and by this the activity which in the finite causality extends into the infinite progress, is redirected toward its origin and returns into itself, and becomes an infinite reciprocal-action.

C.

Reciprocal Action.

In finite causality there are substances which act upon each other. Mechanism consists in this externality of causality in which the cause is reflected into itself in its effect, and is a repelling being. In other words, the identity which has the causal substance, and its effect within it, remains immediately self-external, and the effect passes over into another substance. In reciprocal action, this mechanism is annulled; for it contains in the first place the vanishing of that original persistence of immediate substantiality. In the second place, it involves the origination of the cause, and hence the primitive independence mediates itself through its negation.

Reciprocal action first exhibits itself as opposite causal activity proceeding from substances that are presupposed and self-conditioning. Each one of them is opposed to the other as active and at the same time as passive substance. Since both are passive as well as active, each of these distinctions is annulled. It is a perfectly transparent appearance. They are substances only in so far as they are the identity of the active and passive. Reciprocal action is therefore still an empty form and mode. It needs only an external combination of that which is just as well in itself as posited.

In the first place, there are no longer any substrates which stand in relation to each other, but they are substances. In the activity of the conditioned causality the other presupposed immediateness is annulled, and the conditioning of the causal activity is only an influence from without, or it is its own passivity. This influence from without, however, does not come from another original substance but from a causality which conditions through external

influence, or is a mediated causality. This is external, in the first place—it comes to the cause, and constitutes its side of passivity, and is therefore mediated through itself; it is produced through its own activity, and hence it is passivity posited through its own activity. Causality is conditioned and conditioning; the conditioning is the passive, but the conditioned is also passive. This conditioning or the passivity is the negation of the cause by itself, since it essentially makes itself into effect, and by this very act becomes cause. The cause has not only an effect, but in the effect it stands in relation to itself as cause.

Through this, causality has returned into its absolute ideal, and has become the idea itself [idea = *Begriff*, the totality of a process in its three phases of universal, particular, and individual *i. e.* of determining, determined and self-determined]. It is in the first place, real necessity. It is absolute identity with itself, so that the distinction of necessity is opposed to the inter-related determinations within it—substances, free actualities, opposed to each other. Necessity is in this way, the internal identity. Causality is its manifestation in which its appearance of substantial other-being has been annulled, and the necessity is elevated to freedom. In reciprocal action, the original causality presents itself as arising from its negation, passivity, and as vanishing also into this passivity and becoming the passivity. But this happens in such a manner that the becoming is, at the same time, a mere appearance. The transition into another is reflection into itself. The negation which is the ground of the cause is its positive return into self-identity.

Necessity and causality have therefore vanished in this result. They contain both the immediate identity as connection and relation and the absolute substantiality of the distinct somewhats, and consequently their absolute contingency. This is the primitive independent unity of substantial multiplicity; hence absolute contradiction. Necessity is the being which is because it is; the unity of being with itself which is its own ground; but, conversely, because it has a ground it is not being, it is only appearance—relation or mediation. Causality is this posited transition of original independent being, the cause, into appearance or mere posited-being—and conversely, of posited-being into original independence. But the identity of being and appearance is still internal necessity. This internality or this being-in-itself is annulled by the activity of causality. In this activity, substantiality loses its sides, which stand in essential connection—and necessity conceals itself. Necessity does not through this become freedom—*i. e.*, through the fact that it vanishes—but

through the fact that its internal identity is manifested. This is a manifestation which is the identical movement of the distinct phases within it—the reflection of appearance, as appearance, into itself. Conversely, contingency becomes freedom through this; the sides of necessity which have the form of free actualities not appearing in each other [not mutually dependent] are now posited as identity, so that these totalities of reflection-into-itself appear in their difference only as identical, or are posited only as one and the same reflection.

The absolute substance distinguishing itself from itself as absolute form, therefore, does not any longer repel itself as necessity, nor does it fall asunder as contingency into indifferent substances external to each other; but it distinguishes itself, on the one hand, (1) into the totality which is the primitive independent (that was the formerly passive substance), and is the reflection out of determinateness into itself, as a simple whole which contains its posited-being in itself, and, in this, is posited as self-identical; this is the UNIVERSAL [*das Allgemeine*]. In the second place (this self-distinction) is the (2) totality (which was formerly the causal substance), and which is likewise the reflection out of determinateness into itself as negative determinateness, and which is therefore the whole as self-identical determinateness, but is now posited as self-identical negativity;—this is THE INDIVIDUAL [*das Einzelne*]. But since the Universal is only self-identical inasmuch as it contains the determinateness within itself as annulled, and is therefore the negative as negative, it is immediately the same negativity that Individuality is. And the Individuality, because it is the particularized determination [the determined determination], which is the negative as negative, is immediately the same identity that Universality is. This its simple identity is particularity which retains from the Individual the moment of determinateness and from the Universal the moment of reflection-into-itself, and holds these in immediate unity. These three totalities are therefore one and the same reflection, which as negative self-relation distinguishes itself into Universality and Individuality, but inasmuch as the distinction is a perfectly transparent one—a determinate simplicity, or a simple determinateness—it is one and the same identity. This is the IDEA [*Begriff*], THE REALM OF SUBJECTIVITY, OR OF FREEDOM.

ANAL B.
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Essence

(A) Essence as Reflection into itself.

- A. - Essential and Non-essential.
- B. - Essence and Appearance Being reflected
Unreflected
and
Appearance
 - (1) Appearance as Immediate Negation
 - (2) Appearance as Mediated negation
- C. - Essence as Reflection (Positing of negativity)
 - (1) Positing reflection
 - (2) External reflection
 - (3) Internal reflection
 - (4) Identity
 - (5) Variation
 - Formal Variation
 - Qualitative
 - Quantitative
 - (6) Transformation

itself

Determinations
of
Reflection

3. Ground

- (a) Absolute Ground
 - (1) Form & Essence
 - (2) Form & Matter
 - (3) Form & Content
- (b) Particular Ground
 - (1) Formal Ground
 - (2) Real Ground
 - (3) Perfect Ground
- (c) Condition
 - (1) Relatively Unconditioned
 - (2) Absolutely Unconditioned
 - (3) The Thing

(2^d) Phenomenon.

A - Existence

- (1) - Thing and its properties.
 - (a) Thing in itself.
 - (b) Properties of thing
 - (c) Interaction between things

- (2) - Thing and matter.

- (3) - Dissolution of thing

B - Phenomenon

- (a) Law of Phenomenon

- (b) Phenomenal world and world in itself

- (c) Dissolution of Phenomenon

C - Essential Relation

- (1) - Whole and Parts.

- (2) - Force & Manifestation

- (a) Condition of force

- (b) The soliciting force

- (c) The influence of force

- (3) Internal & External

3^d) Actuality

- A - The Absolute
 - (a) Exposition of the Absolute
 - (b) - The Absolute Attribute
 - (c) - The modes of the Absolute
- B - Actuality
 - (a) Contingency - Formal & Causal Possibility, Objectivity
 - (b) Relative Actuality - Real Actuality, Possibility, Objectivity
 - (c) Absolute Actuality

C - Reciprocal Relation

- (a) Substantiarity

- (b) Causality
 - (1) Formal Causality
 - (2) Specialized Causality

- (c) Reciprocal Action



